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Abstract 
To ensure the integrity of the arbitral process and protect the public 
interest, the courts must support and supervise that process. On the other 
hand, to prevent the confidence of users of the arbitral system from being 
damaged, the level of judicial control should not be too high. Given 
China s developing trade relations, it is crucial for Chinese law to 
reconcile these two aims, so that both domestic and foreign users may 
have confidence in the Chinese system. 
This thesis compares Chinese law with sophisticated modem models in 
the form of the Arbitration Act 1996 in England, and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which has been 
adopted in Scotland. Comparison of the role of the court under these 
three systems shows that Chinese law fails to offer proper support and 
supervision in certain areas, while unduly restricting the arbitral 
autonomy in others. The Arbitration Act 1996 and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law are excellent models pointing up the directions in which 
Chinese arbitration law might be reformed. The thesis suggests a number 
of reforms which might achieve an appropriate balance between the 
autonomy of the arbitral process and the legitimate interests of the 
Chinese legal system, allowing China to become a modern, attractive 
arbitral forum, to the benefit of its developing trade relations. 
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Arbitration is a device whereby parties to a legal dispute agree to refer it 
to the binding resolution of one or more persons. In China, although the 
process of asking a third party to decide a dispute has a long history, 
arbitration in proper sense has not existed until recently. Arbitration 
legislation first appeared early in the 1990's, the first legislative version 
concerning arbitration, the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic 
of China being produced in 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the "PRC 
Civil Procedure Law 1991 "), and the Arbitration Law of the People's 
Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "PRC Arbitration Law 
1994") only being promulgated in 1994 and coming into force in 1995. 
Even now, in many areas of the law the provisions are far from perfect. It 
will be seen that many provisions are obscure or contradictory, that there 
are overlapping legislative regimes and supervisory jurisdictions, and 
that agencies of the state play a very intrusive role in the arbitral process. 
Reform would be useful to benefit domestic users of the system. 
However, given China's developing trade relations, reform is vital if 
foreign users are to have confidence in the Chinese system. Foreign 
parties would struggle to understand how the system operates and would 
be alarmed by much of what they did understand. There may be room for 
the Chinese system to be extensively modernized, placing proper 
emphasis on principles such as the autonomy of the parties and the 
freedom of the arbitral process from improper state interference. 
Fortunately, arbitral systems across the world have been so modernized 
over the last two decades as a result of the influence of the Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the 
`Model Law') which was adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as 
`UNCITRAL') on June 21,1985. This thesis will consider whether the 
Model Law, which has been adopted in Scotland, and more recent and 
comprehensive measures such as the English Arbitration Act 1996 have 
lessons for China. 
Every system must concede a role to its judicial authorities, not only in 
terms of assistance and support, but also supervision of that process. On 
the other hand, if the level of judicial control is too high, the confidence 
of users of the system will be damaged. Foreign parties may indeed 
choose to avoid arbitrating in such a system. Consequently, it is crucial 
to reconcile the autonomy of the arbitration process with the interest of 
national courts in ensuring the integrity of process and the protection of 
public interest. It will be argued that China often fails to offer proper 
support and supervision in some areas, while unduly restricting the 
autonomy in others. 
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The areas to be explored are, 
9 The arbitration agreement and its form. - Will the law permit 
separate arbitration agreements as well as arbitration clauses, and if so, 
will there be any consequences which flow from the different form? Will 
all arbitration agreements have to have a certain fundamental content? 
Will the law say anything about the incorporation of arbitration 
agreements from other contracts? 
" the staying of legal proceedings. - How should the law direct a 
court to react, when a party to litigation pleads the existence of an 
arbitration agreement? Must it stay the proceedings or will it have 
discretion? When should it have discretion? 
9 the creation of the arbitral tribunal. - Should the law have rules as to 
the number of arbitrators, and who should be allowed to be an arbitrator? 
Surely it should have default rules to deal with situations where the 
parties have not agreed upon key specifics of the arbitral tribunal or 
where the procedures agreed by the parties break down? 
" the revocation of arbitral authority and its consequences. I will 
discuss in the part about disqualifications and challenges, removal of 
arbitrator by the court, time for challenge, responses to challenge. 
" the arbitral immunity. Should arbitrators have complete immunity, and 
if not for what manner of behaviour and to what extent should they be 
liable? 
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" the jurisdictional matters and the doctrine of separability. Should the 
arbitral tribunal have the competence to rule on its own competence? 
Should an arbitration clause in the principal contract remain valid where 
that contract turns out to be invalid? 
" the conduct of the proceeding, including the powers of the tribunal 
and the courts. The issues dealt with here are discretion of the 
parties/arbitral tribunal, the opportunity of being treated equally and 
presenting his case, evidence, location of arbitral proceedings, power to 
order interim measures of protection, language, statements of claim and 
defence, supplementary claims and defences, form and scope of 
hearings, advance notice of hearings and meetings, copies of evidential 
material. 
" the arbitral award. The contents include the types of award, 
substance of award, e. g. power to award damages and interest, power 
to award expense, power to make other orders, delivery of the award, 
correction of award, effect of an award. 
" challenging awards. Unlike other literatures on this subject, my 
research will not just discuss the grounds and procedures for challenging 
an award, but also elaborate the substantial principles to resolve the 
challenges, including comprehensive references to the sources of each 
individual principle, and the theoretical underpinnings of the remitting 




BACKGROUND OF CHINESE ARBITRATION 
LAW 
The reason why Chinese arbitration law takes its current form is mainly 
because of Chinese traditional legal culture and the historical 
development of Chinese legislation. Chinese traditional legal culture is 
closely related to Chinese traditional culture, being affected by its 
economic base and polity. 
I. Tradition and Culture 
Before the ending of the Qing Dynasty (the Qing Dynasty was the last 
dynasty of Chinese feudal history, and ended in 1911), Chinese feudal 
society had existed for more than two thousand years, based on a 
centralized feudal monarchy. A Centralized feudal monarchy needs a 
steady and powerful ideology as a theoretical support. Furthermore, in 
Chinese feudal society, the autarkic `smallholder economy' (also called 
the natural economy) is the main form of economy. Its characteristics 
were decentralization, conservatism, and stability. As a result of 
decentralization relationships between producers were very weak. The 
strongest organization in society was the governing group. The strongest 
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relations were those within the governing group and between that group 
and the governed. The emperor carried out high-level systematization 
within the governing group across a huge territory. ' Moreover, due to 
their conservatism and desire for stability, people were accustomed to 
defer to authority. 
Commodity exchange was extremely underdeveloped, so that there was 
no basis for a society ruled by law to come into being. In the process of 
production, the basic unit was the family, the aim of production being to 
satisfy its needs. Individuals did not exchange merchandise. As a result, 
it was impossible for the basic principle of exchange, which is the 
principle of equality, to come into being. Neither were individual rights 
recognized. The order of production being based on the status of the 
family, the status of individual person was of no importance. The basic 
obligation of individuals was obedience. Civil and commercial law, 
dealing with production and exchange between equals, could not come 
into being where there was no equality2. Thus no civil or commercial 
law existed in China before the end of the feudal period. 
Chinese traditional culture has a profound content. Some of that content 
is splendid, but some was not beneficial for the development of Chinese 
1Li, Peizhi/Zhao, Fujiang & Wang, Xiuying, `The Defects of Chinese Traditional Legal Culture and 
the Constitution ofA Modem Society Ruled by Law', 23 (5) Hebei Law Science 2005,157-158. 
2 Tian, Wei & Gao, Hong, `Chinese Traditional Legal Culture in the Process of Making the Society 
Ruled by Law', 5(2) Journal of Hebei Vocational College of Public Security Police 2005,32. 
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law. In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods 770-221 B. C., 
a school of thought called Confucianism emerged in China. The 
philosophy of Confucianism had the most profound historic significance 
for Chinese culture, and inevitably impacted on Chinese legal culture. 
Even today the philosophy of Confucianism plays an important role in 
Chinese life, and to some degree hampers the process of the legal 
modernization of China. Firstly, Confucianists advocated vigorously the 
three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues as specified in the 
feudal ethical code. The three guides are: the ruler guides the subject, 
the father guides his son, and the husband guides his wife. The five 
constant virtues are benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and 
fidelity. The effect of the guides and virtues is that individuals forfeit 
personality. The will of the individuals is subordinate to the will of the 
family. This philosophy still influences contemporary Chinese law, 
including arbitration law, in that its says little about rights, but much 
about obligations. Chinese arbitration law infringes the principle of 
party autonomy more often than the Model Law or the 1996 Act. 
Secondly, Confucianists also emphasized that morality should be 
regarded as important and economic benefit unimportant. Morality and 
individual economic benefit were regarded as mutually opposed to each 
other. The notion of individual rights was suffocated. The notion of 
obligation prevailed. As a result, even today, parties' rights and 
autonomy are not protected well by Chinese law. Thirdly, in traditional 
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culture, the harmony of people and providence ('the will of the sky'), of 
people and society, and of people and nature was regarded as very 
important. The notion that providence and people were integrated and 
should work together is in the mainstream of Chinese traditional culture. 
The sky, land, everything on earth, and the people are an integrated 
entity; with the sky dominating that entity. It was for the emperor to 
actualize the entity. The emperor was regarded as dominating the people 
and everything on earth on behalf of the sky. Therefore, people must 
obey the will of the emperor, and the emperor was supposed to obey 
providence3. The ancient Chinese people believed that referring disputes 
to litigation would disturb the harmony of both society and the universe. 
Moreover, to protect popular harmony within the people and avoid 
hurting each other's feelings people preferred to resolve problems by 
conciliation, rather than referring disputes to litigation. Fourthly, 
Confucianists deemed ethics as the most effective means of regulating 
popular behavior, as they resonated in peoples' minds. By contrast, they 
deemed law, which is enforced through the exercise of power, as 
inauthentic, unilateral, and of limited effect. In their opinion, although 
law can force a person to do or refrain from doing something, it cannot 
make a person act on his own initiative. Thus, in their eyes, law was 
much less effective than ethics. 4 This is why Chinese civil and 
3 Li, Peizhi/Zhao, Fujiang & Wang, Xiuying, `The Defects of Chinese Traditional Legal Culture and 
the Constitution ofA Modem Society Ruled by Law', 23 (5) Hebei Law Science 2005,158. 
4 Zhu Chanlin, `Reform in China's Traditional Legal Culture', 2 Journal of Qing Hai Junior 
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commercial law (including arbitration law) is under-developed even 
though Chinese cultural history is very long. Fifthly, Confucianists 
considered that language and writing are simply tools to express feelings, 
and thus less important than inner experience. Sometimes, certain things 
can only be understood by the heart, and cannot be expressed verbally. 
Although this view might be beneficial for the development of Chinese 
literature and art, it is harmful for that of Chinese law. Many Chinese 
laws are thus much terser and oversimplified in comparison with the 
laws of other countries. 
Moreover, in Chinese traditional legal culture, there was no concept that 
rational and just procedure is necessary for resolution of disputes. 
Consequently, legislators have not given much attention to questions of 
arbitral procedure, so that procedural rules in the Chinese arbitration law 
have many defects. 
The emperor dominated ancient China. His will was law, and could not 
be questioned. 5 The highest power in the country was thus unrestricted. 
Officials would carry out his will. The different ranks of officials 
themselves had different privileges. The higher the rank of the official 
was, the more privileges he would have. Those privileges also apply to 
Teachers' College, 2005,95. 
5 Ke, Wei, 'A Creative Evolution: From Traditional Legal System to Modern Legal System', 25(1) 
Inner Mongolia Social Science 2004,73. 
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his family members. By contrast, the common people were simply the 
objects of the law. Thus, not every one was equal before the law. The 
law was simply a tool to control the people. The idea that common 
people should be ruled and controlled by government still influences 
today's Chinese arbitration law. For example, many issues which would 
be more sensible for the arbitral tribunal to determine are actually 
controlled by a public institution known as an arbitration agency. 
II. Historical Development 
During the Qing Dynasty its government appointed a very learned 
scholar, Shen Jiaben, as judicatory He perused European, American and 
Japanese Codes, as well as the current legal doctrines of these countries, 
borrowing those provisions which suited the monarchy of China for the 
laws of the Qing Dynasty. He created a new framework of constitutional 
and criminal law. Yet this led to a conflict inside the government, which 
was called `conflict between ethics and law'. In this conflict, Shen 
Jiaben and his supporters claimed that the new framework of 
constitutional and criminal law was beneficial for China. However, 
many other officials disagreed with them, claiming that a rights based 
framework infringed Chinese tradition. This conflict ended was only 
resolved by all parties accepting that the new framework would be 
6 Li, Guangyu, `A Comparison on the Characteristics of Chinese Law with Those of Western Law', 
24 Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities (Humanities and Social Science Edition) 
2004,155. 
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ignored in practice. This experience suggests that Western law based on 
commodity exchange cannot easily be transplanted to the Chinese 
`smallholder economy'. Although an important legal reform had 
seemingly been effected, nothing really changed. The smallholder 
economy remained, while commodity exchange was still very 
underdeveloped. The way of life and mode of though of the people did 
not change. People still resolved disputes by virtue of village rules, 
nongovernmental agreements and ethics and morality as of old. No one 
used the new law. Thus there was no condition for the new framework 
of constitutional and criminal law to be put into practice. Yet although 
these political reforms failed, the new laws promoted the transformation 
of Chinese legal system. 
After the end of the Qing Dynasty, the Northern Warlords (1912-1927) 
employed the new laws, except for those provisions which conflicted 
with democracy. Thus in 1925, the government made the first Civil Law 
in Chinese history, based on those laws. After the Kuomintang 
Government replaced that of the Northern Warlords, it continued to use 
the Civil Law rules and resultant case law. From 1929 to 1931 the 
Kuomintang compiled a set of Six Codes, governing such matters as the 
Constitution, Civil Law, Criminal Law, Civil Procedure, Criminal 
Procedure, and Court Organization. This was based on the Civil Law of 
the Northern Warlords and the legal systems of continental Europe. 
11 
Essentially, the Codes were the fruit of the combined wisdom of the law 
experts of the Qing Dynasty, the Northern Warlords, and the 
Kuomintang, based on researching into the law and folk-customs of the 
country. The Codes continued to be used during the War of Resistance 
Against Japan (1937-1945) and the War of Liberation (1945-1949). In 
1949, since the Communist Party considered that its ideological 
difference from the Kuomintang should be emphasized, the six Codes 
were abolished. This abolition led to discontinuity in Chinese civil law. 
In October of 1949, the PRC was founded. Under the guidance of 
`making class struggle first', no Kuomintang law, nor law which had 
any element of either the feudal society of the old China or western 
capitalism could be used. This included the set of six Codes. Thus the 
legislation of the PRC had to start from scratch, and the level of 
legislative activity was very low. Although from 1954 to 1978 three 
constitutions were promulgated, each was simply an expression of 
policy, neither regulating the behavior of the government, nor protecting 
the rights of individuals. 
To begin with, there were a lot of law experts in the PRC. Some had 
joined the Communist Party due to their dissatisfaction with the 
Kuomintang Government. These law experts were initially appointed as 
important officials after the liberation. Unfortunately, they soon came to 
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be criticized and attacked as `counterrevolutionaries', and were cleared 
out of the Communist Party, being replaced by people who knew 
nothing about law and were not well educated. During the counterattack 
in 1957 against the bourgeois Right, even professors in university law 
schools were attacked and cleared out of the universities. Thereafter, law 
was not taught in any university. 
In 1958 the first national economic plan was launched. In this the leader 
of the country considered law as a hindrance, believing that holding 
meetings or issuing policy which might adapt itself to changing 
conditions was more effective and convenient than making binding legal 
rules. The economy became a `planned economy', an economy 
controlled by government or even by the leadership, an approach in 
conflict with the essence of law. 
It worth mentioning the `Great Cultural Revolution', which lasted for 
more than ten years (1966-1978). It was a disaster for China, damaging 
its economy and law. During this period, law itself became the target of 
attack. All law, including the `new' law which was established by the 
Communist Party itself was completely abolished. 7 Thus in that period, 
there was no law in China. The words of Chairman Mao were regarded 
as mandatory and must be obeyed. Where disputes arose, they could not 
7 Wen Qi, `On the Conflicts and Fusions between Chinese legal tradition and Western legal tradition', 
4 Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law 2006,27-29. 
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be resolved unless the parties resolved them by themselves. The `Great 
Cultural Revolution' made China a complete mess. 
Because of the factors described above, Chinese law did not advance 
even a little from 1949-1978. This is one main reason why Chinese law 
is so underdeveloped, comparing to the law of the West. 
The Chinese legislative process did not resume until the end of the Great 
Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping became the leader and introduced 
the guiding principles that democracy should be developed and 
legislation should be strengthened. From 1979, legislation, legal 
education, and the operation of the legal system regained importance. 
Deng Xiaoping opened a door for the Chinese people to learn from the 
Wes. Economic reform began in the 1980s, with the planned economy 
being formally abandoned in 1992, and the aim of the reform the 
economy being defined as system the establishing of a `socialist market 
economy'. 
The former legal system based on a planned economy was clearly 
unsuitable for the development of the market economy. Lessons could 
clearly be learned from the legal systems of western countries with 
developed market economies. Neither traditional Chinese law which 
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emphasised ethics and was characterized by the exercise of feudal power, 
nor socialist law which emphasised obligation and was characterized by 
a planned economy, can provide a legal model for a socialist market 
economy. A market requires to be regulated by law. People who compete 
in the market must know that the rules of the game will be obeyed. 
These rules are law. Western countries have well-developed market 
competition and so their laws regulating that competition are also very 
developed. Given the pace at which economic change must be achieved, 
it has proved much more convenient to adopt effective rules from the 
laws of western countries than to develop original Chinese rules. 
When any sort of market economy is introduced, disputes will invariably 
arise between individual economic actors, and an effective means of 
resolving those disputes must be available. Parties may prefer not to 
resort to the courts, particularly if they are foreign parties. Arbitration 
is a mechanism which allows disputes to be conclusively adjudicated 
without need for reference to the courts, and thus is particularly valuable 
in an emergent market economy with developing foreign trade relations. 
A well-developed arbitration law is thus vital to the development of the 
Chinese economy. There were and there still are many defects of the 
Chinese arbitration law and the Chinese arbitration system. For example, 
although from the 1980s, foreign arbitration in China followed the 
principle that arbitration is a non-governmental activity which should be 
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chosen by the parties, and that an arbitration award is final, 8 before the 
promulgation of the Arbitration Law, domestic arbitration in China was 
very much controlled by administrative bodies. 
Supervision of arbitrations involving Chinese and foreign parties was 
inaugurated in the 1950s. In 1954 the Government Administration 
Council passed a `Decision' which established an arbitration 
commission for external trade within the international trade promotion 
commission, formulating temporary Regulations to govern its operation. 
In December 1958 the State Council passed another `Decision' 
establishing the maritime arbitration commission within the 
international trade promotion commission, along with corresponding 
arbitration rules. From the beginning, foreign arbitration in China 
followed the principle that arbitration is a non-governmental activity 
which should be chosen by the parties, and that an arbitration award is 
final. 9 However, the historical development of domestic arbitration is 
more complex. Between 1955 and 1966, the parties to economic 
contracts could only apply to the economic arbitration commission to 
resolve disputes by arbitration. The court was not allowed to deal with 
such disputes. A party who disagreed with the arbitral award could only 
appeal to the higher administrative department. The practice of resolving 
9 Cheng, Zhongqian, 'Origination from, Development of and Prospects for Arbitration', 9 Journal of 
Arbitration Research of the Guangzhou Arbitration Commission 2005,47. 
9 Cheng, Zhongqian, 'Origination from, Development of and Prospects for Arbitration', 9 Journal of 
Arbitration Research of the Guangzhou Arbitration Commission 2005,47. 
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contractual disputes by administrative measures is typical of a highly 
planned economy. From 1978-1982, before the promulgation of the 
Economic Contract Law, although China resumed arbitration, the system 
was confused and there was no uniform procedure. According to the 
`Combined Notice as to Several Problems of Managing Economic 
Contracts' and the `Trial Regulation of Contract Arbitral Procedure of 
Industrial and Commercial Administrative management Departments' 
both issued by the Industrial and Commercial administrative General 
Department on 8 September 1979 and 2 May 1980, that body would 
arbitrate any dispute. It can be seen that state agencies were playing a 
role as arbitrators at this stage. Confusingly, it would hold 2 sets of 
proceedings, and a party might only appeal to the Court if he disagreed 
with the second arbitral award which was the final award. However, 
once the Economic Contract Law was passed, a dispute could no longer 
be arbitrated twice. There was only one arbitral award, which was final, 
subject to an appeal to the Court. Indeed after the passing of the new 
Economic Contract Law in 1993, an appeal to the court was no longer 
open. 
Before the promulgation of the Arbitration Law 1994, arbitration could 
only be conducted through arbitration agencies, which in turn were 
attached to administrative organs. Thus arbitration agencies dealing with 
economic contracts were attached to industrial and commercial 
17 
administrative management departments; those dealing with real estate 
were attached to real estate management departments; those dealing 
with technology contracts were attached to technology commissions; 
and those dealing with dispute arising from labour relations were 
attached to labour administration departments. In fact, the parties were 
not entitled to appoint arbitrators. The arbitrators were the officers of 
those departments. Thus, essentially, the government exercised 
significant control over arbitration. Moreover, before the passing of the 
Arbitration Law, there were 14 statutes, 82 administrative regulations, 
and 190 local regulations dealing with arbitration, although most of the 
regulations dealt with administrative rather than economic arbitration. 
Additionally, an arbitration agreement was not a necessary pre-condition 
for commencing a commercial arbitration. Where there was no 
arbitration agreement before or even after a dispute arose, a party was 
still allowed to refer the dispute to arbitration. The fact that arbitration 
was an administratively directed activity was conflict with the principle 
of party autonomy, removing a key advantage of arbitration, as seen 
from the common international standpoint. 10 Fortunately, after the 
promulgation of the Arbitration Law 1994, state agencies stopped 
appointing arbitrators and playing a role in the arbitration process. 
Article 8 of the Arbitration Law provides that an arbitration shall be 
conducted independently according to law, free from interference by 
10 Cheng, Zhongqian, `Origination from, Development of and Prospects for Arbitration', 9 
Journal of Arbitration Research of the Guangzhou Arbitration Commission 2005,48. 
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administrative organs, social groups or individuals. Article 14 provides 
that an arbitration commission shall be independent of and not be 
subordinate to any administrative organ. 11 Furthermore, the parties are 
entitled to appoint arbitrators and party autonomy has been protected in 
this regard. However, As a result of historical development of arbitration 
in China, even nowadays, some of the legislators still retain the idea that 
arbitration is an administrative activity which requires to be controlled. 
Accordingly some provisions of arbitration law do not protect party 
autonomy sufficiently, while arbitration agencies continue to have too 
much power. Even the Arbitration Law 1994 shares these defects and 
others. 
III. Policy Debate 
In 1991, the Legality Working Commission of the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress embarked on a project to create a new 
arbitration law. During the process of research and consultation, six 
issues were examined in detail - the question of arbitrability, the role of 
arbitration agencies, the position of arbitration agreements, how 
jurisdictional issues should be resolved, the relationship between 
arbitration and litigation, and the degree ' of state supervision of 
arbitration. After full discussion, the Arbitration Law was passed in 
11 Article 14 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
19 
August, 1994.12 Certainly, the policy debates during the process of law 
making might determine more directly the content of the arbitration law. 
Unfortunately, the details of the policy debates as to the Chinese 
arbitration law are confidential, so that no definitive answer can be 
given as to why the law adopted its particular form. 
It can be seen that, by reason of the culture and tradition of China, 
commercial law, including arbitration law, was not well developed and 
in particular no arbitration law existed before the constitution of the 
PRC. After that constitution of the PRC and before the promulgation of 
the Arbitration Law 1994 and the accompanying CIETAC Rules, 
although there were some arbitral regulation or rules, they were just odd 
and unreasonable. While the Arbitration Law 1994 and CIETAC Rules 
are much better than the previous regulation or rules, they are still far 
from perfect. 
The United Kingdom is a developed western country and its arbitration 
laws are extremely developed. It is submitted that it is particularly useful 
to look to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which may be followed, 
as it offers two models for consideration - the Arbitration Act 1996 in 
England (the 1996 Act), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
12 The Civil Law Office of the Legality Working Commission of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress and the Secretary Office of CIETAC (eds). All sets of the Arbitration Law 
of the PRC. Beijing: Publishing house of Law, 1995,13. 
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International Commercial Arbitration (the Model Law), which has been 
adopted in Scotland. At first sight it may seem odd to suggest that China 
might seek to borrow legislative models from a very different social and 
legal order. However, the UNCITRAL Model Law is, of course, not 
Scottish, but a legislative framework which has been specifically 
devised to be adaptable to the widest possible variety of legal cultures. 
Equally, the English Arbitration Act, which in large measure is directly 
inspired by the Model Law, marks a significant departure for the English 
legal system, going against the grain of much of the previous law. To a 
significant extent it is directed towards attracting international 
arbitrations to England. While the Model Law requires to be general to 
be adaptable as possible, and deliberately avoids framing provisions on 
areas which may be thought to be controversial, the English Act can deal 
with a number of issues not addressed by the Model Law or deal with 
issues more specifically than the Model Law. Furthermore, it can do so 
from the standpoint of a system which has long experience as an 
attractive forum for international arbitration. For such reasons the 
Arbitration Act 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law are excellent and 
obvious models for a country seeking - as dozens of other states have 
done over the last 20 years - to adopt a modern arbitration regime which 
will immediately be comprehensible to potential foreign users. 
21 
CHAPTER 3 
A THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING 
I. Introduction 
In order sensibly to compare the role of the courts in arbitration under 
Chinese and UK law, some sort of theoretical underpinning is needed. 
This chapter thus focuses on two over-arching issues. The first one is the 
role of the state in supervising arbitration, viewed as a process that 
occurs outwith the formal dispute resolution mechanisms established by 
the state. The second issue, which flows form the first, would be the 
respective roles of the court and arbitral tribunal in arbitration. The 
discussion of the first issue encompasses party autonomy in making and 
enforcing arbitration agreements, the balance between mandatory and 
default rules in arbitration, procedural controls, substantive controls. 
The discussion of the second issue encompasses the 
competence-competence principle, and the comprehensive supervision 
theory versus the procedural supervision theory. 
II. The Role of the State and Law in Arbitration 
A. Nature of Arbitration 
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In order to analyse whether, and if so why, the court shall play a role in 
arbitration, the nature of arbitration shall be discussed. The extent to 
which the state should supervise the arbitral process, if at all, must 
depend on the essential nature of arbitration. Bernard13 propounded 
three theories on that issue in 1937. Under the first theory, the arbitration 
agreement and the arbitral award are separate, and the latter should be 
regarded as akin to a court judgment. Under the second theory the award 
derives from the agreement, so that they are inseparable. Thus the 
arbitral award is essentially a contract rather than a court judgment. The 
third theory is a compromise between the first two, and claims that an 
arbitral award can be regarded as akin to a court judgment only where a 
court order is needed for its enforcement. 14 These three theories are now 
respectively known as the "Jurisdictional Theory", the "Contractual 
Theory" and the "Mixed or Hyrid Theory". 'S In the 1960s, a fourth 
theory developed, known as the "Autonomous Theory". All are 
discussed below. 
Jurisdictionral Theory: The Jurisdictional Theory suggests that 
13 Lew, Julian D. M., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration. New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc., 1978,51-52. 
14 Lew, Julian D. M., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration. New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc., 1978,51-52. 
15 Hong-lin Yu, 'Total Separation of International Commercial Arbitration and National Court 
Regime', 5(2) J. Int'l Arb. 1988,148; Georgios I. ZEKOS, 'Problems of Applicable Law in 
Commercial and Martime Arbitration', 16(4) J. Int'l Arb. 1999,177; Gunther J. Horvath, 'The Duty 
of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award', 18(2) J. Int'l Arb. 2001,147-148. 
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arbitration operates within a framework of law, and a state has the power 
to control and regulate all the arbitrations happening in its jurisdiction. 
While the theory concedes that arbitration is based on the agreement of 
the parties, it insists that matters such as the validity of the arbitration 
agreement and award, the powers of arbitrators, and the enforceability of 
awards, all depend on the law of the place of arbitration and the law of 
the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. An arbitration agreement 
will be valid and an arbitral award will be enforceable only if both laws, 
the law of the place of arbitration and the law of the place of 
enforcement, recognize that the parties have the right to refer the dispute 
to arbitration, that the arbitrators have jurisdiction over the case 
concerned, and that the arbitral award is enforceable. In other words, 
arbitral jurisdiction and the validity of the arbitration process ultimately 
depend on the law of the place of enforcement. 16 Moreover, certain 
supporters of this theory insist that adjudication is a sovereign function 
of courts, and only courts have the power to administer justice. The 
reason why the law permits the parties to have recourse to arbitration is 
because the law wants the arbitration to perform a court-like function. 
The only difference between arbitrators and judges is that arbitrators are 
appointed by the parties and judges by the state. Since the powers and 
functions of arbitrators and judges are extremely similar, the arbitral 
award should be regarded as a sort of judgment, and should have the 
16 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modern International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,35. 
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same effect. 17 The theory limits the autonomy of arbitrators and 
emphasizes the power of the state law, requiring the arbitral award to be 
consistent with the law of the place of enforcement. 
4`ontractual Theory : This theory emphasizes the contractual character 
of arbitration. Its supporters give three main reasons why the essence of 
arbitration is contractual. First of all, arbitration is based on the 
agreement of the parties. Where there is no arbitration agreement, no 
party can force another to arbitrate, except in the rare instances of 
compulsory arbitration. 18 Secondly, all issues regarding the constitution 
of the arbitral tribunal can be decided by the agreement of the parties, 
including the appointment of arbitrators, the time and place of 
arbitration, etc. The parties may also agree on the arbitral procedure, 
while domestic arbitration law only provides default rules to deal with 
situations where the parties have not agreed on such issues. 19 Thirdly, 
the reason why an arbitral award is recognized and enforced is because 
of the binding force of the arbitration agreement. 20 The arbitral award is 
made by the arbitrators as the agents of the parties, and thus is itself an 
17 Klein, F. - E.. Considtions sur 1' arbitrage en droit international priv? Bale: Heilbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1955, para. 105-112. 
18 Stone, Morris, `A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration' 21 Arb. J. 1966,156; Wallace, 
E. V., Drafting a New York Arbitration Agreement (No. 3, N. Y. Continuing Legal Education), 
1967, ??? 
19 Eisemann, Fr d ric, L'arbitre - partie, in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martine 
Domke. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967,79. 
20 Niboyet, J. P., Trait de droit international priv? fran ais, tomes V, VI 2. Paris: Sirey, 1950, para. 
1284. 
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agreement made by the agents on behalf of the parties . 
21 Each party has 
an obligation to enforce the award, otherwise the other party can apply 
to the court for enforcement. Such enforcement is different from the 
enforcement of a court judgment, and is essentially the enforcement of a 
contract. Therefore, it is concluded that an arbitration agreement is 
simply a contract based on the consensus of the parties22, and not an 
exercise of delegated sovereign power. This theory sees domestic law as 
creating a framework for the arbitration. Thus the court will not enforce 
an arbitration agreement, if, under the law of the forum, the court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. Nor will it 
enforce an arbitral award which is in conflict with public policy. When 
arbitrators are dealing with the problem of choice of law, they should 
conduct the arbitration according to the parties' explicit expression of 
will. Where there is no such expression, they should guided by their 
deduction of the parties' implied choice. 
9 fixed or Hyrid Theory? This theory asserts that arbitration has both a 
jurisdictional and a contractual character. In 1952, Sauser-Hall explained 
this theory in detai123, pointing out that arbitration cannot transcend the 
legal system, and there must always be laws which determine the 
21 Lew, Julian D. M., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration. New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc., 1978,55. 
22 Domke, Martin, Commercial Arbitration, Englewood Cliffs: N. J. Prentice-Hall, 1965,2. 
23 Sauser-Hall, Georges, `L'arbitrage en droit international prive', in 44-I Anuaire de L'institut de 
Droit International 1952, Grand: Bureau de la Revue de droit international, 469. 
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validity of arbitration agreements and the enforceability of arbitral 
awards. He also considered that arbitration derived from private 
contracts, and that the appointment of arbitrators and the rules governing 
the arbitral process should mainly stem from the agreement of the 
parties. As a result, he believed the jurisdictional and contractual 
character of arbitration correlative and indivisible. 24 Supporters of this 
theory insist that although the jurisdictional and contractual theories are 
diametrically opposed, they can work in a concerted way to explain the 
essence of arbitration. Thus the arbitration agreement is a contract, and 
its validity should be determined in accordance with contractual 
principles. If according to the law of the forum, the court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, or if the arbitrators 
conduct the proceedings in defiance of basic principles of equity, or if 
the award conflicts with the public policy of the forum, the court in 
which the enforcement is sought will refuse to recognize or enforce the 
arbitral award. Arbitrators must balance the will of the parties and the 
law of the place of arbitration. As far as the substantive law which 
would be used to resolve the dispute is concerned, arbitrators should 
respect the will of the parties and apply the law chosen by them. Where 
the parties have made no explicit " choice, arbitrators may directly 
determine the applicable law by virtue of the rules of international 
24 Sauser-Hall, Georges, 'L'arbitrage en droit international prive', in 44-I Anuaire de L'institut de 
Droit International 1952, Grand: Bureau de la Revue de droit international, 469. 
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conflict of laws. 25 
Wutonomous Theory? This theory is advanced by Devichi26. It 
maintains that arbitration is not jurisdictional or contractual, or even 
mixed, but a completely independent system27. In order to determine the 
essence of arbitration, she considers it is necessary to examine the 
function and aim of arbitration. This theory views arbitration from a 
completely different angle from the other three theories. They 
concentrate on the aspects of arbitration which accord with domestic law 
and international law, and how the right of the parties to refer the 
disputes to arbitration and to determine the arbitral process is limited by 
the law. By contrast, the autonomous theory concentrates on the issues 
of the arbitration itself, such as the aim of arbitration, the arbitral 
proceedings, the function of arbitration and the reason why it can have 
such functions. Devichi suggests that neither the jurisdictional theory or 
the contractual theory can correctly reflect the essence of arbitration, 
while the fact that they are in fundamental conflict precludes them being 
combined. She also argues that the three traditional theories all impose 
limits upon arbitration which would restrict certain advantages which 
might otherwise lead businessmen to prefer arbitration to litigation, and 
25 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modern International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,36. 
26 Rubellin-Devichi, Jacqueline, L'arbitrage. Nature Jurisdigue Droit interne et droit international 
pr iv? Paris: Librairie Genei le de Droit et Jurisprudence 1965, pars 14. 
Rubellin-Devichi, Jacqueline, L'arbitrage. Nature Jurisdigue Droit interne et droit international 
priv? Paris: Librairie Gen file de Droit et Jurisprudence 1965, para. 14. 
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which would prevent arbitration from developing. The supporters of this 
theory argue that arbitration was first created and then developed by 
businessmen, regardless of the law. The law simply affirms arbitration. 
The autonomy of the parties to determine both substantive and 
procedural law is based on neither the contractual nor the jurisdictional 
character of arbitration, but on the necessity of commercial custom. 
Similarly, the reason why arbitration agreements and awards are 
enforceable is not because they are contracts, or because the state in 
which enforcement occurs gives concessions, but because businessmen 
across the world would not be able to conduct international commercial 
relations successfully if arbitral awards were not enforceable. Support 
for this theory is found in the fact that certain nongovernmental arbitral 
institutions had been constituted before the existence of the international 
commercial arbitration conventions. 28 The theory sees arbitration as 
non-domestic, with the parties having unlimited autonomy. Commercial 
society is an international environment which can develop its own law, 
and can act as an international court. Parties can determine both 
substantive and procedural law. Devichi 29 contends that the 
unconditional autonomy of the parties makes arbitration supranational 
and international commercial law can apply directly. Thus, the parties 
28 E. g. the ICC was established in 1923 prior to both the Geneva Convention on the Execution of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1927 and the New York Convention of 1958. 
29 Rubellin-Devichi, Jacqueline, L'arbitrage. Nature Jurisdigue Droit interne et droit international 
priv? Paris: Librairie Gensäle de Droit et Jurisprudence 1965, para. 175. See Lew, Julian D. M., 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1978, 
61. 
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can choose not only domestic law to govern the substance of their 
disputes, but also international -commercial law or trade customs. They 
can even choose general principles of justice and equity. Where the 
parties have made no choice, arbitrators may apply the conflict rules 
which they consider suitable, or directly apply relevant international law 
or international rules, 30 instead of applying the conflict rules of the 
place of arbitration. 
The autonomous theory emphasizes the origins of arbitration, but totally 
ignores current arbitral practice. While that theory suggests that 
arbitration should be non-domestic and the parties should have 
unlimited autonomy, in reality neither of these things is true, and the 
theory cannot explain why this is so. Jurisdictional theory ignores the 
contractual essence of arbitration and thus is inappropriate. The key 
issue is then whether arbitration is contractual or hybrid in nature. 
In my opinion, it is inappropriate to say that arbitration is judicial. It is a 
private method of settling disputes, based on the agreement between the 
parties. Its main characteristic is that it involves' submitting the dispute 
to individuals chosen, directly or indirectly, by the parties. The rules of 
contract provide the theoretical basis at to why arbitration is binding. 
The principle of respecting matters agreed by the parties - the doctrine 
30 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modern International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,41. 
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of "party autonomy" permeates the whole arbitral proceedings, 
including performing the arbitration agreement, constituting the tribunal, 
conducting the process of arbitration and so on. If matters agreed by 
parties are violated in arbitration proceedings, the award rendered by the 
tribunal would be set aside or its enforcement refused. Yet it must be 
conceded that where the agreement allowed one party to be treated 
unfairly, that might lead to the award being set aside in most states, 
while if the tribunal ignored that agreement and conducted the 
proceedings fairly; the award would probably be safe from being set 
aside. 
The fact that the basis of arbitration is contractual is not in dispute. The 
arbitrator's power to resolve a dispute is founded upon the common 
intention of the parties. Thus arbitration should be defined by reference 
to two constituent elements which commentators 31 and the courts 
almost unanimously recognize. First, the arbitrators' task is to resolve 
disputes. Secondly, the source of this judicial role is a contract which 
means the arbitrators' power to decide disputes -originates in the 
common intention of the parties rather than being conferred by in the 
State as in the case of courts. Judicial dispute resolution draws its 
31 Fouchard, Philippe/Gaillard, Emmanuel & Goldman, Berthod, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration. New York: ASPEN Publishers, Inc., 1999,29; Mustill, 
Michael J. & Boyd, Stewart C., Commercial Arbitration, 2"d ed. London: Butterworths Law, 1989, 
41 et seq.; Han, Depei (ed), Current Issues of Private International Law, Wuhan: Publishing House of 
Wuhan University, 2004,332-334. 
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authority from the sovereign which created the court. In arbitration, 
decision makers are chosen by the litigants, rather than by the 
community, and the "submission agreement, " or compromis, creates and 
defines the arbitral power. The arbitral power is often created indirectly, 
by reference to rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, or of 
the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and 
the like. While parties create their own dispute resolution mechanisms as 
an alternation to court settlement, they sometimes ask a court to provide 
post-arbitration enforcement32, just as a contract is enforced. Thus, the 
essential nature of arbitration is contractual, although it could be said 
that arbitration has a judicial function. 
The essentially contractual nature of arbitration allows it to be 
distinguished from litigation, although the decisions of arbitrators, who 
derive their powers from a private agreement between individuals, not 
from the State, are binding in the same way as by court orders. At the 
same time the adjudicative character of arbitration makes it different 
from other dispute resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation, 
mediation, settlement and expert proceedings. Judicial intervention in 
arbitration should refrain from interfering with the exercise of the 
powers entrusted to arbitrators by the parties and rather be confined to 
assisting the arbitral process when the need arises. Judicial involvement 
32 Hirsch, Alain, `The Place of Arbitration and The Lex Arbitri', 34 Arb. J. 1979,43. 
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in arbitration is justified on the basis that the powers of arbitrators derive 
from the agreement between the parties, rather than being conferred by 
the state, so that the courts may often have to employ their inherent 
powers to fill the inevitable gaps. 
There are several arguments against the arbitral process being 
completely independent of national court systems. First, the judiciary is 
essential in guaranteeing the integrity of the arbitration process33. 
Secondly, the authority of arbitrators is conferred by agreement and 
extends no further, so that there must be safeguards against arbitrators 
exceeding the authority. Thirdly, parties may want insurance against 
erratic and unpredictable results34. Fourthly, states may want to review 
arbitral decisions to protect weak parties, third parties, or their national 
interests. In relation to disputes which the parties have agreed to refer to 
arbitration the court serves two functions. On the one hand, the court 
provides assistance and support and, on the other, it supervises and 
controls. The control exercised by the court over the arbitral process is 
the price which has to be paid for the court's support. 
B. Areas Where Judicial Intervention Is Needed 
33 Lutz, Robert E, `International Arbitration and Judicial Intervention', 10 Loy. L. A. Int'l & Comp. 
L. J. 1988,621. 
34 Although many systems provide no protection against erratic results in the sense that awards that 
are substantively erroneous must stand. 
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As discussed above, although arbitration has a contractual nature, to 
ensure the integrity of the arbitral process and protect the public interest, 
the courts must support and supervise that process. It is known that the 
jurisdiction of the court is given by the state. Accordingly, the power of 
the court to play a role in arbitration is also given by the state. Thus, the 
role of the court in supervising arbitration is actually state supervision of 
arbitration, viewed as a process that occurs outwith the formal dispute 
resolution mechanisms established by the state. There are a number of 
areas in international arbitration where there are likely to be problems 
with judicial intervention. These areas are: party autonomy in making 
and enforcing arbitration agreements; striking a balance between 
mandatory and default rules in arbitration; control over the arbitral 
proceedings; control over the substantive issues; and the role of state 
agencies as arbitrators and in the arbitration process. These categories 
are addressed in the following discussion. 
1. Party autonomy in making and enforcing arbitration agreements 
An arbitration agreement means an agreement to submit to arbitration 
present or future disputes. Parties have autonomy in making and 
enforcing such arbitration agreements. To protect that autonomy law 
should require that the will of parties to enter into that agreement should 
be genuine, so that if a party is coerced into entering into the agreement, 
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it is deemed to be invalid. Law should also protect party autonomy by 
allowing parties to abandon the arbitration agreement mutually. 
Moreover law must reinforce party autonomy by requiring them to refer 
disputes to arbitration where they have a valid arbitration agreement 
which has not been mutually abandoned. Where there is a valid 
arbitration agreement between the parties and one party goes to the court 
for litigation, if the other party invokes the valid arbitration agreement to 
the court, the court should stay any action brought before it if the matter 
is subject to the arbitration agreement. 
2. The balance between mandatory and default rules in arbitration 
The arbitration law of every legal system features mandatory rules from 
which the parties may not derogate. Arbitration law must also provide 
default rules to support the arbitral process when the agreement of the 
parties breaks down, yet it is in the nature of such rules that parties are 
free to agree otherwise. In China, some of the provisions of the 
Arbitration Law are mandatory and the provisions of the CIETAC Rules 
are default rules. Thus the agreement of the parties may override the 
CIETAC Rules but not the Arbitration Law. In both the Model Law 
and the 1996 Act, some rules are mandatory. In this way, law supervises 
arbitration by forbidding parties to make the agreement which might 
adversely affect the integrity of the arbitral process or harm the public 
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interest. For example, under the Chinese law, the Model law, and the 
1996 Act, provisions governing the grounds on which awards may be 
challenged are mandatory, and parties are not allowed to make their own 
agreements on this issue. This protects the finality of arbitral awards and 
prevents unnecessary court intervention. Under the Model Law, the 
1996 Act, and Chinese law, conflict with public policy is a ground for 
challenging an award. In this way, the public interest can be protected. 
3. Judicial control over arbitration proceedings 
Courts play an indispensable role in controlling the arbitral process and 
award. In the Model Law and the 1996 Act, the court might have 
procedural control over the case where it removes the arbitrators on the 
grounds specified therein. Moreover, under Chinese arbitration law, the 
Model Law and the 1996 Act, the court might have procedural control 
where a party applies to set aside the arbitral award aside on the ground 
that the arbitral proceedings have not been conducted according to the 
parties' agreement or the arbitration rules. The court might also have 
substantive control over arbitral award, as where a party is allowed to 
challenge an award on the ground of uncertainty or ambiguity as to its 
effect, or where a party is allowed to appeal to the court on a question of 
law arising out of the award. 
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III. The respective roles of the court and arbitral tribunal in 
arbitration 
The principle that the roles of judges and arbitrators are complementary 
is considered to be an established fact. It suggests a certain equality 
between the judge and the arbitrator in their respective roles, the 
common object of which is to ensure the effectiveness of international 
commercial arbitration. Yet we shall see that that such equality is not 
absolute. A balance between judicial intervention and arbitral autonomy 
should be achieved. The most important examples relate to the 
respective roles of the court and arbitral tribunal in determining the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, and in dealing with challenges to arbitral 
awards. 
A. Determining the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
competence-competence principle 
Where a party challenges the competence of the arbitral tribunal, should 
the tribunal, the arbitration agency or the court have jurisdiction to rule 
on that competence? This is called the competence-competence problem. 
It has given rise to much controversy and misunderstanding, and behind 
the appearance of unanimity-most laws now recognize the principle in 
some form-it continues to be the subject of considerable divergence 
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between different legal systems. 35 The competence-competence 
principle is now recognized by the main international conventions on 
arbitration. 36 The central idea is that any objection against a tribunal's 
jurisdiction should be dealt with, at least initially, by the tribunal itself. 
A statutory statement of the principle helps avoid the logical conundrum 
of how a tribunal, which rules that it has no jurisdiction, can be said to 
have jurisdiction to make such a ruling in the first place. 
The underpinning of the competence-competence principle is that the 
tribunal's competence to rule over its own competence is the basic 
power for the tribunal to work properly, even though the tribunal's 
decision on this issue might be varied or cancelled by the court. In the 
1950s Devlin J stated that the law does not require an arbitrator to refuse 
to perform his function as an arbitrator simply because his competence 
has been challenged. Neither does the law require an arbitrator to 
continue arbitration, leaving the problem of competence-competence to 
be solved by the court. Rather, the arbitral tribunal has the power to rule 
on its own competence. The aim of doing this is not to make a decision 
on the subject-matter of the dispute, but to resolve a preliminary 
35 Dimolitsa, Antonias, `Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz', in A. J. van den Berg ed., 
Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New 
York Convention (ICCA Congress Series No. 9)1999,217; Park, William W., 'The Arbitrability Dicta 
in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic', 12 Arb. 
Int'l 1996,137. Park, William W., 'Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between 
Courts and Arbitrators', 8 Am. Int'l Arb. 1997,133. 
36 See, e. g., ArticleV, para. 3 of the 1961 European Convention; Article 41 of the 1965 Washington 
Convention. 
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problem so that the parties could know whether the arbitration could be 
continued" Sandrock has since stated that, as the wished to resolve 
their dispute via arbitration, the arbitral tribunal should itself decide 
whether it has competence over the case. To leave the 
competence-competence problem to be decided by the court would be a 
waste of time and money. 38 
Also, the fact that the most modern arbitration statutes39 and the main 
institutional arbitration rules40 include the principle is further evidence 
of its the widespread recognition of the competence-competence 
principle. However, some scholars doubt whether recognition of the 
principle by the arbitral institutions is sufficient to ensure its 
effectiveness. Institutional arbitration rules derive their authority from 
the parties' agreement. The rights of arbitrators given by institutional 
arbitration rules cannot exceed those allowed by the applicable legal 
37 Redfern, Alan & Hunter, Martin, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991,276; Per Devlin J., `Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft 
Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwritschaftsbetribe Registrierte Genossenschaft Mit Beschrankler 
Haftung', I Q. B. 1954,12-13. 
38 Sandrock, Otto, `Arbitration between U. S. and West Germany Companies: An Example of 
Effective Dispute Resolution in International Business Transactions', 9 (1) U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 1987, 
22-23. 
39 The UNCITRAL Model Law provides in Article 6, paragraph 3 that the arbitral tribunal may rule 
on a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction either as a preliminary question or in an 
award on the merits, and that, in the event of an action to set aside a partial award concerning 
jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award. Article 
186 of the 1987 Swiss Private International Law Statute and Article8 para. 1, of the Swiss 
Concordat. Article1697(1) of the Belgian Judicial Code (Law of July 4,1972); Article 1052 (1) of the 
Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure (Law of Dec. 1,1986); Article23 (3) of the Spanish Law 
36/1988 of December 5,1988 on Arbitration. Article458 bis 7 of the Algerian code of Civil Procedure 
(Legislative Decree No. 93-09 of April 25,1993); Sec. 30 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act; 
Article1040 of the German ZPO (1997). 
40 See, e. g., Article2l (I) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article6 (2) of the 1998 ICC 
Arbitration Rules; Article 23.1 of the 1998 LCIAArbitration Rules; Article 15 (1) of the 1997 AAA 
International Arbitration Rules. 
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systems. In other words, unlike national laws, arbitration rules are 
contractual in nature and therefore cannot answer why arbitrators should 
have power to determine their own jurisdiction, unless we adhere to an 
extreme contractual theory of arbitration. More fundamentally, although 
an arbitrator's jurisdiction to rule on his own jurisdiction is indeed one 
of the effects of the arbitration agreement, the basis of that power is 
neither the arbitration agreement itself, nor the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda giving the agreement binding force. 41 If that were the case, a 
"vicious circle" would immediately be created, raising the question how 
can an arbitrator, solely on the basis of an arbitration agreement, declare 
that an arbitration agreement is void or even hear a claim to that effect? 
Thus the answer is simple: the basis for the competence-competence 
principle cannot lie in the arbitration agreement, but in the arbitration 
laws of the country where the arbitration is held and, more generally, in 
the laws of all countries liable to recognize the arbitral award. 2 If a 
country does not recognize competence-competence principle, this 
principle has no basis to exist. For example, at this stage, the Chinese 
arbitration law does not recognize competence- competence principle, 
and as a result, the parties are not allowed to agree that the arbitral 
tribunal should have the competence to rule on its own jurisdiction. 
41 Fouchard, Philippe/Gaillard, Emmanuel & Goldman, Berthod, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration. New York: ASPEN Publishers, Inc., 1999,396. 
42 Fouchard, Philippe/Gaillard, Emmanuel & Goldman, Berthod, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration. New York: ASPEN Publishers, Inc., 1999,399. 
40 
Yet, while the power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction 
may effectively prevent specious jurisdictional objections from being 
resorted to as a means of obstructing the proceedings, if the tribunal's 
determination of this issue were unreviewable, the potential for abuse 
would be immense. No serious legal system could permit an arbitral 
tribunal be the final determinor of its own jurisdiction. Thus in every 
system any jurisdictional ruling, whether a separate ruling or as part of 
an award on the merits of the dispute, may be appealed to the courts. 
The system under which a national court is involved in the question of 
jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal has issued a final award on the 
merits is known as "concurrent control' . 43 In most systems the tribunal 
may rule on jurisdictional issues as a preliminary award or as part of the 
final award. The advantage of ruling 'on jurisdictional issues as a 
preliminary award is that it enables the parties to know relatively 
quickly where they stand; and they will save time and money if the 
arbitration proceedings prove to be groundless. Only if the tribunal has 
confidence in its jurisdiction over the case would it decide to rule on 
jurisdictional issues as part of the final award. 
B Dealing with arbitral awards-the comprehensive supervision 
theory versus the procedural supervision theory 
43 Redfem, Alan & Hunter, Martin, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 2nd 
ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991,365. 
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After an arbitral award is made, either party may challenge the award in 
court. The issue thus arises whether the court should review both 
procedural and substantive issues, or simply the former. There are two 
theories on this issue in China, - the comprehensive supervision theory 
and the procedural supervision theory. The former theory, advanced by 
Professor Chen An claims that the standard of supervision of foreign and 
domestic awards should be the same, embracing both procedural and 
substantive issues. Its theoretical base is that differential supervision of 
foreign and domestic awards is not common internationally. 
Secondly, justice is deemed to be more important than efficiency, and 
the legality and impartiality of an award more important than its finality. 
Professor Chen An argues that where the parties agree to refer disputes 
to arbitration, they have abandoned the right to litigate. Through 
abandoning this right, the dispute can be resolved by a single 
determination. Yet what the parties have abandoned is the right to 
litigate, rather than the right to appeal to the courts, unless they have 
explicitly agreed to abandon this right also. Thus, it cannot be assumed 
that, as the parties have chosen arbitration, they have abandoned the 
right to ask the court to exercise a supervisory role and correct errors, 
especially where a foreign award is improper or illegal. It is an essential 
legal principle that violation of the law must be investigated and dealt 
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with. 44 
Thirdly, the system of challenging arbitrators provided by Articles 34 
and 38 of the Chinese Arbitration Law only supervise their personal 
behavior, and is not enough to protect the correctness of awards. 45 
The procedural supervision theory, advanced by Professor Xiao 
Yongping suggests that foreign-related and domestic awards should be 
supervised in different ways - the former only procedurally, the latter 
both procedurally and substantively. The advocates of this theory attack 
the theoretical basis of the comprehensive supervision theory as follows. 
Firstly, it is commonplace internationally to distinguish foreign from 
domestic awards, and this trend is gaining momentum. Professor Xiao 
Yongping points out that, compared to domestic arbitration, the rules 
regarding international arbitration are more flexible, and international 
arbitration is subject to minimal court supervision. 6 Secondly, the trend 
is towards decreasing court supervision of foreign awards 47 Thirdly, the 
aim of court supervision is to strike a balance between finality of awards 
44 Chen, An, 'Discussion on the System Supervising Chinese Foreign-related Arbitration', 2 Social 
Science of China 1998,101-102. 
45 Chen, An, `Discussion on the System Supervising Chinese Foreign-related Arbitration', 2 Social 
Science of China 1998,102-103. 
46 Xiao, Yongping, `Discussion about the Scope of the Court's Supervision on Arbitration in China', 
1 Law Review of Wuhan University 1998,42; Xiao, Yongping, `Opinions on the System of the 
Supervision upon Domestic Arbitration and Foreign-related Arbitration', 2 Social Science in China 
1998,94.. 
47 Xiao, Yongping, 'Opinions on the System of the Supervision upon Domestic Arbitration and 
Foreign-related Arbitration', 2 Social Science in China 1998,94. 
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and the need for judicial review, in other words between the efficiency 
of arbitration system and justice. Professor Xiao Yongping claims that 
the goal of court supervision is to correct the potential mistakes of 
arbitrators, so that a fair award can be achieved, whereas if the scope of 
supervision is too large, time and energy would be unnecessarily wasted. 
It can be seen from legal practice that the reason why the parties choose 
arbitration to resolve disputes is that they want to achieve a final award, 
avoiding fussy and lengthy legal proceedings. Although the finality of 
awards may result in a party losing the right of appeal against potential 
errors, that finality is of greater benefit. The Law should protect the 
reasonable expectations of the parties regarding the finality of awards. 
The task of law is to balance the autonomy of the parties and proper 
legal supervision. If Chinese law allows the court to supervise the 
substance of foreign-related awards, the arbitral process could be 
threatened by legal proceedings, which would adversely affect the 
finality of awards 48 Fourthly, since the PRC has been constituted, the 
Chinese arbitration system has been divided into two parts - domestic 
and foreign arbitration. Nowadays, the supervision of foreign arbitration 
only on procedural issues is better suited to the practice of China. 49 
48 Professor Xiao Yongping has also pointed out that, considering contractual essence of arbitration 
and the principle of autonomy of the parties, the parties may be allowed to make their own agreement 
to choose between finality of awards and supervision on substantial problems, i. e., the parties may be 
allowed to give the court the power to supervise on substantial problems. Xiao, Yongping, 
`Discussion about the Scope of the Court's Supervision on Arbitration in China', I Law Review of 
Wuhan University 1998,45; Xiao, Yongping, 'Opinions on the System of the Supervision upon 
Domestic Arbitration and Foreign-related Arbitration', 2 Social Science in China 1998,95-96. 
49 Xiao, Yongping, `Discussion about the Scope of the Court's Supervision on Arbitration in China', 
1 Law Review of Wuhan University 1998,42; Xiao, Yongping, `Opinions on the System of the 
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The supporters of this theory also point out that, arbitration is composed 
of the arbitral proceedings and arbitral award, so that arbitral justice 
should include just arbitral proceedings and a just award. However, 
since substantive justice is difficult to achieve and assess, an arbitral 
award should be deemed just if the principle of party autonomy has been 
obeyed, the arbitral proceedings have been conducted according to the 
agreement of the parties, during the process of arbitration the parties 
have been treated equally and have been given a adequate opportunity to 
make representations and to provide evidence, and the arbitrators have 
heard the case cautiously. S° In my opinion, the procedural supervision 
theory is more sensible than the comprehensive supervision theory. 
IV. Conclusion 
Supervision upon Domestic Arbitration and Foreign-related Arbitration', 2 Social Science in China 
1998,94. 
50 Professor Liang Yeping pointed out in 'Discussion of Justice of Law' (published in 'Weekend of 
South', October 2nd, 1998, Edition 5) that, the society, particularly the parties, shall be ready to accept 
a result of hearing, even though the result falls short of what they expect. Actually, the sort of thing 
happen frequently. The reason of that is that what the so-called right judicial system could do is to 
provide the parties to a dispute a public place so that they could make their representation as equitably 
as possible, and finally, a third party who has been trained specially and has rich experience would 
make a decision according to the law. Generally, after all of these have been done, the so-called jural 
justice has been achieved. The problem is, that in the above process, many realities and estimation of 
daily life which people are familiar with have not been involved, as they may be precluded by rules of 
evidence, or they may be considered irrespective of the case concerned. At the end, we may discover 
that, the reality recognized by the law is not the reality of the daily life, but a reality recombined by 
the rules of law. jural justice is not direct presentation of natural justice, but a result of a factitious 
process. Indeed, a final judicial decision is not necessary based on the reality of daily life, and justice 
is not necessarily achieved. However, in a legal society, people assume that a judicial decision is 
based on the reality and justice has been achieved by the judicial decision... in this respect, a judicial 
decision is similar to a final judgment of gymnastic sports. People obey the referee and trust the final 
judgment of him, not because the final judgment is always accurate, but because the referee has been 
authorized legally, and because they are needed by the world. ' The above words of Professor Liang 
Yeping could also be adopted to explain justice of arbitration and finality of an arbitral award. 
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Arbitration has both a contractual nature and an adjudicatory character. 
The powers of arbitrators derive from the agreement between the parties, 
rather than being conferred by the state, but the courts may often have to 
employ their inherent powers to fill the inevitable gaps so that the 
integrity of the arbitral process and the public interest may be protected. 
Issues are likely to arise in relation to judicial intervention in various 
areas, such as party autonomy in making and enforcing arbitration 
agreements, striking a balance between mandatory and default rules in 
arbitration, control over the arbitral proceedings, control over the 
substantive issues. Although court supervision is necessary, the level of 
that supervision should not be too high, otherwise the autonomy of the 
arbitral process will be damaged. Thus a careful balance should be 
struck between court intervention and arbitral autonomy. To achieve that 
balance, the court intervention should be restricted. For example, an 
arbitral tribunal should have competence to rule on its own jurisdiction, 
at least initially, while arbitral awards should be subject to procedural 
but not substantive supervision. As discussed in Chapter 2 Chinese 
arbitration law has a very specific culture, tradition and historical 
background. As a result, the state plays a significantly different roles in 
supervising arbitration under Chinese law as compared to either the 
Model Law or the 1996 Act, while different roles are conceived for the 
court and arbitral tribunal. Those differences will be compared and 
analyzed so as to find out whether the level of court support and 
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supervision in Chinese arbitration law is rational. If the answer is 
negative it will be considered how Chinese law might be improved so 




THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND ITS 
FORM 
A valid 'arbitration agreement is the basis on which a party may refer a 
dispute to arbitration, and on which the arbitration agency and arbitral 
tribunal can accept a case. To make an arbitration agreement valid, is the 
consent of the parties enough? Or must arbitration agreements adopt a 
particular form and content? If the law permits different forms of 
arbitration agreements, do consequences flow from the different forms? 
This chapter aims to consider the Chinese approach as to the above 
questions, and how this compares with to the approach of the law of 
Scotland and England. 
I. The Chinese Approach to Arbitration Agreements 
A. Definition and form 
The general definition of arbitration agreement given by Article 16 of 
Arbitration Law of The PRC is `a written agreement to submit present or 
future differences to arbitration'51. Article 2 of the Arbitration Rules of 
51 Article16 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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CIETAC that an arbitration agreement can be made to resolve disputes 
concerning economic relations and trade bounded or not bounded by 
contracts. 52 An agreement to arbitrate may, therefore, either be 
contained in a contract to be activated where a dispute arises under that 
contract, (an arbitration clause) or it may be reached after a dispute has 
arisen between the parties (a submission agreement). 53 Generally, a 
submission agreement is a separate contract; while an arbitration clause 
is usually contained in a principal contract. Since an arbitration clause is 
a part of the principal contract, in most cases, it is made before the 
dispute arises, although it would be possible for the parties to agree to 
add such a clause once a dispute has arisen. A submission arbitration 
54 agreement can only be made after the dispute arises. Under the 
Chinese legal system, the parties are permitted to refer either existing or 
future disputes to arbitration. The Rules of CIETAC (1994) states that, 
upon written application by one of the parties, the Arbitration 
Commission takes cognizance of cases in accordance with an agreement 
between the parties to refer their disputes to the Arbitration Commission 
for arbitration, which agreement may be concluded before or after the 
occurrence of the dispute. s CIETAC has accepted a similar regulation 
52 Article 2 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
53 Lew, Julian D. M., `Arbitration Agreements: Form and Character', in Peter Sarcevic ed., Essays on 
International Commercial Arbitration, London: Graham & Trotman Martinus Nijhoff 1989,52; 
Redfern, Alan & Hunter, Martin, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 2nd 
ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991,130. . 54 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modem International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,43. 
55 Article 3 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (1994). 
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in the amendment of its arbitration rules. 56 The arbitration agreement 
is the basis on which a party- may refer a dispute to arbitration, and on 
which the arbitration agency and arbitral tribunal can accept a case s7. A 
valid arbitration agreement ousts the jurisdiction of the courts and is the 
58 basis on which the award can be enforced. 
B. The Content of Arbitration Agreements 
According to the Arbitration Law, an arbitration agreement shall contain 
the following: 1. The expression of an application for arbitration. 2. The 
matters to be arbitrated. 3. The arbitration commission chosen. 59 This 
can create obvious problems when the agreement takes the form of an 
arbitration clause, driving the parties to give such clauses the widest 
possible scope. If an agreement for arbitration fails to specify any of 
these matters, the parties may conclude a supplementary agreement, but 
if a supplementary agreement cannot be reached, the agreement is 
invalid. 60 Where the parties have chosen CIETAC to arbitrate, they are 
not required to choose which sub-commission to actually deal with 
disputes. The parties concerned may reach an agreement to have their 
disputes arbitrated by the arbitration committee in Beijing or by the 
56 Article 5 (1) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
57 Article4 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
58 Article 5 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
59 Article 16 (2) ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
60 Article 18 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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sub-committees of the arbitration committee in Shenzhen or Shanghai. 
In the absence of an agreement, the claimant shall decide where the case 
should be arbitrated, in Beijing, Shenzhen or Shanghai. The first choice 
of the site shall be the final. Should any dispute arise in regard to the 
place of arbitration, the arbitration committee shall make the decision. 61 
It should be noted that the CIETAC was formerly called the Foreign 
Trade Arbitration Committee of the Chinese Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade, which was later renamed as the Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade Arbitration Committee of the Chinese 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Article 2 (4) of the 
Rules of CIETAC (2005) provides that if the arbitration agreement or 
arbitration clause in a contract specifies that the arbitration shall be 
conducted by the arbitration committee or its sub-committee or by the 
former Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee of the Chinese Council for 
the Promotion of International Trade or the Foreign Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Committee, it shall be deemed that the parties have agreed to 
have the case arbitrated by the arbitration committee or its 
sub-committees. 
Since the legal requirements regarding the content of arbitration 
agreements are so demanding, the courts, especially the SPC, the 
Beijing High Court and the Beijing Second Intermediate Court, have 
61 Article 2 (8) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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adopted an extremely flexible view of those requirements in order to 
render apparently defective arbitration agreements effective. The SPC 
recognizes that in international arbitrations the parties may agree to ad 
hoc arbitration abroad. In Fujian Company of Raw Material for 
Production v. Jinge Merchant Shipping Limited Company it held that, 
since the parties had agreed to ad hoc arbitration abroad, the court had 
no jurisdiction, as if parties have agreed on the place of arbitration, that 
arbitration agreement should be deemed valid unless ad hoc arbitration 
is forbidden in the place of arbitration. 62 Obviously, in an ad hoc 
arbitration, the arbitration agreement would not nominate an arbitration 
commission. 
C. The Requirement of Writing 
The Chinese law of arbitration takes the view that the need for writing 
should not be abandoned. Arbitration agreements have to be in writing, 
and an oral arbitration agreement would be deemed invalid. The rules of 
CIETAC provide that the arbitration committee shall accept a case upon 
a written application by a party for the arbitration of a dispute pursuant 
to an arbitration agreement between the parties concluded before or after 
the dispute arises63. They continue that an arbitration agreement means 
62 See the 'Reply by Letter on the Validity of Arbitration Agreement contained in the Bill of Lading 
of the International Shipping Dispute Case between General Company of Raw Materials of Fujian 
Province and Jin Ge Shipping Ltd. ' by the SPC, Law Letter No. 135, Oct. 20,1995. 
63 Article 5 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
r, 
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an arbitration clause stipulated by the parties in their contract, or any 
other written agreement concluded by the parties to submit their dispute 
for arbitration64. Article 16 of the Arbitration Law defines an arbitration 
agreement as a written agreement to submit present or future differences 
to arbitration. Article 11 of the Contract Law of the PRC offers a modern 
and flexible definition of writing, which mirrors the development of 
science and commercial practice, by providing that written form mean 
any form which can show the described contents visibly, such as a 
written contractual agreement, letters, and data-telex (including telegram, 
telex, fax, EDI and e-mails). It may be seen that the legislative 
requirement for writing, is flexible. 
It is also clear that the highest courts interpret the requirement of writing 
very flexibly. For example, in one case, the SPC confirmed the validity 
of arbitration clause, even though there was no actual arbitration clause 
in the principal contract. The parties had agreed that the common terms 
of delivery between China and Mongolia should apply to all unsettled 
matters, and these common terms included an arbitration clause. The 
SPC held that65 as the parties had agreed to be bound by these terms, 
and since they stipulated that any dispute arising from the contract 
`which cannot be resolved by consultation, shall be referred to 
64 Article 5 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
65 See `Reply by Letter to How to Determine Jurisdiction Where an Arbitration Agreement is not 
Included in an Economic Contract concerning Mongolia' by the SPC, Law Letter No. 177 (1996), Dec. 
14,1996. 
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arbitration', the parties were deemed voluntarily to have chosen 
arbitration to resolve their disputes. Thus the court was not entitled to 
hear the case. This decision of the highest court demonstrates 
commendable flexibility and is in accordance with international legal 
practice66. 
II. Disadvantages of the Chinese System 
1. Since the parties are required to choose an arbitration agency, ad hoc 
arbitration is definitely rejected, even though the parties are permitted to 
agree to ad hoc arbitration abroad by the decision of the SPC. An ad hoc 
arbitration may arise where an arbitration clause provides for arbitration, 
without agreeing upon a particular arbitral body, or invoking a set of 
institutional rules. The Commission of Legal Affairs of Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress explains why there are 
only provisions about institutional arbitration: 
"There are two main reasons. Firstly, ad hoc arbitration appeared 
earlier than institutional arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration is going to 
disappear. Secondly, the history of arbitration in China is relatively short. 
There is only institutional arbitration, rather than ad hoc arbitration. " 
This explanation is questionable. Firstly, although ad hoc arbitration 
appeared earlier than institutional arbitration, it is hard to say which is 
66 Zhao, Jian, Judicial Supervision of International Commercial Arbitration, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,75. 
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better and hard to predict how they will fare in the future. It cannot be 
decided that ad hoc arbitration will just disappear. On the contrary, 
nowadays, most of the disputes in the world are decided by ad hoc 
arbitration. 67 One can be sure that ad hoc arbitration will not disappear 
in the near future. Secondly, the mere fact that institutional arbitration 
came into being later than ad hoc arbitration cannot be a reason why ad 
hoc arbitration should not be recognized. 
Ad hoc arbitration needs to be recognized by Chinese Law. First of all, it 
has merits, such as high efficiency, low costs and flexibility. That is why 
parties generally prefer it to institutional arbitration. If ad hoc arbitration 
cannot be recognized, the will of parties to have ad hoc arbitration in 
China will not be achieved, to the detriment of the development of the 
Chinese arbitration system. Secondly, the rejection of ad hoc arbitration 
causes an imbalance between the obligations and rights of China under 
the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards. Under the New York Convention, the courts of 
China have to recognize and enforce foreign awards, whether made by 
ad hoc or institutional arbitration. However, awards in ad hoc arbitration 
in Chinese arbitrations would not be recognized and enforced by foreign 
67 Nowadays, there are large numbers of arbitration cases in the world each year, but the main 
arbitration institutions only deal with no more than 4000 cases ( International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Agency deals with 400 cases at most, CIETAC deals with 900 cases at most, Hongkong 
International Arbitration Central deals with 100 cases, USA Arbitration Institute deals with 100 
international arbitration cases. ) Most of cases have been dealt with through ad hoc arbitration. 
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courts because they are not valid in China. It is obvious that this is 
unfair for China and the parties to such arbitrations68. Yet it is the 
rejection of ad hoc arbitration by Chinese law which causes the 
unfairness, rather than 1958 New York Convention or foreign countries. 
2. The requirement of choosing an arbitration agency may give the 
arbitral tribunal, or in some circumstances the People's Court, the 
burden of examining whether the parties have chosen an arbitration 
agency effectively. The common understanding, as to effectiveness of a 
choice of arbitration agency in an arbitration agreement, was achieved in 
an `arbitration business coordination conference' (a meeting in which 
scholars discuss legal problems). Although this common understanding 
cannot be used as law when the tribunal or the court deals with disputes, 
it shows that China had been trying quite hard to produce clear rules to 
determine the effectiveness of a choice of an arbitration agency. The 
common understanding was that the courts would hold the following 
arbitration agreements valid: 69 
a. an arbitration agreement which nominates two or more arbitration 
68 Han, Jian, `Agreement about Arbitration Institution in Arbitration Agreement: Discussion of 
Related Provisions in Arbitration Law of the PRC, 4 Law Review of Wuhan University 1997,31. 
69 See Cai, Xinyu, `Validity and Improvement ofAgreement with Defects , 64(4) 
Journal of Carder Institute of Politics and Management in Hubei Province 1999, 
58-59; Li, Denghua, `Discussion on the Validity and Improvement ofArbitration 
Agreement with Defects ,9 Lawyer's World 
1997,20-21; Lin, You, `Study on 
Several Problems Arising from Implementation ofArbitration Law ,1 Politics and 
Law 1996,68; Feng, Jun, `On Legal Matters regarding Arbitration Agreement in 
China sArbitration Law ,I Law and Science 
1996,23-25; Liu, Lu, Reasearch on 
Un-normal Arbitration Agreement', 6 Politics and Law Review 2004,72-75. 
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agencies. 
b. an arbitration agreement in which the parties use the former name of 
an agency. 
c. an arbitration agreement which contains a clerical error, but where the 
arbitration agency chosen can be discerned. 
(i) an arbitration agreement which contains an arbitration agency 
which does not exist. 70 (For example, CIETAC only has 
sub-commissions in Shenzhen and Shanghai. If the parties agree to 
submit the dispute to the sub-commission in Fujian or Nanjing, the 
agreement is still valid. In these circumstances, the parties are deemed to 
have chosen CIETAC arbitration with the arbitral proceedings merely 
being located in Fujian. ) 
(ii) an arbitration agreement in which the parties have not specified an 
arbitration agency, if only one agency can possibly be chosen71. 
To provide exhaustive rules regarding arbitration agreements which 
contain an effective choice of arbitration agency, is not the greatest way 
to resolve the problem. It might be asked whether the situation would be 
better if the parties are not required to make a choice of arbitration 
agency. Moreover, if there is no need to make such a choice in an 
70 The Supreme Court considers the following arbitration agreement invalid: (1) the arbitration 
agreement which stipulates that the disputes can be solved by arbitration or litigation, or that if the 
parties are not satisfied with the award, they could appeal to the court; (2) the arbitration 
agreements which are obviously unfair. See the Supreme Court Law Reply(96), No. 26; 
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arbitration agreement, no practical problem will arise since the parties 
may make that choice once the dispute has arisen. 
3. Article 16 of the Arbitration Law defines an arbitration agreement as a 
written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration. 
It is not clear what `written' means. Although the Contract Law of the 
PRC and the views of the SPC give some clues as to what the term 
means, if the Arbitration Law and the Rules of CIETAC themselves do 
not deal with the matter, Chinese arbitration law is incomplete. 
Furthermore, whether the provisions of the Contract Law and the 
judicial interpretation thereof are adequate is itself an issue. 
Chinese arbitration law needs to be improved in this area. How that 
might happen and whether China should adopt rules from more 
developed legal systems is the question which the next section will 
attempt to answer. 
III. The Approach of the Law Operating in the UK 
It is submitted that it is useful to look to the United Kingdom for a 
paradigm which may be followed, as it offers two models for 
consideration - the Arbitration Act 1996 in England (the 1996 Act), and 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(the Model Law), which has been adopted in Scotland. At first sight it 
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may seem odd to suggest that China might seek to borrow legislative 
models from a very different social and legal order. However, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law is, of course, not Scottish, but a legislative 
framework which has been specifically devised to be adaptable to the 
widest possible variety of legal cultures. Equally, the English Arbitration 
Act, which in large measure is directly inspired by the Model Law, 
marks a significant departure for the English legal system, going against 
the grain of much of the previous law. To a significant extent it is 
directed towards attracting international arbitrations to England. While 
thie Model Law requires to be general to be as adaptable as possible, and 
deliberately avoids framing provisions on areas which may be thought to 
be controversial, the English Act can deal with a number of issues not 
addressed by the Model Law or deal with issues more specifically than 
the Model Law. Furthermore, it can do so from the standpoint of a 
system which has long experience as an attractive forum for 
international arbitration. For such reasons the Arbitration Act 1996 and 
the UNCITRAL Model Law are excellent and obvious models for a 
country seeking - as dozens of other states have done over the last 20 
years - to adopt a modern arbitration regime which will immediately be 
comprehensible to potential foreign users. 
A. Definition and form 
59 
Article 7(1) of the Model Law provides, 
"An arbitration agreement is an agreement by the parties to submit to 
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise 
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship whether 
contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an 
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. " 
Thus under art 7(1) the arbitration agreement may call for the 
submission to arbitration of both existing and future disputes including 
disputes arising out of contract, quasi-contract and tort. 72 
Equally s. 6 (1) of the Arbitration Act 199673 defines an arbitration 
agreement as "an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future 
disputes (whether they are contractual or not)". By virtue of s. 82(1)74, 
`dispute' includes `any difference' between the parties and there is 
authority to suggest that this inclusion embraces in particular a failure to 
agree. 75 It is suggested that China could adopt this rule. 
An agreement to arbitrate may either be contained in an agreement to be 
72 See the Analytical Commentary, Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 21. 
" It is submitted that the expression `defined legal relationship' should be given a wide interpretation 
so as to cover all non- contractual commercial cases occurring in practice (e. g., third party interfering 
with contractual relations, infringement of trademark or other unfair competition)". 
73 This is the effect of the 1996 Act, Section 100 (2), which extends the general definition in Section 
6 to New York Convention cases. 
74 Section 82 of the 1996 Act provides that "... 'dispute' includes any difference'... ". 
75 F. &G. Skyes (Wessex)Ltd v. Fine Fare Ltd [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 53. "Arbitration Law", Lloyd's 
of London Press ltd, pp2-1. 
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activated where a dispute arises under the main contract 76 (an 
arbitration clause), or may be reached independently after a dispute has 
arisen between the parties (a submission agreement). The line between 
these two types of arbitration agreement is not always clear cut. 
Pursuant to Art. 7 (1), an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an 
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. 
Both forms are comprised in the term "arbitration agreement" and a 
model law State which accepts this provision without change is bound to 
recognize either. 77 Equally, the 1996 Act recognizes the distinction 
between an arbitration clause and a submission agreement, but does not 
afford it very significant consequences. Since whether an arbitration 
agreement is a submission arbitration agreement or an arbitration clause, 
it shows the consent of the parties to arbitration. There is no need to treat 
them differently. Moreover, if some rules of the arbitration law do not 
apply to deal with an arbitration clause, some parties may choose not to 
make an arbitration clause in their contract, or even not to go to 
arbitration at all. It is not helpful to attract international arbitrations to 
China. 
B. The Content of Arbitration Agreements 
76 Disputes may be referred serially, as and when they arise: Compagnie Grani re SA v. Fritz Kopp 
AG [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 463. 
77 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,40. 
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Neither the 1996 Act nor the Model Law prescribes the content of an 
arbitration agreement. The parties are free to decide matters such as the 
number of arbitrators and the applicable arbitration rules (if any). 
Neither of the measures provide default rules which apply in the absence 
of agreement on vital issues. Since the parties are not required to choose 
an arbitration agency, ad hoc arbitration is permitted -under both the 
1996 Act and the Model Law. Under the guise of a definition 
UNCITRAL inserted a statement in Art. 2(a) of the Model Law that 
"arbitration" means "any arbitration whether or not administered by a 
permanent arbitral institution. ' 78 By virtue of this article, arbitration 
covers "pure" ad hoc arbitration as well as all forms of administered 
arbitration, whether by private national or international institutions, or 
by the courts of arbitration attached to chambers of commerce for 
foreign trade in socialist countries. 79 The 1996 Act does not explicitly 
provide that ad hoc arbitration is permitted, but such is the case. 
It is suggested that China deletes the requirement that arbitration 
agreements must nominate an arbitration agency and ad hoc arbitration 
should be explicitly permitted. The reason why the parties who apply the 
1996 Act know ad hoc arbitration is permitted is because there is such a 
78 Cf., New York Convention, Article I (2): "The term 'arbitral awards' shall include not only awards 
made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to 
which the parties have submitted". 
79 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,39. 
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tradition in England, and English law has a long history of ad hoc 
arbitration. Therefore it is not quite necessary for the 1996 Act to give a 
clear rule to permit ad hoc arbitration. The situation in China is 
completely different. China does not have a history or a tradition of ad 
hoc arbitration. If the Chinese arbitration law does not recognize ad hoc 
arbitration literally, the parties and the arbitral tribunal would have no 
idea whether ad hoc arbitration is permitted. Where the other. party 
makes a challenge that ad hoc arbitration is not permitted, the arbitral 
tribunal would find no legal rule to support ad hoc arbitration. To avoid 
the problems which might be raised, it is better for Chinese arbitration 
law to state clearly that ad hoc arbitration is permitted. 
C. The Requirement of Writing 
Art. 7(2) of the Model Law provides that the arbitration agreement shall 
be in writing. The drafters of the Model Law pointed out that if the law 
required the arbitration agreements to be signed in order to be effective, 
many problems would arise. Accordingly, there is no requirement of 
signature in article 7(2) with regard to agreements arising from 
exchanges of letters, telexes or telegrams. As far as formal arbitration 
agreements are concerned, it is not clear whether there is a requirement 
of signature. Article 7(2) refers to the agreement being `contained in a 
document signed by the parties', so it is certainly arguable that, to make 
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a formal agreement valid, the signature of the parties is required. 
Traditionally, an arbitration agreement is be recognized by English 
legislation only if it has been reduced to writing. Currently s. 5 of the 
1996 Act confirms the established English principle by stating that an 
arbitration agreement must be in writing in order for Part I of the Act to 
apply. Indeed all agreements between the parties concerning an 
arbitration, such as variations to the arbitration agreement, agreements 
as to procedural matters, agreements to opt out of non-mandatory 
provisions 80, and so on, must be in writing if they are to be effective for 
the purposes of the Act. The only exception to the requirement of 
writing concerns agreements to terminate an arbitration81. The exception 
exists in this case because of the impracticality of imposing a 
requirement of writing in certain of the circumstances in which an 
arbitration may be mutually allowed to determine, for example where 
both parties simply abandon proceedings, or allow them to lapse. 82 The 
DAC's view on this point was that a signature requirement did not fit the 
established procedures of many of the trades in which arbitration is 
commonly used, and they pointed out that signature would pose 
particular problems in the export trade, which operated under unsigned 
bills of lading, and for corporate articles of association which generally 
contain arbitration clauses but which are obviously not signed by 
80 Section 4(2) of the 1996 Act. 
81 Section 23 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
82 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 3`d 
ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,61. 
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shareholders 83. The 1996 Act provides that an agreement in writing is 
binding whether or not the parties have signed it, as long as an intention 
to be bound can be ascertained from the surrounding circumstances. 
At first sight, it is reasonable for the Model Law to require an arbitration 
agreement `contained in a document' to be `signed by the parties', as it 
is practically possible to sign a document, while it is more inconvenient 
to sign letters, telexes or telegrams. However, it might be asked why a 
more formal agreement, such as a paper document, needs to be signed, 
while a less formal agreement, such as a letter, telex or telegram, needs 
not. From my point of view, since a signature would pose problems in 
the commercial trade, the best way is not to ask for a signature, therefore, 
the approach of the 1996 Act is more recommendable. 
Although the Model Law does not clearly deal with the question 
whether an oral or partly oral arbitration agreement is valid, its drafters 
did recognize that the requirement of writing would exclude many 
familiar types Of commercial contracts which were oral or partly oral, 
such as bills of lading, reinsurance contracts, certain types of commodity 
contract. 84 It is suggested that the logic of the Model law is that an 
agreement which is not in writing is simply not recognized by the Model 
83 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,2-6. 
84 U. N. doe A/40/17, para. 84. 
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Law The question whether that agreement may have legal consequences 
outwith of the framework of the Model Law then becomes a matter for 
the domestic law of the adopting state. 
It should nonetheless be emphasized that under the 1996 Act, the 
requirement of writing is not a precondition to the validity of the 
agreement to go to arbitration, but rather to the applicability of Part I, as 
the common law applying to such agreements is expressly preserved by 
section 81(1)(b)85, which provides a saving for oral agreements. There 
was some. conflict in the earlier authorities as to whether an agreement 
had to be reduce to writing in its entirety, so that oral evidence was 
inadmissible in so far as it was to be used to resolve any ambiguity, 86 
or whether it was enough that the agreement's salient features had been 
reduced to writing. The 1996 Act provides a more generous approach 
that the Act can be applied to a partly written and partly oral agreement, 
because such an agreement is either made in writing, or at least 
evidenced in writing, as permitted by s. 5(2)(c), or referring to writing, as 
permitted by s. 5(3). Section 5(3) is also mainly designed to give effect 
to many types of agreements which are purely oral. Oral or partly oral 
agreements are permitted under the 1996 Act, while the Model Law does 
not clearly provide so. The 1996 Act gives clear answer to the problem, 
85 Section 81 (b) of the 1996 Act provides that nothing in this Part shall be construed as excluding 
the operation of any rule of law consistent with the provisions of this Part, in particular, any rule of 
law as to -... (b) the effect of an oral arbitration agreement, ... 86 Aughton Ltd VMF Kent Services Ltd [1992] ADRLJ 83. 
f 
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and therefore, if China wants to adopt the Model Law, it should states 
clearly oral or partly oral agreements are permitted. 
An agreement may be made-that is to say itself embodied-in writing, 
in which case its form will probably be a document. This is provided by 
s. 5(2)(a) of the 1996 Act, and, as noted earlier, signature is not required. 
It will be recalled that Article 7(2) of the Model Law also provides that 
an agreement is in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the 
parties. 
The Arbitration Act 1996 s. 5 (2) (b), in providing that an agreement may 
be made by the exchange of communications in writing, is a more 
general version of s. 7 of the Arbitration Act 1979, which referred to "an 
exchange of letters and telegrams". By contrast, the Model Law, art 7(2), 
is rather more elaborate in providing that an agreement is in writing if 
"it is contained... in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other 
means of telecommunication which provide a record of the 
agreement. "87 Earlier versions of the Bill which became the 1996 Act 
referred to any letter, tele-message, telex, fax or any other means of 
communication providing a record of the agreement, wording almost 
87 For illustrations of this provision, see: Pacific International Lines (Pte) v. Tsinlien Metals and 
Minerals Co Ltd [1992] ADRLJ 240. Oonc Lines Ltd v. Sino- American Trade Advancement Co Ltd 
[1994] ADRLJ 291. LG Caltex Gas Co Ltd and Contigroup Companies Inc v. China National 
Petroleum Co and China Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation [2001] BLR 235, 
reversed on other grounds, [2001] BLR 325. 
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identical to that in art 7(2) of the Model Law. However, the final version 
of s. 5(2)(b) takes the line that the general phrase "exchange of 
communications" covers all eventualities, and sees no need to spell any 
of them out. Indeed, it is made clear by para. 34 of the DAC's February 
1996 Report that the purpose of generalization was to widen rather than 
to narrow the scope for a finding of an agreement under these 
circumstances". It is also to be noted that the requirement that an 
exchange of communications is to provide "a record of the agreement" 
in art 7(2) of the Model Law does not appear in s 5(2)(b) of the 1996 Act. 
This omission is a strong indication that, under the 1996 Act, it is 
sufficient for consensus on the principle of arbitration to appear in the 
89 exchange of communications. 
Section 5(5) of the 1996 Act states `An exchange of written submissions 
in arbitral or legal proceedings in which the existence of an agreement 
otherwise than in writing is alleged by one party against another party 
and not denied by the other party in his response constitutes as between 
those parties an agreement in writing to the effect alleged. ' This 
subsection is taken from art 7(2) of the Model Law, which provides that 
an agreement is in writing if it is "in an exchange of statements of claim 
and defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by one 
88 Para 34 of the DAC's Februrary 1996 Report. 89 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,2-6. 
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party and not denied by another". The position under earlier English 
legislation was probably the same, 90 and indeed there are cases in which 
an exchange of submissions accepting the existence of an arbitration 
agreement was sufficient to create an ad hoc submission to arbitration 
where none previously existed, e. g., because the express arbitration 
clause was ineffective. 91 The mere allegation of an oral agreement made 
by one party in an exchange of written submissions in an arbitration or 
an action will suffice to make an agreement in writing if the other party 
responds, but does not controvert the allegation. This only applies as 
between the parties to the exchange, and to the effect alleged. 92 Under 
the Act, an allegation must be made by one party which is "not denied 
by the other in his response" The italicized words mean that if the other 
party does not respond at all, the subsection cannot apply. In other words, 
there is no estoppel by complete silence, but there is an estoppel where a 
response is made in the form of submission which does not deny the 
existence of the agreement. 93 The Model Law has omitted that 
restriction by stating that the failure by the respondent to deny the 
existence of the arbitration agreement can be ascertained either by 
90 Roper v. Levy (1851) 7 Exch 55. Lievesley v. Gilmore (1866) LR I CP 570; Jones Engineering 
Services Ltd v. Balfour Beatty Building Ltd [1994] ADRLJ 133. Earlier English authorities had 
treated endorsement on the brief submitted to counsel as sufficient written evidence of an agreement 
to arbitrate: Aitken v. Bachelor (1893) LJQB 193; Brandon v. Smith (1853) LJQB 321. 
91 The Amazonia [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 236; For the creation of ad hoc agreements generally, and for 
problems which the absence of writing creates where the agreement is ad hoc. 
92 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 3`l 
ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,61. 
93 This is expressly stated to be the case by the DAC in its February 1996 Report, para 38. 
69 
complete silence or by silence on the particular point in a response. 94 
Care must also be taken as to the meaning of the word "submission" in 
s. 5(5) of the 1996 Act, as not every written response is a submission. 
The DAC in its February 1996 Report, para 39, makes it clear that 
informal written communications between the parties do not suffice to 
create a s. 5(5) estoppel, and that formal submissions are required. 95 
Since the precise scope of the phrase `statements of claim and defence' 
in art. 7 (2) of the Model Law is unclear, it is difficult to say whether an 
informal statement of claim and defence suffices to create an estoppel. 
Some doubt if an uncontradicted statement concerning the alleged 
existence of an arbitration agreement in a letter simply relating to an 
appointment would amount to a `written submission', but that such an 
uncontradicted statement in a letter seeking a direction, to which the 
other party responds, could be covered. 96 Once again, it is arguable if 
the scope of `in arbitral and legal proceedings' (under the 1996 Act) is 
bigger than the scope of `contained in an exchange of statement of claim 
and defence'(under the Model Law). From my point of view, the former 
is bigger, since there could be some other documents transferred in the 
arbitral and legal proceedings, besides the statements of claim and 
defence. The 1996 Act requires the submission to be a formal written 
one, while the Model Law is not clear about this issue. Under the 1996 
94 See, however, HS mal Ltd v. Goldroyce Garment Ltd [1994] ADRLJ 298. 
95 The DAC in its February 1996 Report, para 39. 
96 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 3`' 
ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,61. 
70 
Act, a party would not be regarded as failing to deny the existence of an 
agreement if he does not respond at all. By contrast, complete silence 
under the Model Law may impliedly create an agreement. Thus the 
Model Law would appear more generous. However, the phrase under 
the 1996 Act `in arbitral and legal proceedings' is wider than the phrase 
in the Model Law `in an exchange of statements of claims and defence'. 
Consequently, it is better for Chinese law to make a rule which says that 
an exchange of written submissions in arbitral or legal proceedings in 
which the existence of an agreement otherwise than writing is alleged by 
one party against another party and not denied by the other party 
constitutes an agreement in writing. 
In light of s. 5(3) of the 1996 Act, a non-written agreement that 
incorporates by reference the terms of a written agreement containing an 
arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement in writing. It is 
obvious where parties agree by reference to an oral agreement, the 
agreement they make is not in writing. Moreover, to incorporate the 
written terms the reference must be sufficient. Section 6(2) requires the 
reference must be such as to make that clause part of the agreement. The 
`terms which are in writing" could include, for example, a standard form 
of agreement containing an arbitration clause, or a specific written 
agreement containing such a clause, or a set of written arbitration 
71 
rules. 97 
Section 5(3) provides support for the proposition that a partly oral 
agreement is within the phrase "agreement... made in writing" under 
s. 5(2), by stating that "where the parties agree otherwise than in writing 
by reference to terms which are in writing, they make an agreement in 
writing. " Section 5(3) is also primarily designed to give effect to many 
types of agreements which are purely oral, but which refer to the terms 
of a written agreement containing an arbitration clause, e. g. oral sale of 
goods contracts which may be taken to have incorporated standard 
commodity arbitration rules, on the basis of the fact that the seller has 
performed the contract. Section 5(3) will operate to full effect only 
where the oral agreement is confined to the incorporation of arbitration 
terms only. It may also cover an agreement by conduct, which is plainly 
referable to a written document containing an arbitration clause, as 
where a party proposes to contract on written terms, and the other 
accepts them by performing the contract in accordance with them. Thus 
where an offer document, containing an arbitration clause, is issued to 
the public at large, the terms of which may be accepted by conduct, any 
person who accepts the offer by conduct is bound by the arbitration 
clause, on the basis that the agreement refers to terms which are in 
97 Section 6 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
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writing in accordance with s. 5 (3) of the 1996 Act. 98 Art 7(2) of the 
Model Law provides that "the reference in a contract to a document 
containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement 
provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to 
make that clause part of the contract. " It is obvious that a reference to an 
oral agreement is insufficient and where the reference is to a document, 
the reference must be so sufficient to make that clause part of the 
contract. The working Group pointed out that this language should not 
be understood as requiring an explicit reference to the arbitration clause 
in the other document 99 I cannot see any reason why an agreement by 
conduct should not be covered. Where a party performs according to a 
written clause, he should be regarded to agree with the clause by his 
conduct. Although the provisions in the 1996 Act and the Model Law do 
not recognize literally the effect of agreements by conduct, agreements 
by conduct are covered under the two laws. Where a party proposes to 
contract on written terms, and the other accepts them by performing the 
contract in accordance with them, that performance is plainly referable 
to a written document containing an arbitration clause, and could 
constitute an agreement referring to writing in accordance with s. 5(3) of 
the 1996 Act. 10° The approaches of the two laws are basically similar, 
98 National Boat Shows Ltd v. Tameside Marine July 2001, unreported (invitation to take up display 
space at a boat show). 
91 And its national law did not recognize arbitration agreements so evidenced (New York Convention, 
ArticleVII (1)). 
100 National Boat Shows Ltd v. Tameside Marine July 2001, unreported (invitation to take up display 
space at a boat show). 
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and the Chinese law could adopt either of them. 
Section 5(2)(c) of the 1996 Act allows a single party to record a binding 
arbitration agreement by some form of writing, and the arbitration 
agreement is then effective, without more. This subsection is best 
regarded as safety net provision, for it catches those agreements not 
committed to writing but for which there is some evidence in other 
documentation. The subsection is amplified by s. 5(4), under which it is 
also possible for one of the parties, or a third party to make such a 
record. In either case the recording must have the authority of both 
parties. The authority can presumably be given orally. '0' The purpose of 
the sub-section is explained by the DAC in its February 1995 Report, 
pars 37, to incidentally facilitate flexibility during hearing, promoting 
flexibility in determining whether or not an agreement exists. 102 
Variations to the arbitration agreement or agreements as to procedural 
matters which are made orally will still be effective for the purposes of 
this Part of the Act if they have been duly recorded, with authority. It is 
also admissible for the tribunal to carry out the recording as the 
authorized third party. It is plainly open to a court to conclude there is an 
agreement evidenced in writing in a case where there is some oral and 
some written evidence. It is to be noted that the subsection has no 
101 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,61. 
102 The DAC in its February 1995 Report, para 37. 
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I 
temporal limits. In practice, the need for authorization of the recording 
may prove to be of little significance. Thus, if one party makes a 
contemporary attendance note of telephone or other conversation, that 
note amounts to written evidence only where the other party has 
authorized the recording to be made. Yet as the authorization is required 
by the wording of the section to apply to the recording, rather than to the 
information contained in the recording, it would seem to follow that if 
one party makes an attendance note to the knowledge of the other party, 
it is admissible, even if the other party may subsequently take issue with 
the content of that note. 103 Under the Model Law, there is not an 
independent provision about an agreement evidenced in writing. But it 
indicates that an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of 
telecommunication constitute an agreement in writing only if they 
provide a record of the agreement. It can be seen from that that, under 
the Model Law the scope of exchange of communication is smaller than 
that under the 1996 Act, since the latter does not require the exchange of 
communication to be a record of the agreement. It also obvious that the 
scope of agreements evidenced in writing is smaller than that under the 
1996 Act, since the latter does not require the evidence to be an 
exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of 
telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement. Under the 
Model Law, to be an agreement in writing, an exchange of 
103 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,2-6. 
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communication must be a record of the agreement, and there is no an 
independent provision about agreements evidenced in writing. The 1996 
Act indicates that both agreements made in exchange of communication 
and agreements evidenced in writing constitute agreements in writing. 
The approach of the 1996 Act is preferable, and so Chinese law should 
adopt it. 
IV. Conclusion 
The requirement of choice of arbitration agency under Chinese 
arbitration law has two main disadvantages. First of all, the requirement 
of choice of arbitration agency rejects ad hoc arbitration, which has lots 
of merits that institutional arbitration does not have. If ad hoc arbitration 
is rejected, the will of parties to have ad hoc arbitration in China will not 
be achieved, and an imbalance between obligations and rights of China 
under the New York Convention would be caused. Secondly, the 
requirement gives the arbitral tribunal and the court a heavier burden to 
examine the validity of arbitration agreements. Therefore, it is suggested 
that Chinese arbitration law should adopt the approach of either the 
Model Law or the 1996 Act, which has no requirement for the parties to 
choose an arbitration agency. Chinese arbitration law requires arbitration 
agreements to be in writing, not recognizing oral agreements, but it does 
76 
not give clear rules as to what constitutes "in writing". It is suggested 
that China could adopt the 1996 Act which permits oral agreements 




THE STAYING OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
Where the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, either 
before or after a dispute has arisen, if a party considers it is more 
beneficial to go to court, it is possible that he would choose do so 
without showing the arbitration agreement to the court. When the other 
party comes to be aware of the litigation brought by that party, he may 
invoke the arbitration agreement before the court, asserting that the 
dispute should be dealt with by arbitration. In these circumstances, must 
the court stay the legal proceedings, or does it have discretion, and if so 
within what parameters? This chapter aims to consider how Chinese law 
directs a court to react such cases, and compares this to position under 
the 1996 Act and the Model Law. 
I. The Chinese Approach to Staying Legal Proceedings 
A. Before the 1994 Arbitration Law 
Before 1994 when the Arbitration Law of the PRC was promulgated, the 
Chinese law of arbitration stated that arbitration agreements could 
overcome the jurisdiction of the courts. For example, Article 257 of the 
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Civil Procedure Law provided that, with respect to contractual disputes 
arising from the foreign economic, trade, transport or maritime activities 
of China, if the parties included an arbitration clause in the contract, or 
subsequently reached a written agreement on arbitration, they must 
submit any dispute to arbitration by the foreign affairs arbitration agency 
of China, and might not bring a suit in a people's court. 
This provision is quite different from corresponding laws in most other 
countries. Most countries require courts to refuse to accept cases 
concerning a dispute which is within the scope of an arbitration 
agreement, or to stay the proceedings so that the arbitration agreement 
may be supported. By contrast, Article 257 imposes a requirement upon 
the parties, rather than the courts. In light of this rule, the parties lose the 
right to go to the court as soon as they make an arbitration agreement. 
Obviously, the provision not only diminishes the legal effect of 
arbitration agreements upon the courts, since the court is not expressly 
forbidden from accepting the case, but also adversely affects the 
flexibility of arbitration and the autonomy of the parties, in that the 
wording of the provision seems to prevent the parties abandoning the 
arbitration agreement by mutual consent. Furthermore, it is not clearly 
provided that whether a court should stay the proceedings where the 
respondent party to litigation invokes an arbitration agreement. 
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In 1992, the SPC published `Opinion on the application of the Civil 
Procedure Law', which gives an answer to the problem that whether the 
court should stay when an arbitration agreement is invoked. Section 148 
of the Opinion indicates that where a party goes to the court without 
reference to an arbitration agreement, if the other party responds to the 
action, the court would have jurisdiction over the case. It can thus be 
seen that even after making, an arbitration agreement, the parties still 
have right to go to the court. The court may accept the case, if the party 
initiating legal action does not state that there is an arbitration agreement. 
Once the court has accepted the case, if the other party does not 
challenge its jurisdiction, the court would then have jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the Opinion does not make the following problems clear: 
" whether the court should stay proceedings if the other party 
challenges its jurisdiction, or simply does not respond to the action; 
" whether the court should stay proceedings of its own motion; 
" whether the court has the right to force the parties to arbitration. 104 
Another problem is the relationship between the validity of arbitration 
agreements and the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts. Article 34 of the 
Civil Procedure Law confines the scope of exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts, by providing that lawsuits concerning real estate, harbour 
104 Deng, Be, `On staying the court proceedings and enforcing the arbitration agreement: discussion 
about the support of the court to the validity of arbitration agreements', Vol. 57, No. 6, Journal of 
Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 2004,845. 
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operations, inheritance, disputes arising from the performance of 
contracts for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, or Chinese-foreign 
contractual, joint ventures, or Chinese-foreign cooperative exploration 
and development of natural resources shall be under the jurisdiction of 
the people's courts of Chinalos 
Yet under Chinese law, the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts does not 
necessarily oust the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. The Law on 
Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures and the Law on Joint 
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment state that any disputes 
between the Chinese and foreign parties arising from the execution of the 
contract, or under the articles of association for a contractual joint 
venture, shall be settled through consultation or mediation. If either party 
is unwilling to settle the dispute through consultation or mediation, or 
they have failed to settle the dispute by those means, the parties may 
submit it to a Chinese arbitration agency or any other arbitration agency 
for arbitration in accordance with an arbitration clause in the original 
contract, or a subsequent written arbitration agreement106. "The opinion" 
stipulates that by virtue of Articles 34 and 246 of Civil Procedure Law, 
the parties are not entitled to make an agreement conferring jurisdiction 
on foreign courts to deal with matters which are within the exclusive 
105 Article 246 of the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC 1991. 
106 Article 24 of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, Article 15 of the 
Law of the PRC on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investme 2001, 
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jurisdiction of the people's courts of China, but they are entitled to agree 
to refer such cases to arbitration. 107 That Chinese law admits that the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the court might yet yield to an agreement to 
arbitrate is not illogical, as arbitration and litigation are different ways of 
resolving disputes, and if an arbitration agreement could not oust the 
jurisdiction of the court, whether domestic or foreign, international 
arbitration could hardly operate. 
B. After the 1994 Arbitration Law 
The Arbitration Law deals comparatively clearly with the problems 
which were not resolved by the Opinion, and makes the relationship 
between the validity of arbitration agreements and the jurisdiction of the 
courts more explicit. Article 5 provides that if the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate, the court shall not accept a suit brought by a single party, unless 
the arbitration agreement is invalid. Article 26 provides that where the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate, but one brings a suit without notifying 
the court that there is an agreement for arbitration and, after the court has 
accepted the case, the other party submits the agreement for arbitration 
before the first hearing, the court shall reject the suit, unless the 
arbitration agreement is invalid. It is obvious that only the other party, 
i. e., the party against whom legal proceedings are brought, can apply the 
107 Article 305 of `The Opinions of the SPC on the Several Matters of the Application of the Civil 
Procedural Law of the PRC' Law Issue No. 22 (1992), July 14,1992.. 
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court to stay. If the other party fails to raise objection to the court's 
acceptance of the case before first hearing, it shall be regarded as having 
abandoned the agreement to arbitrate, and the court shall continue the 
hearing. It is obvious that the time-limit set up by the Arbitration Law of 
the PRC is ineffective to safeguard the legal proceedings against dilatory 
tactics. Fortunately, Article 6 of the CIETAC Rules provides that a 
jurisdictional plea shall not be put forward after the first substantive 
defence is submitted by the respondent, while a jurisdictional plea 
regarding a counterclaim shall not be put forward after the first 
substantive defence to that counterclaim is submitted. 
In light of those provisions108, where the parties have agreed to arbitrate, 
yet one seeks to litigate, the court should not accept the case if it is aware 
of the existence of the agreement. If it is not aware of the existence of 
agreement, it should accept the case. The other party may invoke the 
arbitration agreement and challenge jurisdiction of the court, but must 
make any challenge before the first hearing. If he fails to do so, he would 
be deemed to abandon the arbitration agreement, and the court has 
jurisdiction. If the party invokes the arbitration agreement after the first 
hearing, and challenges the jurisdiction of the court, the court should 
108 Deng, Be, `On staying the court proceedings and enforcing the arbitration agreement: discussion 
about the support of the court to the validity of arbitration agreements', Vol. 57, No. 6, Journal of 
Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 2004,845. 
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dismiss the challenge'09. If the party invokes the arbitration agreement 
before the first hearing, the court should stay the proceedings and 
dismiss the action. 110 It seems that the court should dismiss the case, 
rather than stay the legal proceedings, providing it considers the 
arbitration agreement valid. The `Notice of several problems of 
application of Arbitration Law of the PRC' provides that where the 
parties have made an agreement in writing to abandon the arbitration 
agreement, if one party goes to the court, the court should accept the 
case. "' 
Can the court stay the proceedings and start to examine the validity of 
the arbitration agreement of its own motion, or may it do so only if the 
parties apply? Does it have discretion as to whether to examine the 
validity of arbitration agreements or not? - The court could supervise 
the arbitration by examining the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
Alternatively, it may supervise the arbitration by nullifying awards or 
refusing to enforce them, neither of which is possible unless a party 
applies to the court. 112 The parties have the right to choose whether to 
challenge jurisdiction! 13 It can be seen from those provisions that the 
109 'Opinion of the Shanghai High Court of enforcement of the Arbitration Law of the PRC' made by 
the Shanghai High Court on 16th, July, 2004. 
110 Guangli Exploitation Company v. Shenzhen New Xu Guang Machine Limited Company, Cai Zi 
No. 114, Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court, 1998. 
111 Section 1 of `Notice of Several Problems on Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC' by 
the SPC, Law Issue No. 4 (1997), Mar. 26,1997. 
113 Article 20 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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principle that the autonomy of the parties should be protected is a basic 
principle of Chinese arbitration law. In light of that principle, the parties 
should have not only the right to choose arbitration to resolve their 
disputes, but also the right to abandon the arbitration agreement 
implicitly or explicitly, if they agree to do so. 
Article 26 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC provides that when the 
parties have reached an agreement to arbitrate, but one party brings a 
suit in the people's court without notifying the court of the existence of 
the agreement, and after the court has accepted the case the other party 
submits the agreement before the first hearing, the court shall reject the 
suit, unless the agreement is invalid'14. Obviously the law does not 
stipulate that the court is entitled to refer the parties to arbitration. 
"The opinion on the application of Civil Procedure Law" made by the 
SPC states that, in light of Article 111(2) of the Civil Procedure Law, 
where the parties have agreed to arbitration in a written contract, or have 
agreed in writing to arbitrate after the dispute arises, if one party goes to 
court, the court shall reject the suit and instruct the plaintiff to go to 
arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement is invalid or unenforceable 
because of the ambiguity of its content' 15. The `Notice of Several 
Problems in the Application of the Arbitration Law' indicates that 
arbitration agreements made before the promulgation of the Arbitration 
Law continue to be valid. If one party goes to the court, the court should 
decline to accept the case and advise the party to go to arbitration 116. It 
114 Article 26 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 115 Article 145 of 'The Opinions of the SPC on the Several Matters of the Application of the Civil 
Procedural Law of the PRC' Law Issue No. 22 (1992), July 14,1992. 
116 Section 1 of 'Notice of Several Problems on Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC' by 
the SPC, Law Issue No. 4 (1997), Mar. 26,1997. 
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can be seen from these decisions that, where the arbitration agreement is 
valid, the court should not only refuse to accept the case, but also advise 
the parties to go to arbitration. However, it is not clear whether the court 
will actually refer the parties to arbitration. In practice, in most cases the 
courts simply dismiss the suit, without referring the parties to arbitration, 
nor even advising them to refer the dispute to arbitration. "? 
In terms of the legislation, where the arbitration agreement is invalid, 
the court has jurisdiction. Thus the court should examine whether an 
arbitration agreement is valid or not. The court may not rule the matter 
at its discretion. The SPC definitely requires that the court should not 
accept a case where a objection on the validity of arbitration agreement 
is filed to the court after the first hearing at the arbitration tribunal or a 
petition for confirming the validity of arbitration agreement is presented 
to the court after, the arbitration agency makes a decision. Besides, a 
petition for setting aside a decision made by arbitration agency on the 
validity of arbitration agreement may not be accepted by the court. 
118As regards the determination of the validity of arbitration agreements, 
there are three basic kinds of situation: First of all, where the parties 
have doubts as to the validity of an arbitration agreement, and one asks 
the arbitration agency for a decision, while the other asks the court for a 
117 Hong Kong Zhen Lian International Limited Company of Hong Kong, Du Stock Limited 
Company of Xiang Zhou, Zhuhai v. Jian Yuan Engineering Limited Company of Zhu Hai Economic 
Especially District (1998) Zhu Civil Chu Zi No. 45. Hu Bei Press Import and Export Company v. Hu 
Bei Dong Hu Compact Disc technology Limited Company. (2004) Wu Civil Commercial Foreign 
Chu Zi No. 9. 
1 18 Article 13, }'iterpretation on the Application of the Arbitration Law of PRC' by the SPC. 
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ruling, if the agency makes a decision before the court accepts the 
request, the court may not accept the request. If at that point the agency 
has not made a decision, the court shall accept the request and instruct 
the agency to stay its proceedings. If, after the arbitration agency makes 
its decision on jurisdiction, a party appeals to arbitration, while the other 
party requests the court for a ruling regarding the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, the court shall accept the case and instruct the 
arbitral institution to stay its proceedings. 119 Secondly, where a party 
refers the dispute to arbitration, and the other party asks the court to 
make a determination that the arbitration agreement is invalid, the court 
should accept the application, rather than stay. Article 6 (4) of the 
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) provides that a jurisdictional 
challenge should not affect the arbitration proceedings. `Challenge' 
under this article includes challenges made to the arbitral tribunal and 
the court. Therefore, where a party applies to the court to determine the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, the tribunal need not suspend the 
arbitration proceedings. Under this circumstance, after the party applies 
to the court to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement, if the 
party who refers the dispute to arbitration applies to the arbitration 
agency to make a determination that the arbitration is valid, the court 
should stay its proceedings. Thirdly, where a party refers a dispute to 
119 `The Official and Written Reply to the Questions about Affirming the Validity of 
Arbitration Agreement' by the SPC, Law Interpretation No. 27 (1998), October 21, 
1998. 
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arbitration, and the other brings legal proceedings, the court should 
examine the validity of the arbitration agreement: The tribunal need not 
suspend its proceedings. Under this circumstance, if after the court 
begins to examine the validity of the arbitration agreement, the party 
who refers the dispute to arbitration goes to arbitration agency for a 
determination on the validity of the arbitration agreement, again the 
court should stay its proceedings. If, after examining the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, the court considers it valid, it should stay its 
proceedings. If the court considers the arbitration agreement invalid, it 
should refuse to stay and would have the jurisdiction over the case. 120 
Article 145 of "The opinion on the application of the Civil Procedure 
Law" indicates that when parties have reached an agreement for 
arbitration, but one party brings a suit in the court without notifying the 
court that there is an agreement for arbitration, and, after the court has 
accepted the case, the other party submits the agreement for arbitration 
before the first hearing, the court shall reject the suit, unless the 
arbitration agreement is invalid or unenforceable 121. Therefore, by virtue 
of this opinion, the court may refuse to stay legal proceedings if it 
considers the arbitration agreement is invalid, or unenforceable. `The 
Opinion of the Shanghai High Court on the enforcement of the 
Arbitration Law of the PRC' states that if the arbitration agreement is 
120 Article 5 and Article 26 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
121 Article 145 of "The Opinions of the SPC onthe Several Matters of the Application of the Civil 
Procedural Law of the PRC', Law Issue No. 22 (1992), July 14,1992. 
88 
found to be invalid or unenforceable, the court should treat domestic 
disputes and foreign-related disputes differently. Where the dispute is 
domestic, the court should dismiss any jurisdictional challenge, and 
assume jurisdiction over the case, while foreign-related disputes must be 
referred to a higher court 122. If the appeal court holds the arbitration 
agreement to be invalid or unenforceable, it should refer the case to the 
SPC. Until the SPC makes its decision, no court should make a 
jurisdictional ruling. 123 
Generally, the court should examine only formalities. There are five 
aspects thereof/ (1) Is the arbitration agreement in writing? (2) Have the 
parties agreed to refer disputes to arbitration? (3) Do the parties have 
capacity so to agree? (4) Is the dispute arbitrable? (5) Is the will of the 
parties to arbitrate genuine? 
124 
II. Disadvantages of the Chinese System 
1. There is a conflict in the application of the law. The Arbitration Law 
122 Section 1 of `Notice of Several Problems on Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC' by 
the SPC, Law Issue No. 4 (1997), Mar. 26,1997. 
123 'Opinion of the Shanghai High Court of enforcement of the Arbitration Law of the PRC' by the 
Shanghai High Court on July 16,2004. 
124 Article 17 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994; Article 145 of 'Opinion of on the Several Matters 
of the Application of the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC' by the SPC, Law Issue No. 22 (1992), July 
14,1992. 
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requires the parties to raise a jurisdictional challenge before the first 
hearing, otherwise they are deemed to abandon the right to arbitration. 
Yet the Civil Procedure Law sets up a different time-limit125 - Article 38 
providing that a party must raise a jurisdictional objection after the court 
has accepted a case, during the term for filing the bill of defence. 
Article 113 of Civil Procedure Law provides that the defendant shall file 
a bill of defence within 15 days from his receipt of the copy of the bill of 
complaint. If a defendant has no domicile in China, the court shall serve 
a copy of the bill of complaint on the defendant and notify him to 
forward his bill of defence within 30 days after he receives the copy of 
the bill of complaint. 126 In light of these provisions, parties domiciled in 
China must make a challenge within 15 days of the defendant receiving 
the counterpart. of the bill of complaint, 127 and those who are not 
domiciled in China must object within 30 days of the defendant 
receiving the counterpart of the bill of complaint. As the Civil Procedure 
Law was made earlier than the Arbitration Law, the latter should prevail 
in light of the principle that later law derogates earlier law and that 
special law derogates general law. So the Arbitration Law, rather than 
the Civil Procedure Law, would apply as to the time-limit for raising a 
jurisdictional challenge, as the unity of Chinese law would be damaged 
126 Article 248 of Civil Procedural Law of the PRC 1991. 
127 Article 38 of the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC 1991. 
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if Article 38 of the Civil Procedure Law set up a different time-limit128. 
Therefore, it is recommended that an amendment should be made to the 
Civil Procedure Law so that the integrity of Chinese law could be 
preserved. 
2. Chinese arbitration law only permits the party against whom legal 
proceedings are brought to apply to the court to stay. Yet the party who 
brought the proceedings may change his mind, and agree to refer the 
dispute to arbitration, or in very rare cases may discover the arbitration 
agreement after bringing the legal proceedings. The party who brought 
the proceedings may simply withdraw his claim. Article 140 of Civil 
Procedure Law of the PRC provides that an appeal may be lodged 
against an order applied to rejection of a lawsuit, objection to the 
jurisdiction of a court, dismissal of an action. 129 `The SPC's Opinion 
on the Matters concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law' 
provides that after the court dismisses the action, where the plaintiff 
brings an action against the dispute again, if the requirements to 
commence an action are satisfied, the people's court should accept the 
case. 130 However, the only case in which the requirements can be 
satisfied after the dismissal of the court is, after the dismissal the 
128 Qing Xucai, 'Discussion about Article 26 ofArbitration Law of PRC', in Translation of the 
University of Zhongnan Finance and Economics, No. 1. p 101 (1999). 
129 Article 140 of the Civil Procedure Law of PRC 1991. 
130 Article 142 of 'The Opinions of the SPC on the Several Matters of the Application of the Civil 
Procedural Law of the PRC' Law Issue No. 22 (1992), July 14,1992. 
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plaintiff persuades the defendant to abandon the arbitration agreement in 
writing and the defendant agrees to litigation. In practice, this kind of 
thing never happens in China. Therefore, after the court dismisses the 
action, the plaintiff cannot bring the action again, and the plaintiff is 
permitted to appeal against the dismissal of the court. Article. 144 of the 
Opinion provides that after the party withdraws his claim, if the party 
brings the action against the same dispute, the court should accept the 
case. 131 Since the legal results of dismissing the action by the court and 
withdrawing the claim by the party are different, and it is possible that a 
party does not want to withdraw his claim, but wants to apply the court 
to dismiss the action. In that case, if that party does not have the right to 
apply to the court to stay, it seems that autonomy of the parties would be 
destroyed. 
In this area, the main disadvantage of Chinese arbitration law is the 
conflict of applicable laws, and the limits on who can apply. The first 
can be resolved simply by changing the rules of the Civil Procedure Law. 
To resolve the latter problem, one might have reference to more 
developed laws. More importantly, the Chinese law system of staying 
legal proceedings is based on the fact that the Chinese arbitration law 
does not adopt the beneficial principle of Competence-competence. If 
the principle of Competence-competence were adopted by China, the 
"1 Article 144 of `The Opinions of the SPC on the Several Matters of the Application of the Civil 
Procedural Law of the PRC' Law Issue No. 22 (1992), July 14,1992. 
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system of staying legal proceedings needs to be changed accordingly. 
The next section will attempt to deal with the problems which may arise 
if China adopts the principle of Competence-competence. 
III. The Approach of the Laws Operating in the UK 
As ever we refer to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which may be 
followed, looking at the 1996 Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Article 8 of the Model Law provides that a court before 
which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an 
arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not later than when 
submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the 
parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed. In term of this provision, 
any party could make such a request. Permitting any party, rather than 
only the party against whom legal proceedings are brought, to apply for 
a stay effectively protects the autonomy of the parties. Under the 1996 
Act, only the party against whom legal proceedings are brought may 
apply to the court to stay the proceedings. 132 Chinese arbitration law 
should adopt the stance of the Model Law in this regard. The time-limit 
for making such a request set up under the Model Law is "not later than 
when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. " It 
132 Section 9 (1) of the 1996 Act. 93 
does not preclude an application being made simultaneously with a step 
which would otherwise be inconsistent with the request for a stay. 
Equally s. 9 of the 1996 Act provides that an application may not be 
made by the party before taking the appropriate procedural step to 
acknowledge the legal proceedings against him or after he has taken any 
step in those proceedings to answer the substantive claim. 133 The 
chance of a party using recourse to arbitration as a dilatory tactic is thus 
enormously reduced. It is contemplated by the Model Law and the 1996 
Act that a party may make an application co-incidentally with his first 
statement on the substance of the dispute, and Chinese arbitration law 
boasts a similar provision. 
It can be seen from Article 8(1) of the Model Law that the court will only 
grant a stay when the relevant conditions are fulfilled. One of the 
conditions is a timeous request by a party. 134 Therefore the court may 
not stay its proceedings of its own motion. 135 Under the 1996 Act, the 
court has no power to grant a stay of legal proceedings, unless a party 
makes such an application. 136 The reason why the Chinese arbitration 
133 Section 9 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
134 Broches, Aron, `The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: an 
exercise in international legislation', 18 N. Y. I. L. 1987,43. 
135 During the discussion in the Working Group of what became Article 8(1), some support was 
expressed for a proposal to delete the requirement of the request of a party. The proposal was rejected 
and the requirement maintained in order to be consistent with the New York Convention text, an 
argument frequently indiscriminately used, rather than for the compelling reason that a court should 
not be permitted to enforce an arbitration agreement against the will of the parties. 
136 Tweeddale, Keren & Tweeddale, Andrew, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, London: 
Blackstone Press Limited, 1998,57. 
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law, the Model Law, and the 1996 Act all forbid the court to stay its 
proceedings of its own motion is that the fact that a party goes to court 
regardless of an arbitration agreement shows his will to abandon that 
agreement. In this case, if the other party does not challenge the 
jurisdiction of the court, but instead defends himself or even 
counterclaims, that defence or counterclaim means he abandons the 
arbitration agreement too. Since both parties have abandoned the 
arbitration agreement, the court should respect their wishes and deal with 
the case. If the court refuses to accept the case, the parties may neither go 
to court nor refer the dispute to arbitration. Therefore, they have the right 
to decide whether to apply to the court to examine the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, and the court should not stay the proceedings of 
its own motion. 137 
The Model Law does not say whether the court shall stay the 
proceedings or dismiss the action. The Working Group decided that this 
matter should be determined by the procedural law of the adopting 
state. 138 If China wants to adopt this rule, it has to consider whether to 
require the court to stay or to dismiss. The 1996 Act provides that the 
court should stay its proceedings, rather than dismiss the case. Under 
137 Deng, Jie, `On staying the court proceedings and enforcing the arbitration agreement: discussion 
about the support of the court to the validity of arbitration agreements', Vol. 57, No. 6, Journal of 
Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 2004,845. 
138 See, for details, Broches, Aron, `The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration: an exercise in international legislation', 18 N. Y. I. L. 1987,19-22. 
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Chinese arbitration law, the court is required to dismiss the suit. Which 
approach is more beneficial for China? Under the 1996 Act, the court has 
discretion as whether to examine validity of the arbitration agreement, 
and as discussed later, it may stay its proceedings until the tribunal (or 
even the court in Section 3213) makes a decision. Therefore by requiring 
the court to stay its proceedings rather than dismiss the action the Act 
takes an appropriate course. As far as Chinese arbitration law is 
concerned, the court should examine validity of the arbitration agreement 
without any discretion. After the court makes a decision on the validity 
of the arbitration agreement, if it considers the arbitration agreement 
valid, it could simply dismiss the legal action. There is no need for the 
court to stay the proceedings as it would not continue the proceedings 
later on. However, it might be asked whether Chinese arbitration law 
should give the court discretion to examine the validity of the arbitration 
agreement in the future. If that is the case, Chinese arbitration law should 
require the court to stay legal proceedings rather than dismiss the action. 
The Article 8 (1) of the Model Law directs the court to "refer the parties 
to arbitration", which phrase is borrowed from the New York Convention 
and originally the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses 140. It is 
suitable for a treaty to use this phrase to make it clear that courts should 
refrain from hearing and determining the merits of disputes, leaving it to 
139 This contemplates that in certain circumstances a party may directly request the court to 
determine a preliminary point of jurisdiction. 
140 League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. XXVII, p. 158, No. 678, Article4. 
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implementing legislation to translate this objective into the procedural 
laws'4' of the adopting states. But it is not useful for national procedural 
law to adopt this requirement. I have two main reasons for saying this. 
Firstly, where a court rules that it has no jurisdiction because a valid 
arbitration agreement exists, the only way of resolving the dispute is 
arbitration. So if the parties want to resolve the dispute, they must go to 
arbitration, even if the court does not order them to do so. If the party 
who goes to the court in the first place wants to resolve the dispute, he 
would have to go to arbitration, and the other party is not likely to refuse 
to do so, as he has challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground 
that a valid arbitration agreement exists. Should the party who has 
challenged the jurisdiction of the court seek to go to arbitration in order 
to make a counterclaim, it is possible that the other party will refuse to 
arbitrate. In this circumstance, the former party may inform the 
arbitration agency of the ruling of court on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement and question of the jurisdiction. Moreover, if the parties do 
not want to resolve the dispute any more, or have decided to resolve the 
dispute themselves, the court has no right to force them to arbitrate. 
Secondly, the court does not have any practical means of forcing the 
parties to arbitrate, as it could neither send the parties under escort to 
arbitration, nor impose a fine upon them if they do not go. Consequently, 
it would be pointless for the law to provide that the court should refer the 
141 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,43. 
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parties to arbitration. Neither the Chinese arbitration law nor the 1996 
Act includes the phrase "refer the parties to the arbitration. " 
Under both the Model Law and the 1996 Act, the court will not stay its 
proceedings where the validity of the arbitration agreement is in 
question 142. In such a case the court will determine whether there is a 
valid arbitration agreement or not, and only if it concludes that there is a 
valid agreement will it then stay the proceedingsla3. Under Article 8(1) 
of the Model Law, when a arbitral tribunal is dealing with an issue, if a 
party asks the court to consider the issue, arguing that the arbitral 
tribunal has no jurisdiction over it, the court might, but need not, 
suspend its proceedings if the tribunal is dealing with the issue. The 
court is not bound by the decision of the arbitral tribunal. 144It can be 
seen that the court has the discretion whether to examine the validity of 
the arbitration agreement. It is allowed to rule at any time that the 
arbitration agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed". Article 8(2) provides that the arbitral proceedings 
may be commenced or continued when a jurisdictional issue is brought 
before a court. This provision is in accordance with the power of the 
arbitral tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction, i. e., the principle of 
142 
Article 16 of the Model Law and Section 32 of the 1996 Act. 
143 Brise Construction Ltd v St David Ltd [1999] 1 BLR 194. See Tweeddale, Keren &'Iweeddale, 
Andrew, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1998,57. 
144 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,43.. 
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Competence-competence, 145 and aims to protect the arbitral process 
against dilatory tactics. Therefore it is clear that the court and the arbitral 
tribunal can proceed concurrently. The Model Law does not determine 
which of the two proceedings will in fact move first to a decision, and 
thus a conflict of decision might arise. The conflict might arise when the 
tribunal decides to rule on the plea as a preliminary question and decides 
that it has jurisdiction 146. If that decision precedes the ruling of the 
court, any party may appeal against the tribunal's ruling to the court 
specified in Article 6, whose decision shall not be subject to appeal 147. It 
would appear that the court before which the jurisdictional issue is 
pending should be bound by the decision of the court in Article 6. To 
avoid this conflict, it is suggested that the former court should suspend 
its proceedings until the arbitral tribunal has determined its own 
jurisdiction as a preliminary question. Alternatively, the Law should 
require the court in Article 6 to dismiss any request for a decision if at 
that time the court in Article 8 has already made a decision upon the 
validity of the arbitration agreement. 148 
Under the 1996 Act, if in an application for a stay a question arises as to 
145 
Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,48. 
146 Pursuant to Article 16(3), the arbitral tribunal may rule on the plea either as a preliminary 
question or in an award on the merits. 
147 Article 16 (3) of the Model Law. 
148Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,50. 
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whether there is a concluded arbitration agreement between the parties 
or whether the dispute falls within the terms of the arbitration agreement, 
the court may decide that question or give directions to enable it to be 
decided and may order the proceedings to be stayed pending its 
decision. 149 It can be seen that the court under the 1996 Act also has 
discretion as to whether examine the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. When the issue is pending before the court, the arbitral 
tribunal should not be precluded from initiating or continuing the 
arbitral proceedings, in accordance with the Competence-competence 
Principle1S0. The tribunal may either rule the issue of validity of the 
arbitration agreement as a preliminary question1S1 or on a challenge to 
the award'52. After the tribunal has made a decision, whether or not it is 
in favour of its jurisdiction, the party may apply the court specified in 
s. 32 to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement under s. 32. 
153 The decision of the court in s. 32 should be subject to no appeal. If 
the decision of the court in s. 32 is different from the decision of the 
court in s9, a conflict could arise. To avoid this conflict, it could be 
recommended that the court in s. 9 suspends its proceedings until the 
arbitral tribunal has determined its own jurisdiction as a preliminary 
question, or, if the party asks the court in s. 32 to make the decision, until 
149 CPR r 62.8(3). 
150 Section 32 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
151 Section 32 of the 1996 Act. 
152 Section 67 of the 1996 Act. 
153 Section 32 of the 1996 Act. 
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that court has made its decision. Again I leave open the question 
whether the Act could require the court in s. 32 to dismiss a request for a 
decision if at that time the court in s. 9 had already made a decision 
upon the validity of the arbitration agreement. As will be recalled, 
Chinese arbitration law does not have this potential conflict of decisions 
of different courts, since Chinese arbitration law does not adopt the 
principle of Competence-competence adopted by the Model Law and 
the 1996 Act. The other reason is the "official and written reply to 
questions about validity of arbitration agreement made by the SPC on 
October 215t , 1998". However, as mentioned in Chapter 9 (concerning 
jurisdictional matters and the doctrine of separability), it is beneficial for 
China to adopt the Principle of Competence-competence. If China 
adopts the Principle of Competence-competence, the "official and 
written reply to questions about validity of arbitration agreement made 
by the SPC on October 21 t, 1998" will lose its usefulness in practice. In 
that case, the Chinese arbitration law would probably be faced with the 
problem of conflict of decisions, which face the Model Law and the 
1996 Act. The recommendation given above as to avoid the conflict in 
the Model Law and the 1996 Act could also be used to resolve any 
conflict in Chinese arbitration law. The Model Law permits the court not 
to suspend legal proceedings if it finds that the agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. This can effectively 
protect legal proceedings against dilatory tactics. The Chinese 
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arbitration law and the 1996 Act have the similar rules154. 
IV. Conclusion 
To resolve the problems existing in the Chinese arbitration law and the 
problems which might arise if the principle of Competence- competence 
is adopted, it is useful to look to the Model Law and the 1996 Act. 
Chinese arbitration law may adopt the position of the Model Law 
permitting any party to apply to the court to stay proceedings. If China 
adopts the principle of Competence-competence someday, many rules in 
the Chinese arbitration law need to be changed. In that case, the Chinese 
law should adopt the approach in the 1996 Act and require the court to 
stay its proceedings, rather than dismiss the action, as the legal 
proceedings might be continued later. The courts in China should have 
discretion whether to examine the validity of the arbitration agreement, 
adopting the approach of either the Model Law or the 1996 Act. 
154 Section 9 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CREATION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 
In the Arbitration Law of the PRC the non-enforcement or revocation of 
an international arbitral award is subject to more stringent conditions 
than a purely domestic award, in that the revocation or non-enforcement 
of an international arbitral award is only possible on procedural grounds, 
while the non-enforcement or revocation of a domestic award is also 
possible on evidential grounds. Therefore, the principal basis for 
challenging an international arbitral award is the impartiality of the 
arbitral procedures. Undoubtedly, the composition of an arbitral tribunal 
and the process for appointing arbitrators are of the greatest importance 
in this context. As regards the creation of the arbitral tribunal, should the 
law have rules as to the number of arbitrators, and who should be 
allowed to be an arbitrator? Should the parties have the right to agree 
upon key specifics of the arbitral tribunal, and if so, should the law have 
default rules to deal with situations where the parties reach no 
agreement or where the procedures agreed by the parties break down? 
This chapter aims to consider the Chinese approach as to the above 
questions, and how this compares with the approach taken in English 
Law and the Model Law. 
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I. The Chinese Approach to the Creation of the Arbitral 
Tribunal 
A. Arbitration Commission 
Only institutional arbitration is permitted in China. Ad hoc arbitration is 
not permitted under Chinese arbitration law. There are many arbitration 
institutions, which are in charge of accepting the parties' application, the 
employment and dismissal of arbitrators, creating the arbitral tribunal 
and protecting the arbitral process. These institutions are 
nongovernmental bodies, and have relatively consummate arbitration 
rules and lists of arbitrators. 155 The term "arbitration commission" first 
appeared in Article 4 of the Arbitration Law, which provides that in 
settling disputes through arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate should be 
voluntarily reached by the parties concerned; and without such an 
agreement, the arbitration commission must refuse to accept an 
application for arbitration by a single party. '56 This rule has three 
functions: first, it establishes the principle of autonomy of the parties; 
secondly, it permits institutional arbitration and implicitly forbids ad hoc 
arbitration; thirdly, it indicates that the function of the arbitration 
commission is to accept cases, rather than review their merits. '57 In 
155 Song, Xiaoli, Ma Yongshuang, `Discussion on Independence of Arbitration', 6(2) Journal of 
Adult Education of Hebei University 2004,65-6. 
156 Article 4 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
157 Kang, Ming, `How the Arbitrators/Arbitration Tribunal Play the Role in the 
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light of Article 2 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2000), Article 1 
of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005), and Article 1 of Constitution 
Rules of CIETAC (2005), CIETAC shall, by means of arbitration, settle 
independently and fairly disputes arising from international (or 
foreign-related) and domestic economic and trade transactions of 
contractual or non-contractual nature , whether those parties are 
legal or 
natural persons. In China, CIETAC is a major arbitration institution 
dealing with disputes concerning international or foreign economic and 
trade disputes. 158 The main functions of CIETAC are as follows: 
1. accepting international arbitration cases and arbitration cases 
concerning foreign affairs, arbitrations involving Hong Kong, Macao or 
Taiwan being regarded as foreign. 
2. accepting other arbitration cases with authorization of the 
Government or other domestic or international organizations. 
3. supplying other services to resolve disputes where the parties agree 
to permit it to do so. 
4. by virtue of the agreement or application of the parties, appointing 
arbitrators for ad hoc arbitration abroad159. 
5. disseminating, popularizing and researching arbitration and other 
Institutional Arbitration', 2 China's Foreign Trade-Arbitration in China 2002,44-46. 
. 58 In China, the CIETAC only dealt with the disputes concerning international or foreign economic 
relations and trade before implementing its Rules 2000 in which the scope of accepting cases begins 
to extend to the domestic disputes. 
159 It shall be noted that the parties can agree to ad hoc arbitration abroad. In Fujian 
Company of Raw Material for Production v. Jinge Merchant Shipping Limited 
Company, the SPC held that in international arbitrations the parties are permitted to 
agree to ad hoc arbitration abroad. 
105 
resolutions of disputes. 
6. taking part in the related international or domestic organizations. 160 
The Arbitration Law provides that branches of the recognized arbitration 
commissions may be set up in municipalities under the direct 
jurisdiction of the central government, provinces and autonomous 
regions, or in other places according to need. The Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005) state that the arbitration committee shall be 
headquartered in Beijing but with sub-committees in the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone and Shanghai. The arbitration committee and its 
sub-committees are an integral whole. 161 An arbitration commission 
must have its own name, residence, property, members and arbitrators 
available for appointment 162. 
The arbitration committee shall be composed of a chairman, a number of 
vice-chairmen, a secretary-general, commissioners, and a number of 
other employees 163. The chairman, vice-chairmen and commissioners 
shall be experts in law, economy and trade, with practical work 
experience, and must constitute at least two-thirds of the membership as 
160 Article 2 of Constitution Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
161 Article 10 of Constitution Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
162 Article 11 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
163 Article 8 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2000); Article 3, Article 4 of Constitution Rules of 
CIETAC (2005). 
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a whole164. The chairman shall perform the duties endowed by the 
relevant rules and the vice-chairman may take over the duties and 
responsibilities of the chairman if they are entrusted to him by the 
chairman. 165The arbitration committee shall have a secretariat to handle 
routine affairs. 166 and each sub-committee shall have a secretariat to 
handle the routine affairs of that branch. 167 The secretariat helps to 
ensure a proper procedure by handling routine affairs such as 
registration of cases and, acceptance of arbitration fees168. If a case is 
handled by a sub-committee, the duties and functions prescribed to be 
performed by the chairman and secretariat of the arbitration committee 
shall be performed by the chairman and secretariat of the 
sub-committee. '69 
B. The Arbitral Tribunal 
Arbitral tribunals must consider cases and make awards. 170 Arbitrators 
are not representatives of the parties, and must treat the parties 
164 
Article 12 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994; Article 3 of Constitution Rules of CIETAC 
(2005). 
165 Article 9 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2000). 
166 Article 9, para. 2 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2000),; Article 2 (6) ofArbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005). 
167 Article 12 of Constitution Rules of CIETAC (2005); Article 2 (7) ofArbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005). 
168 
Article 4 of Constitution Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
169 Article 11, para. 2,3 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2000); Article 4 (1) of Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005). 
170 
Song, Xiaoli, Ma Yongshuang, `Discussion on Independence ofArbitration', 6(2) Journal of 
Adult Education of Hebei University 2004,65-66. 
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equally. 171 The Arbitration Law provides that the arbitral tribunal can be 
composed of one or three arbitrators. 172 The Law does not prevent the 
parties from making their own agreement on the number of the 
arbitrators. The Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) state that if the 
parties have agreed to vary the Rules, they can act according to their 
agreement, unless it is not capable of being implemented, or it is 
forbidden by the mandatory rules of the place of arbitration 173. It can be 
seen that the parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators. If 
there is no such agreement, or the procedures agreed by the parties break 
down, the Arbitration Law and Arbitration Rules of CIETAC provide 
default rules. The Arbitration Law provides that an arbitral tribunal shall 
be composed of one or three arbitrators, and in the latter case there must 
be a chief arbitrator. 174 The Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) also 
state that an arbitral tribunal shall be composed of one or three 
arbitrators; continuing that an arbitral tribunal shall be composed of 
three arbitrators, unless the parties otherwise agree or the Rules 
otherwise provide. '75 
CIETAC has a list of the panel of arbitrators. 176 The panel is drawn 
171 Article 19 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
172 
Article 31 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
173 Article 4 (2) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
174 Article 30 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
175 Article 20 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
176 
Article 2 (10) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005), Article 10 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC 
(2000). 
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from arbitrators appointed by the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (China International Chamber of Commerce) from 
among Chinese and foreigners who have the knowledge and practical 
experience in law, economic relations or trade, science and 
technology. 177 An arbitrator must meet one of the following 
requirements: 
a. At least eight years experience in the field of arbitration; 
b. At least eight years of experience as a lawyer; 
c. At least eight years of experience as a judge, or 
d. Engaging in law research and teaching, with a senior academic title. 
An arbitration commission shall prepare a list of arbitrators according to 
different specialities. 178 It can be seen that the qualifications required of 
arbitrators are quite demanding. The secretariats of CIETAC and its 
sub-commissions may make a list of arbitrators. The Commission of 
Examining Qualification of the Arbitrators of CIETAC (CEQ) will 
examine the ability of the arbitrators whose names are in the list, and 
CIETAC will then employ any arbitrators who satisfy the CEQ of their 
ability, and will report to the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade. That body then puts the list on record. 179 The strict 
requirements regarding the qualifications of arbitrators and the strict 
regulation of the process of admitting arbitrators to the list ensures that 
177 Article 10 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2000); Article 67 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 
1994. 
178 Article 13 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
179 
Article 14 of Constitution Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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all arbitrators in the list are qualified. 
`The Notice that incumbent judges cannot be chosen as arbitrators' of 
the SPC (July. 13th, 2004) provides that in light of the Judicial Law and 
the Arbitration Law, if judges could be chosen to be arbitrators, the 
relative rules will be broken and legal rights of parties to litigation 
would not be protected. Being an arbitrator is inconsistent with the role 
of a judge. Therefore, judges cannot be arbitrators, and judges already 
chosen as arbitrators had to resign the latter occupation within a month 
after the publication of the Notice. Therefore judges cannot be admitted 
to the list of arbitrators. 
The parties may choose arbitrators from the list or outwith it'80. The 
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) state that where the parties have 
agreed to appoint arbitrators from outside the list, those arbitrators can 
only act after being affirmed by the Chairman of CIETAC. If the parties' 
agreement is breached by the arbitration commission, the awards shall 
not be enforceable'81. In most cases, the Chairman will affirm the choice 
of the parties, as their autonomy must be protected and very few parties 
will choose arbitrators who are obviously unqualified to deal with the 
case. But there are some cases in which the Chairman will disaffirm the 
parties' choice. In light of CIETAC's Regulation on the behaviour of 
180 Article 21 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
181 Article 7 (4) of `Arrangement of Mutual Enforcement of Awards between Mainland and Hong 
Kong SAR', Law Interpretation No. 3 (2000), Feb. 2,2000. 
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Arbitrators, if an arbitrator in the list has discussed the case with either 
party, or has given advice about the case to either party, he cannot be 
chosen as an arbitrator in that case 182. It may be supposed that if the 
parties choose such a person or a judge' 83, the Chairman will disaffirm 
their choice. 
A controversial issue is the existence of "in- house arbitrators". In 
CIETAC, it is common for the Chairman, vice chairman, 
secretary-general, and other full-time managers to be arbitrators. The 
advantage of such "in-house arbitrators" is that they are more familiar 
with the arbitration process. Working full-time in CIETAC they have 
enough time to devote to cases. They are more likely to be experts in 
arbitration, so that arbitrations may proceed faster and the justice of the 
process could be ensured 184. Yet certain scholars doubt their 
independence and impartiality. They argue that, if those who have the 
right to employ arbitrators and to make the list of arbitrators, are 
themselves arbitrators, who can supervise them? They also point out that 
there is a risk that other arbitrators may be unwilling to express opinions 
182 Zhang Meicheng, `On the Legal Status of Arbitration System and the Liability of Arbitration 
Institutions in China', 3(2) Journal of Jiangsu Polytechnic University (Social Science Edition) June 
2002,13-16. 
183 }'otice that Incumbent Judges shall not be Chosen as Arbitrator'bythe SPC, Law No. 129 (2004), 
July 13,2004. 
184 Song, Lianbing, `Approaches to the Several Issues on Amending the Arbitration Law 1994 of 
PRC', 4 Journal of International Economic Law Discussion of reform of system of arbitrators' 2001, 
615. 
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which are different from those of the' "in-house arbitrators", considering 
the relationship between the "in-house arbitrators" and CIETAC. 
In my opinion, concerns regarding "in-house arbitrators" are unfounded. 
The Arbitration Law'85 sets up demanding qualifications required of 
arbitrators. There is strict regulation of the process of admitting 
arbitrators to the list, and the decision as to whether a person is qualified 
to be an arbitrator is not made by one person, but by the Commission of 
Examining Qualification of the Arbitrators of CIETAC (CEQ). Thus 
"in-house arbitrators" are supervised by the Law and the CEQ. The risk 
mentioned above is unlikely to materialise in practice. Since arbitrators 
are experts in law, economy and trade, mostly coming from universities 
and academic research institutions, they have no real incentive to agree 
with "in-house arbitrators", and no disincentive to disagree with them. 
Thus they would surely not be afraid to air their own opinions. If the 
arbitrator is a lawyer, it is possible that he may fear that an "in-house 
arbitrator" may have a bias against him in the future, should he appear 
as counsel in a case heard by an "in-house arbitrator". Yet that situation 
might arise whether or not the arbitrator with whom he disagrees is an 
"in-house arbitrator", and it is surely unlikely that any arbitrators will be 
biased against such a lawyer-arbitrator simply because their opinions 
differ in a previous case. However, parties may sometimes have similar 
185 Article 13 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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concerns. When an "in-house arbitrators" is chosen by one party, the 
other may be doubtful as to his impartiality, and may refuse to cooperate 
with the tribunal and decline to abide by the award. In that case, the 
arbitration may be delayed or even completely undone. To avoid this 
happening, the "Regulation of Examination of Arbitrators" provides that 
if the Chairman, vice chairman, or any other arbitrator who works in 
CIETAC is appointed by one party to be an arbitrator, that person shall 
refuse the appointment. 186 By contrast, if such a person is appointed by 
the chairman of CIETAC, he can accept the appointment, as the parties 
would have no reason to doubt his independence and impartiality. 
Permitting the parties to choose arbitrators has two main advantages. 
First of all, the autonomy of the parties is protected, and secondly, the 
parties will always try to appoint arbitrators who are high-minded and 
well qualified. Thus arbitrators will view cases impartially to ensure 
they have a good reputation. Where the parties want to choose 
arbitrators from the list, they can be secure in the knowledge that they 
have chosen an appropriate person. Where they want to choose 
arbitrators outside- the list, supervision is provided by the Chairman of 
CIETAC. Considering arbitration does not have a very long history in 
China and arbitration is not well known by the public, that support and 
supervision is needed. 
186 Article 5 (7) of the `Regulation of Examination ofArbitrators' of CIETAC. 
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The parties also have the right to agree on the appointment procedure, 
including the waiting periods within which the parties must attempt to 
reach agreement. The Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) allow the 
parties to agree to vary the Rules, unless the agreement is not capable of 
implementing or is forbidden by the mandatory rules of the place of 
arbitration. 187 If there is no such agreement, or the procedures agreed by 
the parties break down, the Arbitration Law and Arbitration Rules would 
provide default rules. The Arbitration Law states that where the parties 
agree that the arbitration tribunal is to be composed of three arbitrators, 
each shall choose one arbitrator or entrust the appointment to the 
chairman of the arbitration commission, while the third arbitrator will be 
jointly chosen by the parties or by the chairman of the arbitration 
commission when jointly entrusted with this task by the parties. The 
third arbitrator shall be the chief arbitrator. 188 Where the parties agree to 
have a single, they shall jointly choose the arbitrator or entrust the 
choice to the chairman'89. Where the parties fail to decide on the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal or fail to choose arbitrators within 
the time limit prescribed in the arbitration rules, the chairman shall make 
the decision. 190 
The Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) go into more detail: Where the 
parties agree that the arbitral tribunal is composed of three arbitrators, 
each of them shall, within 15 days after receiving the notice of 
arbitration, choose one arbitrator or entrust the appointment to the 
187 Article 4 (2) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
188 Article 31, para. l of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
189 Article 31, para. 2 ofArbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
190 Article 32 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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chairman of the arbitration commission. If the parties fail to choose an 
arbitrator or entrust the appointment to the chairman, the chairman shall 
choose the arbitrators. 191 The chief arbitrator, within 15 days after 
receiving the notice of arbitration, shall be jointly chosen by the parties, 
or appointed by the chairman if jointly entrusted by the two parties 192. 
As regards choosing the chief arbitrator, each party may recommend up 
to three arbitrators as candidates, and shall submit that recommendation 
to CIETAC within 15 days after receiving the notice of arbitration. If the 
name of one arbitrator appears in both of recommendations, he will be 
appointed chief arbitrator. If the names of more than one arbitrator 
appear in both recommendations, the Chairman of CIETAC shall choose 
one. If no name is recommended by both parties, the Chairman shall 
appoint a chief arbitrator from outwith the recommendations193. The 
functions of the arbitrators can be agreed by the parties194. Where there 
is no such agreement, the legal status of all three arbitrators is the same, 
each having only one vote. However, Article 43 of Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005) provides that where a majority vote cannot be reached, 
the award shall be decided on the basis of the opinion of the chief 
arbitrator. The views of other arbitrators can be written down in the 
record, but do not constitute part of the award. 19S This is echoed in 
191 Article 22 (1) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
192 Article 22 (2) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
193 Article 22 (3) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
194 Article 4 (2) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
195 Article 43 (5) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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Article 53 of the Arbitration Law, which also states that an arbitral 
award shall be decided by the majority, and the views of the minority 
can be written down in the record. Thus where a majority vote cannot be 
achieved, the view of the chief arbitrator is crucial. 
Since the chief arbitrator plays a more important role in the arbitration, 
more attention shall be paid to that appointment. Scholars have 
suggested that a chief arbitrator should: (1) be impartial and have good 
moral character, (2) be an expert in the sort of case concerned, (3) be 
familiar with the arbitral process, (4) be good at speaking and speak 
steadily, (5) master the technology of hearing, (6) have enough time to 
deal with the case, (7) be fluent of foreign languages, if there are foreign 
arbitrators. 
196 
Where the parties agree that the tribunal should be composed of one 
arbitrator, the parties may choose the sole arbitrator in accordance with 
Article 22 (2) and (3) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) 197. 
According to Article 22 (2) and (3), the sole arbitrator shall, within 15 
days after receiving the notice of arbitration, be jointly chosen by the 
parties concerned or appointed by the chairman of the arbitration 
commission jointly entrusted by the two parties. Each party may 
196 Kang, Ming, `How the Arbitrators/Arbitration Tribunal Play the Role in the Institutional 
Arbitration', 2 China's Foreign Trade-Arbitration in China 2002,44-46. 
197 Article 23 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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recommend up to three arbitrators, and shall submit the 
recommendations to CIETAC within 15 days after receiving the notice 
of arbitration. If the name of One arbitrator appears in both 
recommendations, he becomes the sole arbitrator. If the names of more 
than one arbitrator appear in both recommendations, the Chairman of 
CIETAC shall choose one taking into account the nature of the dispute. 
If no name is recommended by both parties, the Chairman of CIETAC 
shall appoint the sole arbitrator from outwith those recommendations 198. 
In practice, the parties rarely agree to choose a sole arbitrator -before a 
dispute arises, while the choice of a sole arbitrator after a dispute arises 
is more rarely still. 
Since an arbitral tribunal must be composed of one or three arbitrators'99, 
where there are two or more parties involved, it is not possible for each 
party to appoint an arbitrator. In such cases, the claimants' side and the 
respondents' side shall, through consultation, each appoint one arbitrator 
from among the panel of arbitrators of the Arbitration Commission, or 
entrust the chairman of the Commission to make that appointment200. If, 
within 15 days from the date on which the respondents' side receives the 
notice of arbitration, either side fails so to appoint or entrust, the 
198 In light of Article 22 (2)(3) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
199 Article 30 ofArbitration Law of the PRC1994; Article 20 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC 
(2005). 
200 Article 24 (1) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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appointment will be made by the chairman201. The parties may choose 
the chief arbitrator or the sole arbitrator in accordance with Article 22 (2) 
and (3) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005)202. Requiring the 
claimants' side and the respondents' side each to appoint one arbitrator 
can effectively prevent the arbitral tribunal from becoming cumbersome. 
Some scholars consider that not permitting each claimant and 
respondent to appoint an arbitrator damages the principle of `equitable 
treatment'. But from my point of view, although the principle of 
`equitable treatment' is an important basic principle, it should not be 
`treated as sacrosanct' 203. It is not right to say that if each party cannot 
appoint an arbitrator the justice of arbitration will be damaged. 
Substantially, equitable treatment in appointing arbitrators means that 
every party has the same legal rights regarding appointment. It does not 
mean every party must have the right to choose an arbitrator. Obviously, 
if the arbitral tribunal permits only certain parties be involved in the 
choice, the principle of `equitable treatment' will be damaged204. But if 
all parties are forbidden to choose arbitrators of their own motion and 
are required to choose arbitrators jointly, the principle of `equitable 
treatment' is not damaged. 05 It would be more unjust if, for example, 
201 Article 24 (2) ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
202 Article 24 (3) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
203 Christopher Stippl, 'International Multi-Party Arbitration: The Role of Party Autonomy', 7 Am. 
Rev. Int'l Arb. 1996,52. 
204 See, e. g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Multipary Disputes: The Search for Workable 
Solutions, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 473, p. 523 (1987). 
205 Martin Platte, 'When Should an Arbitrator Join Cases', 18 (1) Arb. Int'l (2002), 75. 
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there were 3 claimants and 1 respondent, and each could appoint an 
arbitrator. 
Moreover, in most cases, arbitrators are persons who have professional 
knowledge and are high-minded. They will view the case and make 
awards on the basis of the facts of the case and the relevant legal rules. 
Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that the arbitrator chosen by a 
party will favor that party. The Arbitration Rules of CIETAC contain 
provisions as to the requirement of impartiality and independence of 
arbitrators 206. These provisions require arbitrators to ensure their 
impartiality and independence; while a party who doubts the impartiality 
or independence of any arbitrator, may raise an objection to that 
appointment. It can be seen that even if a party has no right to choose his 
own arbitrator, he still can play a role in appointing arbitrators. 
It should be noted that, where the parties are from different countries, 
the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC do not require that the chief arbitrator 
shall be from a third country. Yet this does not mean CIETAC never 
appoints a person from a third country to be the chief arbitrator, even 
though it appoints Chinese as chief arbitrators more often than persons 
from third countries. There are several reasons why CIETAC appoints 
Chinese individuals as chief arbitrators more often than foreigners. The 
206 Article 19 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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fees of foreign arbitrators are high, and arbitral remuneration is modest 
in China. Equally, often parties are not willing to pay such travel costs. 
Moreover, few foreigners would be satisfied with the payment on offer, 
and thus few are willing to become chief arbitrators207. Furthermore, the 
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC require arbitrators to treat the parties 
equitably208. They must be impartial regardless of their nationality. 
Therefore, if the parties have agreed to appoint a person from a third 
country as chief arbitrator, CIETAC shall behave accordingly. Where 
parties have no such agreement, it is unreasonable to doubt the integrity 
of the arbitral tribunal simply because the chief arbitrator is not from a 
third country. So far no award has been deemed unenforceable simply 
because the chief arbitrator is not from a third country. 209 Yet while the 
rules do not produce problems in practice, in order to make them more 
developed, it is recommended they should require that where the two 
parties are from two different countries, the third arbitrator or the sole 
arbitrator shall be from a third country. 
II. The Disadvantages of Chinese Approach 
CIETAC's list of arbitrators is too simple. The Arbitration Law only 
207 Gao Fei, `If the Chief Arbitrator Is Not from A Third Country, Will the Injustice of Arbitration be 
Damaged?, 8 China's Foreign Trade-Arbitration in China 2001,17. 
208 Article 19 ofArbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
209 Gao Fei, `If the Chief Arbitrator Is Not from A Third Country, Will the Injustice of Arbitration be 
Damaged?, 8 China's Foreign Trade-Arbitration in China 2001,17. 
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requires the arbitration commission to make a list of arbitrators in 
accordance with different professional specialities, without requiring the 
list to contain the contact and other details of arbitrators. The list simply 
records the arbitrators' names, academic attainments, titles and 
- professional specialities. The list was made so simple because its makers 
thought this would prevent parties contacting arbitrators in an unlawful 
way210. However, in practice, parties who want to contact arbitrators, 
easily find other ways to discover their details. Moreover, since the list 
is so basic, it is quite difficult for the parties to gauge the professional 
ability of arbitrators, or to know whether the arbitrators have enough 
time to deal with the case. 
III. The Approach of the Laws Operating in the UK 
As ever we refer to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which offers 
two models for consideration - the 1996 Arbitration Act and the Model 
Law Chinese arbitration law, the Model Law, and the 1996 Act all 
permit the parties to agree on the number of arbitrators and the 
appointment procedure. Where there is no such an agreement or the 
agreement made by the parties break down, each law provides default 
rules. Permitting the parties to agree on these issues protects the 
autonomy of the parties, and providing default rules ensures the 
210 Kou Liyun, 'Main Problems of Chinese System ofArbitrators and Suggestions about Reform', 6 
Arbitration and Law 2002,16-28. 
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arbitration proceedings will be conducted successfully. Since there are 
differences in culture and tradition, there are differences between the 
three laws as to the detail of the rights of the parties and the default rules. 
The main difference is that in Chinese arbitration law, the court is never 
asked to appoint arbitrators, whereas under the 1996 Act and the Model 
Law, the court can play a role in the appointment procedure. As regards 
whether judges can be arbitrators, the attitude of Chinese arbitration law 
again differs from that of the 1996 Act and the Model Law. 
Article 10 (1) of the Model Law gives the parties the right to determine 
the number of arbitrators, as the Working Group believed that the Law 
should not contain mandatory requirements as to the number of 
arbitrators, and that the parties should be free to agree on the matter211. 
Equally, s. 15 (1) of the 1996 Act permits the parties to agree on the 
number of arbitrators, and whether there is to be a chairman or umpire. 
The agreement of the parties as to the structure of the tribunal may well 
arise by reference to institutional rules212. If the parties do not specify 
the number of arbitrators, but simply agree that the dispute shall be 
resolved by "arbitrators", there is a presumption that the tribunal shall 
consist of two arbitrators, unless there is contrary evidence213. In light of 
211 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,53. 
212 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
Yd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,87. 
213 Fletamentos Maritimos SA v. Effjonhn International BV [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 311. See 
Tweeddale, Keren & Tweeddale, Andrew, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, London: 
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s. 15 (2), an agreement that there shall be two arbitrators (or any other 
even number) shall be understood as requiring the appointment of an 
additional arbitrator as chairman of the tribunal. Yet where the parties 
specifically agree that the arbitral tribunal shall consist of an even 
number of arbitrators and an umpire, or an even number of arbitrators 
alone, the tribunal shall be composed accordingly. If there is no such 
specific agreement, the tribunal shall be composed of an even number of 
arbitrators and a chairman. 214 
Where there is no agreement as to the number of arbitrators, the Model 
Law and the 1996 Act both provide default rules. Under the Model Law, 
the tribunal shall consist of threearbitrators (or one in Scotland)215. This 
number follows Art. 5 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules216, and 
reflects common practice in international commercial arbitration. By 
contrast, under the 1996 Act the default rule is that tribunal shall consist 
of a sole arbitrator. 217 The DAC considered that the cost of three 
arbitrators was likely to be three times of that of a sole arbitrator, and 
that this burden should not be imposed on the parties unless they so 
chose. In Chinese practice, the parties rarely agree to choose a sole 
Blackstone Press Limited, 1998,103. 
214 Tweeddale, Keren & Tweeddale, Andrew, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, London: 
Blackstone Press Limited, 1998,103. 
215 Article 10 (2) of the Model Law. 
216, If the parties have not previously agreed on the number of arbitrators (i. e., one or three)... three 
arbitrators shall be appointed. ' 
217 Section 15 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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arbitrator. Therefore the default rule provided by the 1996 Act would not 
suit practice in China. 
In practice arbitration agreements often demand that arbitrators have 
certain qualifications. Under the Model Law the parties may apply to the 
court to remove an arbitrator on the ground that he does not possess the 
qualifications required by the arbitration agreement, or may challenge 
the arbitral award on that ground. 218 Under the 1996 Act, a party to 
arbitral proceedings may apply to the court to remove an arbitrator if he 
does not possess the qualifications required by the arbitration 
agreement. 219 If there is no express agreement as to the qualifications of 
arbitrators, there is no basis for the removal of an arbitrator who does 
not possess the qualification anticipated by one of the parties220. In 
Chinese arbitration law, the parties may also demand qualifications of 
arbitrators. The Arbitration Law lays down grounds on which an 
arbitrator can be removed and on which the award shall be set aside221. 
218 Articles 12 and 34 of the Model Law. 
219 Section 24 (1) (b) of the 1996 Act. 
220 
Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,8-10. 
221 
Article 34 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994: An arbitrator shall be withdrawn and the 
parties concerned have the right to request withdrawal, whereas: 1. The arbitrator is a party involved 
in the case or a blood relation or relative of the parties concerned or their attorneys. 2. the arbitrator 
has vital personal interests in the case. 3. the arbitrator has other relations with the parties or their 
attorneys involved in the case that might effect the fair ruling of the case. 4. the arbitrator meets the 
parties concerned or their attorneys in private or has accepted gifts or attended banquets hosted by the 
parties concerned or their attorneys. 
Article 58 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994: If parties concerned have evidences to 
substantiate one of the following, they may apply for the cancellation of arbitral award with the 
intermediate people's court at the place where the arbitration commission resides. 1. There is no 
agreement for arbitration. 2. The matters ruled are out the scope of the agreement for arbitration or the 
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Failure by arbitrators to fulfill the qualifications agreed by the parties is 
included in neither set of grounds. In my view, the Chinese arbitration 
law should permit parties to apply to the court to remove an arbitrator on 
the ground that he does not possess the qualifications required by the 
arbitration agreement, and make this a ground of challenge of the 
arbitral award. 
Neither the Model Law nor the 1996 Act contains restrictions on the 
persons who are allowed to be arbitrators 222. Yet if the court is to appoint 
an arbitrator, Article 11(5) of the Model Law directs that it shall have 
due regard to any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the 
agreement of the parties and to such considerations as are likely to 
secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. The 
parties are free to specify directly, or through the incorporation of 
institutional rules, that nationals of certain States may, or may not be 
appointed as arbitrators223. But where there is no such specification, no 
person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from acting as an 
limits of authority of an arbitration commission. 3. The composition of the arbitration tribunal or the 
arbitration proceedings violate the legal proceedings. 4. The evidences on which the ruling is based 
are forged. 5. Things that have an impact on the impartiality of ruling have been discovered concealed 
by the opposite party. 6. Arbitrators have accepted bribes, resorted to deception for personal gains or 
perverted the law in the ruling. The people's court shall form a collegial bench to verify the case. 
Whereas one of the aforesaid cases should be found, arbitral award should be ordered to be cancelled 
by the court. Whereas the people's court establishes that an arbitral award goes against the public 
interests, the award should be cancelled by the court. 
222 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,8-10; F Davidson, Arbitration, W. Green, pars 6.22 (14 Dec. 2000). 
223 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 28, para. 1. 
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arbitrator224. The Model Law does not require that a sole arbitrator 
should have a nationality other than those of the parties, unless the 
parties so specify225. But where the court is to make the appointment, it 
shall take into account the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a 
nationality other than those of the parties226. The 1996 Act gives no 
such guidance where the court is to make the appointment. Nor does it 
make clear whether any person shall be precluded by reason of his 
nationality from acting as an arbitrator. It is to be supposed that no 
person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from being an 
arbitrator, unless the parties have so specified. There is certainly no 
requirement that a sole arbitrator or chairman shall have a nationality 
other than those of the parties. Chinese arbitration law does not require 
that the chief arbitrator should be from a third country. Yet while the 
rules do not produce problems in practice, in order to make them more 
developed, it is beneficial for the Chinese arbitration law to adopt the 
stance of the Model Law. Under the Model Law, the court shall take into 
account the advisability of appointing an arbitrator from a third country. 
Of course in China the court does not appoint arbitrators, so if Chinese 
arbitration law adopts the stance of the Model Law, it would be for the 
Chairman of CIETAC to take into account the advisability of appointing 
an arbitrator from a third country 
224 Article 11(1) of the Model Law. 
225 A proposal for an explicit provision to this effect was made in the written observation of Sudan 
on the Working Group draft. (Doc. A/CN. 9/263/Add. 1, p. 9 ). 
226 Article 11(5) of the Model Law. 
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Section 93 of the 1996 Act provides that a judge of the Commercial 
Court or an official referee227 may, if in all the circumstances he thinks 
fit, accept appointment as a sole arbitrator or as umpire by virtue of an 
arbitration agreement228, but he shall not do so unless the Lord Chief 
Justice has informed him that, having regard to the state of business in 
the High Court and the Crown Court (or the state of official referees' 
business), he can be made available229. An application that a judge at the 
trial of an action sit in the dual capacity of judge and arbitrator was 
refused on the basis that no one person can fulfill both functions at the 
same time230. In practice appointments of judges as arbitrators are very 
rare, partly no doubt due to their heavy workload. The Model Law does 
not say whether judges can be appointed as arbitrators. The Chinese 
arbitration law forbids judges to be arbitrators. The approach of both 
Chinese arbitration law and the 1996 Act is effectively to ensure that a 
judge cannot rule on a challenge to any award which he himself has 
made. 
Article 11(2) of the Model Law provides that the parties are free to agree 
227 Section 93 (5): In this section-"arbitration agreement" has the same meaning as in Part I. and 
"official referee" means a person nominated under section 68(1)(a) of the SPC Act 1981 to deal with 
official referees' business. 
228 Section 93 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
229 Section 93(2)-(3) of the 1996 Act. 
230 Wilson v. Keen, unreported, Court ofAppeal, June 25,1991. See Sutton, David St. John & Gill, 
Judith, Russell on Arbitration, 22"d ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003,455. 
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on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. Their freedom 
is not unlimited, since their agreement may not run counter to Article 
11(4) (which provides for recourse to the court in defined 
circumstances), nor to Article 11(5) (which provides criteria to be 
observed by the court in appointing arbitrators) 231. Failing such 
agreement, the default rules provided by the Law apply. Article 11(3) 
provides that if the arbitral tribunal is to consist of three arbitrators, each 
party shall appoint one arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a 
request to do so from the other party, and the two arbitrators thus 
appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator within thirty days of their 
appointment. If the tribunal is to consist of a sole arbitrator, the parties 
shall agree on the appointment. There is no period specified for the 
appointment of the sole arbitrator. Section 16(1) of the 1996 Act also 
gives the parties autonomy to agree on a procedure for appointing the 
arbitrator(s), including a procedure for appointing any chairman or 
umpire. The parties may also agree that a particular body should appoint 
the arbitrators. Examples of such appointing bodies are the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators, the London Court of International Arbitration, 
the Royal Institute of British Architects and the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors232. If or to the extent that there is no such 
agreement, the default rules provided by the Act apply. If the tribunal is 
231 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,56. 
232 Tweeddale, Keren & Tweeddale, Andrew, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, London: 
Blackstone Press Limited, 1998,105. 
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to consist of a sole arbitrator, the parties shall jointly appoint the 
arbitrator not later than 28 days after service of a request in writing by 
either party to do so233. If the tribunal is to consist of two arbitrators, 
each party shall appoint one arbitrator not later than 14 days after 
service of a request in writing by either party to do so234. If the tribunal 
is to consist of three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator 
not later than 14 days after service of a request in writing by either party 
to do so, and the two so appointed shall forthwith appoint a third 
arbitrator as the chairman of the tribunal235. If the tribunal is to consist 
of two arbitrators and an umpire, each party shall appoint one arbitrator 
not later than 14 days after service of a request in writing by either party 
to do so, and the two so appointed may appoint an umpire at any time 
after they themselves are appointed and shall do so before any 
substantive hearing or forthwith if they cannot agree on a matter relating 
to the arbitration236. The court has power to extend these time limits 
pursuant to Section 79237 It should be noted that two arbitrators must 
233 Section 16(3) of the 1996 Act. 
234 Section 16(4) of the 1996 Act. 
235 Section 16(5) of the 1996 Act. 
236 Section 16(5) of the 1996 Act. 
237 Section 79 of the 1996 Act: (1) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the court may by order 
extend any time limit agreed by them in relation to any matter relating to the arbitral proceedings or 
specified in any provision of this Part having effect in default of such agreement. This section does 
not apply to a time limit to which section 12 applies (power of court to extend time for beginning 
arbitral proceedings, &c. ). (2) An application for an order may be made-(a) by any party to the arbitral 
proceedings (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal), or(b) by the arbitral tribunal (upon 
notice to the parties) (3) The court shall not exercise its power to extend a time limit unless it is 
satisfied- (a) that any available recourse to the tribunal, or to any arbitral or other institution or person 
vested by the parties with power in that regard, has first been exhausted, and(b) that a substantial 
injustice would otherwise be done. (4) The court's power under this section may be exercised whether 
or not the time has already expired. (5) An order under this section may be made on such terms as the 
court thinks fit. (6) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under 
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appoint an umpire before any substantive hearing, even if at that stage 
there is no disagreement between them238. 
The Model Law, the 1996 Act and Chinese arbitration law all give the 
parties freedom to agree on the appointment procedure, including the 
periods within which the parties must attempt to reach agreement. Yet 
there are differences in these default rules. First of all, the Model Law 
and Chinese arbitration law only provide rules to deal with the situations 
in which the arbitral tribunal consists of one or three arbitrators. Neither 
law contemplates appointment procedures for an even number of 
arbitrators. It is beneficial for the Chinese arbitration law to contain 
default rules, along the lines of the 1996 Act, dealing with an arbitral 
tribunal consisting of an even number of arbitrators. Secondly, the 
periods within which the parties must attempt to reach agreements are 
different in the three laws. The period in Chinese arbitration law is 15 
days, as against 30 in the Model Law, and 14 or 28 days in the 1996 Act. 
The reason why time limits imposed by the default rules in the 1996 Act 
are expressed in multiples of seven days is because that DAC considered 
that the possibility of their expiring on a weekend could be avoided in 
this way. In Chinese practice, where a time limit expires on a weekend 
or a public holiday, the arbitration commission or the arbitral tribunal 
this section. 
238 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,90. 
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permits the period to extend to the next working day. Therefore, the time 
limit in the Chinese arbitration law does not produce problems. There is 
no need for Chinese arbitration law to adopt the time limit imposed by 
the Model Law and the 1996 Act. Thirdly, the 1996 Act and the Chinese 
arbitration law both contain the rules concerning with the period within 
which a sole arbitrator shall be appointed, while the Model Law does 
not. 
Article 11(4) of the Model Law provides that, where the arbitrators 
cannot be chosen under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the 
parties, any party may request the court to take the necessary measure, 
unless their agreement provides other means for securing the 
appointment. It can be seen that pre-eminence is given to the right of the 
parties to agree on the means for securing the appointment. Article 11(4) 
also specifies the situations in which the parties may request the court to 
act. Those situations are: where a party fails to act as required under the 
agreed procedure; where the parties or two arbitrators, are unable to 
reach an agreement expected of them under the procedure; where a third 
party, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to 
it under such procedure. It is noted that Article 11(4) is a mandatory 
provision from which the parties may not derogate, i. e. they may not 
exclude appointment by the court as a last resort239. As mentioned above, 
239 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
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if the parties have reached no agreement on an appointment procedure, 
the default provisions of the Law apply. If the parties fail to appoint 
arbitrators, Article 11(3) enables a party to request the court to make the 
appointment. Article 11(5) indicates that this decision shall be subject to 
no appeal. 
Under s. 17(1) of the 1996 Act, the parties are free to agree how to deal 
with the situation in which each party is to appoint an arbitrator and one 
party refuses to do so or fails to do so within the time specified. If the 
parties have not made such an agreement, s. 17 (1) states that the other 
party, having duly appointed his arbitrator, may give notice in writing to 
the party in default that he proposes to appoint his arbitrator to act as 
sole arbitrator. Section 17(2) then requires the party in default to make 
the required appointment and notify the other party that he has done so, 
within 7 clear days of that notice being given. If he fails to do so, the 
other party may appoint his arbitrator as sole arbitrator, whose award 
shall be binding on both parties as if he had been so appointed by 
agreement. The court has the power to extend the 7 day time limit240. 
Where a sole arbitrator has been appointed under s. 17 (2), the party in 
default may, upon notice to the appointing party, apply to the court to set 
aside the appointment 241. The 1996 Act does not prescribe any grounds 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,57. 
240 Section 79 of the 1996 Act. 
241 Section 17 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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on which the court might do so. Therefore, the court seems to have 
unfettered discretion as to whether to set aside the appointment of the 
sole arbitrator. But that discretion is subject to the general principles 
expressed in s. 1 242. The leave of the court is required for any appeal 
from its decision under this section. 243 By virtue of s. 18 (1), the parties 
are free to agree what is to happen in the event of a failure of the 
procedure for the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. There is no failure 
if an appointment is duly made under s. 17, unless that appointment is set 
aside. Section 16(7) provides that in any other case, particularly if there 
is a multi-party arbitration, the procedure stated in Section 18 applies, 
and the parties are free to agree as to how to deal with the situation 
where the arbitrators cannot be appointed in a multi-party arbitration. To 
the extent that there is no such agreement, any party may apply the court 
to exercise its powers, which include giving directions as to the making 
of any necessary appointments, directing that the tribunal shall be 
constituted by such appointments (or any one or more of them) as have 
been made, revoking any appointments already made, and making any 
necessary appointments itself. Any application must be made upon 
notice to the other parties. 244 In considering whether, and if so how, to 
242 Section 1 of the 1996 Act provides: The provisions of this Part are founded on the following 
principles, and shall be construed accordingly-(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair 
resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense. (b) the parties 
should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest. (c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene 
except as provided by this Part 
243 Section 17 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
244 Section 18 (2), (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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exercise its powers, the court is required to have due regard to any 
agreement of the parties as to the qualifications required of arbitrators, 245 
unless the agreement expresses that certain qualifications are not 
required if the appointment is made by the court under s. 18246. The court 
can either direct one of the parties to initiate some process for making an 
appropriate appointment, or make any appointment that he fails to make. 
Where the tribunal is to consist of more than one arbitrator, there are 
two parties, and the second party fails to appoint an arbitrator, s. 17 will 
apply, and the arbitrator chosen will be the sole arbitrator. Therefore, the 
court will direct that the tribunal shall be constituted by such 
appointments as have been made only if there are more than one 
arbitrator. This power is also likely to be exercised where, for instance, 
two arbitrators have failed to appoint a third arbitrator or umpire, or 
where there are more than two parties, and one has failed to make an 
appointment. As far as choosing an umpire is concerned, if the 
arbitrators cannot agree but fail to give notice of that fact, or if any of 
them fails to join in the giving of notice, any party to the arbitral 
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) 
apply to the court, which may order that the umpire shall replace the 
other arbitrators as the tribunal with power to make decisions, orders 
and awards as if he were sole arbitrator. The leave of the court is 
245 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,95. 
246Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, Yd 
ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,98. 
134 
required for any appeal from its decision under this section 217 . The 
court's power to revoke appointments made allows it to redress the 
balance, since where one party chooses his own arbitrator and the other 
party has an arbitrator imposed by the court, there may be unfairness248. 
Similarly, this power can only be used where there are a number of 
arbitrators, or two arbitrators have failed to appoint a third arbitrator or 
umpire, or where there are more than two parties, and one has failed to 
make an appointment. Moreover, the power can only be invoked where 
there is a failure in appointment, and not by a mischievous party seeking 
the removal of an arbitrator when the appointment procedure had 
otherwise been successfully implemented 249. The court will make an 
appointment itself as a last resort. It would be important to obtain an 
indication of willingness to act from the potential arbitrators whose 
names are put forward, and a further indication of their ability and 
suitability. The court also must take into account the agreement of the 
parties as to the qualification required of the arbitrators250. Where the 
court makes an appointment under s. 18 (3) of the Act, it is treated as 
having the same effect as if it had been made by the agreement of the 
parties251. The leave of the court is required for any appeal from its 
247 Section 21 (5), (6) of the 1996 Act. 
248 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,95. 
249 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,95. 
250 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,96. 
251 Section 18 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
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decision under this section252. 
It can be seen that under the Model Law and the 1996 Act the court 
plays a role in appointment procedure where the parties themselves 
cannot appoint arbitrators, while under Chinese arbitration law, only the 
arbitration commission will play such a role. Since the decision made by 
the arbitration commission in this regard under Chinese arbitration law 
has the same legal effect as the decision made by the court under the 
Model Law and the 1996 Act, it is not necessary for the Chinese court to 
intervene in the appointment procedure. In China, where parties fail to 
make an appointment within an agreed time limit, the arbitration 
commission will appoint arbitrators, but has no power. to give any 
direction as to the making of any necessary appointments prior to 
making an appointment itself. Since a main principle of the modern law 
of arbitration is that the court shall not intervene too much in arbitration, 
Chinese arbitration law could be modernized if the arbitration 
commission was given the power to give directions to the parties as to 
appointment of arbitrator prior to making an appointment itself. 
Furthermore, where there are more than two parties, Chinese law 
requires each side to appoint one arbitrator. When one side has chosen 
its own arbitrator, but the other side has an arbitrator imposed upon by 
252 Section 18 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
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the arbitration commission, it may be said there is unfairness. Therefore, 
it is beneficial for the Chinese arbitration law to adopt the stance of 
1996 Act and give the arbitration commission power to revoke any 
appointments already made. It is noted that the Model Law deals 
separately with the situation where the parties have no appointing 
agreement and fail to choose arbitrators according to the default rules of 
the Law, and the situation where the parties fail to act according to their 
agreed appointment procedure. In my view, there is no need to regulate 
the two situations separately, as the resolutions provided by the Model 
Law to deal with them are the same. The 1996 Act and the Chinese 
arbitration law do not separate the two situations. Under the Model Law, 
the parties are at liberty to agree on the means for securing the 
appointment in their agreement on the appointment procedure. It is 
possible that the parties, who have no agreement on the appointment 
procedure, want to agree on the means for securing the appointment 
after the failure of appointment arises. It seems that this situation is 
omitted and the Law does not say in that case whether the parties could 
agree on the means for securing the appointment. By contrast, the 1996 
Act, by providing that the parties are free to agree what is to happen in 
the event of a failure of the procedure for the appointment of the arbitral 
tribunal, permits the parties to agree how to secure the appointment 
procedure, whether or not the parties have made their agreement on the 
appointment procedure. In China arbitration, the parties can agree on the 
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means of securing the appointment procedure and an agreement on the 
appointment procedure is not required. 
The functions of the arbitrators can be agreed by the parties. If there is 
no such agreement, where there is unanimity or a majority, the decision 
shall be made by unanimity or the majority, and the chairman's view has 
no more weight than that of any other arbitrator. Where there is no 
unanimity or majority, the chairman's view would prevail. One 
difference is that the 1996 Act contains the concept of "umpire" which 
does not exist in the other two laws. The use of an umpire in arbitral 
proceedings is a peculiarly English concept (although Scots law features 
a similar idea in the institution of oversman), of no interest to other 
systems, and rare in practice even in England. 
IV. Conclusion 
To resolve the problems existing in Chinese arbitration law, it is useful 
to look to the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 1996 Act. In Chinese 
arbitration law, there is a gap where the arbitral tribunal consists of an 
even number of arbitrators. Thus Chinese law might borrow the position 
of the 1996 Act in this respect, although in practice the parties are very 
unlikely to create a tribunal with an even number of arbitrators. Chinese 
arbitration law does not regard an arbitrator's lack of agreed 
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qualifications as a ground for removing him or challenging the award. 
Thus the parties have no resource when arbitrators do not possess the 
qualifications agreed by the parties. Chinese law might usefully adopt 
the approach either of the Model Law or the 1996 Act and make this a 
ground for both removing arbitrators and challenging awards. Where 
there are more than two parties, Chinese arbitration law requires each 
side to appoint one arbitrator. When one side chooses an arbitrator, and 
the other side has an arbitrator imposed by the arbitration commission, it 
may be said there is unfairness. In the 1996 Act, the court has the power 
to revoke appointments already made by the parties to redress the 
balance. The Chinese arbitration law may adopt the stance of the 1996 
Act and give the arbitration commission the power to revoke the 
appointments already made. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REVOCATION OF ARBITRAL AUTHORITY AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES 
As we know, it is very important to have appropriate arbitrators. If they 
are not qualified or do not conduct the proceedings impartially and 
independently, their awards will not be just or impartial. Although it is 
important that the parties have the right to appoint arbitrators, it is 
possible that the arbitrators chosen are disqualified or inequitable. Thus 
the power to supervise arbitrators after their appointment is vital. In 
particular, it is important to be able to revoke the authority of arbitrators, 
whom the parties consider to be unqualified or to be conducting the 
proceedings less than impartially. This Chapter aims to discuss the 
revocation of arbitral authority and its consequences, including the 
process of disqualification and challenge, removal of arbitrators by the 
court, time-limits for challenges and responses to challenges. As ever, 
the Chinese approach to the above questions will be compared with the 
approach taken in English Law and the Model Law. 
I. The Chinese Approach to the Revocation of Arbitral 
Authority 
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By virtue of Article 4(2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC(2005), the 
parties are free to agree on grounds for challenge and whether arbitrators 
have a duty to disclose any circumstance, unless their agreement is 
inoperative or in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law of the 
place of arbitration. The reason why the parties' agreement should not 
conflict with a mandatory provision of the law of the place of arbitration 
is because if that is the case, the arbitral award may not be recognized or 
enforced by the court of the place of arbitration. The mandatory rules of 
the Arbitration Law of the PRC regarding the grounds for challenge are 
found in Article 34 which provides that the authority of an arbitrator 
shall be revoked and the parties shall have the right to challenge, where: 
(1). The arbitrator is a party involved in the case or a blood relation of 
any party or the attorney of a party. 
(2). the arbitrator has a vital personal interest in the case. 
(3). the arbitrator has other relations with any party or the attorney of a 
party which might affect the fair ruling of the case. 
(4). the arbitrator has met any party or the attorney of a party in private, 
or has accepted gifts from or attended banquets hosted by such a person. 
Although under the Arbitration Law revocation of authority appears to 
be automatic, no practical means is provided for that to be achieved. 
Thus effectively an arbitrator can only be removed, if a party applies to 
the court for his removal. It is suggested that it is in any case sensible for 
the authority of an arbitrator to be revoked only where an application is 
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made for that to happen. Thus the law might usefully be amended so that 
it is made clear that while an arbitrator is liable to be removed on certain 
grounds, it requires a formal application by a party to achieve his actual 
removal. 
In a broad sense, situations (1), (3) and (4) may fall within situation (2), 
since in each case it might be argued that the arbitrator has a vital 
personal interest in the case253, albeit that the Arbitration Law does not 
give a clear definition of vital personal interests. There is no requirement 
in the Arbitration Law for arbitrators to disclose relevant circumstances. 
Thus the parties can agree to release the arbitrator from the duty of 
disclosure. If there is no such agreement, the Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC provide default rules regarding the grounds for challenge and 
the duty of disclosure. Article 25(1) of those Rules provides that any 
arbitrator appointed by the parties or the arbitration commission shall 
give a written statement of any fact that might produce reasonable doubt 
as to his independence or impartiality. Article 25(2) further requires that 
an arbitrator, throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay 
disclose to CIETAC any circumstances that may produce reasonable 
doubt as to his independence or impartiality. Article 26 (2) provides that 
a party who has justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or independence 
of an appointed arbitrator may make a request in writing to CIETAC for 
253 Wen Be, `Discussion on the Withdrawal of the Arbitrators Who are in Special Status', 2 China 
Foreign Trade -Arbitration in China 2003,48-50. 
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that arbitrator's removal. In such a request, the facts and reasons on 
which it is based must be stated, along with supporting evidence. (It 
should be noted that neither the Arbitration Law nor these Rules regards 
the fact that the arbitrators do not achieve the qualifications required by 
the law or agreed by the parties as a ground of challenge. ) These 
provisions indicate two things. First of all, the ground provided by the 
CIETAC Rules is that circumstances exist that may produce reasonable 
doubt as to an arbitrator's independence or impartiality. Secondly, 
arbitrators must disclose relevant circumstances to CIETAC, and the 
duty is a continuing one. In the light of Article 25(3) of the Arbitration 
Rules, where an arbitrator discloses circumstances producing justifiable 
doubts as to his independence or impartiality, CIETAC will then forward 
any such statement and/or any information disclosed to the parties254. 
Article 4(2) of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules enables the parties to 
agree on a challenge procedure. Nonetheless, their agreement should not 
be inconsistent with Articles 35 and 36 of the Arbitration Law. Article 
35 provides that in requesting removal, the parties must state reasons 
before the first hearing of the tribunal. If such reasons become known 
only after the first hearing, they may be stated at any time before the end 
of the last hearing. Article 36 provides that the removal of an arbitrator 
shall be decided upon by the chairman of the arbitration commission, or 
where the chairman actually serves as an arbitrator, by the arbitration 
commission acting collectively. If there is no such agreement, where an 
arbitrator discloses circumstances that may produce justifiable doubts as 
254 Article 25 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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to his impartiality and independence, a party who intends to challenge 
the arbitrator on the basis of the information disclosed, shall, within ten 
days of receiving the announcement and/or disclosure, send a challenge 
to CIETAC in writing 255 Where an arbitrator is released from the duty 
of disclosure or a party has discovered relevant circumstances which 
have not been disclosed, if the party becomes aware of a factor 
indicating a potential ground of challenge before receiving the notice of 
constitution of arbitral tribunal, he shall, within fifteen days after 
receiving the notice of constitution of arbitral tribunal, intimate that 
challenge to CIETAC in writing. If a party becomes aware of any 
circumstance giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's 
impartiality or independence after receiving the notice of constitution of 
arbitral tribunal, he shall make any challenge in writing within fifteen 
days after becoming aware of the circumstance. No challenge shall be 
made after the last arbitral hearing256. 
Article 29(2) of the Rules indicates that where both the parties and the 
arbitral tribunal consider that there is no need for a hearing, the tribunal 
may adjudicate the case by written record. There is no rule in the 
CIETAC Rules as to time limits for such adjudication, although in 
practice, parties are required to issue any challenge before the statement 
of a substantive defence. Under the Arbitration Law, where the facts fall 
within the grounds for revocation provided by the law, revocation is 
automatic, although the party also has the right to challenge. Under the 
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005), revocation is not automatic, but 
depends on a challenge -being made. Some scholars argue that the 
Arbitration Rules should follow the line of the Arbitration Law in 
255 Article 26 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
256 Article 26 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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providing that revocation is automatic in such circumstances2.57 Yet I 
would argue that the revocation should not be automatic, otherwise the 
autonomy of the parties would be damaged. Rather the Arbitration Law 
should adopt the stance of the Arbitration Rules, and provides that the 
revocation should depend on challenge by a party. 
By virtue of Article 26(4) of its Rules, CIETAC shall, without delay, 
deliver in writing any challenge to the other party, the challenged 
arbitrator, and any other arbitrators. The other party and the challenged 
arbitrator are entitled to respond to the challenge. Article 26(5) provides 
that where one party challenges the authority of the arbitrator, if the 
other party agrees with the challenge, or the challenged arbitrator 
resigns of his own motion, the arbitrator's authority ceases. Neither case 
implies that the challenge made by the party is sustainable. Article 26(6) 
provides that where a controversy remains as to the ground for challenge, 
the Chairman of CIETAC shall make a final decision on the challenge, 
with or without stating his reasons. The arbitrator may continue the 
arbitral proceedings and make an award while the Chairman's decision 
is pending. 258 
Although Article 4(2) of the Arbitration Rules gives the parties the right 
to modify them, Article 37 of the Arbitration Law provides that where 
an arbitrator is removed or is otherwise unable to perform his duty, 
another arbitrator shall be chosen or appointed according to the relevant 
provisions of the law. Therefore, although the parties may agree upon 
the procedure for appointing a substitute arbitrator and whether the 
previous proceedings should stand, they are not at liberty to agree not to 
257 Song Lianbing, `Discussion of Reform ofArbitrators System of China', in Law and Arbitration, 
Dec, 2004, p92 (2004). 
258 Article 26 (7) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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appoint a substitute arbitrator. If there is no such agreement, Article 
27(1) of the Arbitration Rules provides that if an arbitrator is prevented 
de jure or de facto from fulfilling his functions, or has failed to fulfill his 
functions in accordance with the requirements of the Rules within the 
time period specified in the Rules, the Chairman of CIETAC has the 
power to decide whether the arbitrator should be replaced. It should be 
noted that the last sentence of Article 27(1)259 states "The arbitrator may 
also withdraw from office" This is confusing. Since Article 27 deals 
with replacement of arbitrators, it has nothing to do with the withdrawal 
of arbitrators. Article 27(4) of the Arbitration Rules provides that the 
Chairman of CIETAC shall make a final decision on whether an 
arbitrator should be replaced or not, with or without stating the reasons 
" therefore. Article 27(2) states that Articles 22,23 and 24 (procedure for 
appointing arbitrators and failure of appointment procedure) apply in 
relation to the filling of the vacancy as in relation to an original 
appointment. It is for the new arbitral tribunal to decide whether, and if 
so to what extent, the previous proceedings should stand260. It should be 
noted that the Chairman of CIETAC may decide whether an arbitrator 
should be replaced of its own motion, and the application of the parties 
is not needed. 
The terms of Article 28 are very confusing. It provides that if, after the 
conclusion of the last oral hearing, an arbitrator in a three-member 
arbitral tribunal is unable to participate in the deliberations and/or render 
the award owing to his demise or removal from the CIETAC's Panel of 
Arbitrators, the other two arbitrators may request the Chairman of the 
259 Article 27 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
260 Article 27 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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CIETAC to replace the arbitrator pursuant to Article 27. After consulting 
with the parties and upon the approval of the Chairman, the other two ' 
arbitrators may continue the arbitration and make decisions, rulings or 
the award; The Secretariat of the CIETAC shall notify the parties of the 
above circumstances. This creates problems. First, in my view, there is 
no need to provide separately for the above situation. The question 
whether to fill the vacancy should not be affected by the time when the 
arbitrator ceases to hold office. The whole arbitral proceedings should 
not be cut into two stages - before and after the last arbitral hearing. 
Secondly, the essence of the provision contains nothing different from 
Article 27, as under this provision the Chairman of CIETAC still must 
decide whether to appoint a substitute arbitrator. Thirdly, it is not clear 
what the phrase "after consulting with the parties" means. Does it mean 
"upon notifying the parties" or "with the permission of the parties"? 
There is no decisive answer. Fourthly, the last sentence of the provision, 
"the Secretariat of the CIETAC shall notify the parties of the above 
circumstances", is otiose. As, the two remaining arbitrators must consult 
the parties, the parties will thus be fully informed about the situation. 
There is no need for the secretariat to notify the two parties again. It is 
suggested that Article 28 could usefully be deleted. 
II. The Disadvantages of the Chinese Approach 
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1. Chinese arbitration law provides that only if a party has reasonable 
doubt regarding an arbitrator's independence or impartiality, may he 
apply to the arbitration commission to remove the arbitrator. 261 It does 
not permit a party to apply to remove the arbitrator if the latter does not 
possess the qualification required by the law or by the agreement of the 
parties. If a party finds that the arbitrator is disqualified, he has no 
recourse. (Obviously, if both parties have an issue with the fact that the 
arbitrator is disqualified, they can simply agree to remove the arbitrator. ) 
2. Unless the other party agrees with a challenge, or the challenged 
arbitrator resigns, it is for the Chairman of CIETAC to decide whether 
to remove the arbitrator at the first stage, and his decision is final. 262 It 
is arguable that it is sensible not to give the parties the chance to 
challenge the Chairman's decision. 
3. The Arbitration Law does not contain mandatory rules requiring 
arbitrators to disclose facts or circumstances likely to give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. Article 4(2) of 
the Arbitration Rules enables the parties to agree not to require the 
arbitrators to disclose such facts or circumstances. In my view, the 
freedom of the parties in this regard should be qualified. If the 
261 Article 26 (1) and (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
262 Article 26 (5) and (6) of the Arbitration Rule of CIETAC (2005). 
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arbitrators do not disclose such facts and circumstances, should the 
parties find out at a later stage and then challenge the arbitrator's 
authority, time and energy will be wasted. Moreover, without a duty of 
disclosure, it is more difficult for the parties and the arbitration 
commission to become aware of facts or circumstances likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator's impartiality or 
independence. 
4. Article 26(6) provides that the Chairman of CIETAC shall make a 
final decision on any challenge, while Article 27(1) provides that he 
shall have the power to decide whether the arbitrator should be replaced. 
Article 27(3) states that the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether the 
whole or part of the previous proceedings shall be repeated, and Article 
27(4) states that the Chairman shall make a final decision on whether an 
arbitrator should be replaced or not. (Although Articles 27(1) and 27(4) 
seem to have identical content, the latter makes it clear that the decision 
of the Chairman is final. It might be better if Article 27(1) took that form, 
so that Article 27(4) could then be deleted. ) None of these provisions 
indicates clearly whether the decisions made by the Chairman or the 
tribunal shall be subject to appeal. Since, these decisions are not subject 
to appeal, their characterization as "final" should be amended to read 
"subject to no appeal", which is clearer and more straightforward. 
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5. Article 28 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) is confusing 
and unnecessary. It is better to delete it. 
6. Article 29(2) of the CIETAC Rules indicates that where both the 
parties and the arbitral tribunal consider that there is no need for a 
hearing, the tribunal may adjudicate the case by written record. Neither 
the Arbitration Law nor the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC contains time 
limits regarding adjudication by written record. Such a time limit should 
be added to the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC, and there is no reason 
why it should be different from the time limit in adjudication by hearing. 
7. Article 36 of the Arbitration Law provides that the removal of an 
arbitrator shall be decided upon by the chairman of the arbitration 
commission. Where the chairman of the arbitration commission serves 
as an arbitrator, the withdrawal shall be decided upon collectively by the 
arbitration commission. The Law does not give any clue as how this 
collective decision should be made. It is not clear whether the decision 
should be made by unanimity, or by majority, or by some particular 
person in the arbitration commission. Practical problems are created in 
making this decision by the lack of detailed regulation. 
8. Article 37 of the Arbitration Law breaches the autonomy of the parties, 
as it prevents them agreeing whether to replace an arbitrator who is 
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unable to perform his duty. Moreover, its requirement that the arbitrator 
concerned shall be replaced even deprives the Chairman of his right to 
make the decision whether to replace the arbitrator. The decision 
whether an arbitrator who is unable to perform his functions should be 
replaced should be made on a case to case basis concerned, and should 
not be decided by a provision of a mandatory law. Therefore, Article 
37 should be deleted. The parties should have the freedom to agree 
whether an arbitrator should be replaced, and if so, how. 
III. The Approach of the Laws Operating in the UK 
As ever we refer to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which offers 
two models for consideration - the 1996 Arbitration Act and the Model 
Law Chinese arbitration law, the Model Law, and the 1996 Act all 
permit the parties to challenge arbitrators, and if the parties' challenge is 
successful, the authority of the challenged arbitrator will be revoked. 
Since there are differences in culture and tradition, there are differences 
between the three laws as to the detail of grounds of challenge, the 
challenge procedure, and the consequences of a successful challenge. 
The main difference is that in Chinese arbitration law, the court is never 
asked to remove arbitrators, whereas under the 1996 Act and the Model 
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Law, the court can play a role in the challenge procedure. There is also a 
difference between the role of court under the 1996 Act and under the 
Model Law. The 1996 Act does not lay down a time limit for making a 
challenge, whereas under Chinese Law and the Model Law, a party is 
required to make a challenge within a certain period of time, and if he 
fails to do so, he will be deemed to have abandoned his right to 
challenge the arbitrator's authority. 
A. Imposing a Duty of Disclosure 
Model Law. Article 12(1) of the Model Law provides that when a 
person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an 
arbitrator, he shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, 
from the time of his appointment and throughout the arbitral 
proceedings, shall without delay disclose any such circumstances to the 
parties unless they have already been informed of them by him. This 
provision is designed to avoid the appointment of an unacceptable 
candidate. It is clarified and strengthened by stipulating that the duty of 
disclosure is a continuing one and must be carried out promptly. 
1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not explicitly impose a duty of disclosure 
of such facts or circumstances. But certain commentators suggest that 
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such a duty is implicit263, without properly indicating the basis of that 
view and the consequences thereof. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the parties may by 
agreement absolve arbitrators of their duty of disclosure. In the absence 
of such agreement, the arbitrators are subject to a duty of disclosure. I 
suggest that no benefit derives from giving this freedom to the parties, 
as arbitrators are given a chance to conceal facts or circumstances which 
are grounds, for challenge. In the absence of a duty of disclosure, the 
parties will find more difficult to discover those circumstances. 
Therefore, Chinese arbitration law should not give parties this freedom, 
but simply state explicitly that an arbitrator shall disclose any 
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence. 
B. Grounds for Revoking Authority 
Model Law: Under the Model Law, parties are not permitted to agree as 
to the grounds on which arbitral authority may be revoked. Article 12(2) 
provides that the parties may challenge the authority of an arbitrator 
only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess the qualifications 
263 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 3`' 
ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,114. 
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agreed by the parties. A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by 
him, or in whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of 
which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made. By 
providing such limits on challenging a party's own appointee, abuse of 
the challenge procedure can be, to some extent, avoided. The Working 
Group considered it necessary to add the phrase "or in whose 
appointment he has participated", as the policy considerations which 
applied to the case of the party-appointed arbitrator were of equal force 
in the case where the parties jointly appointed an arbitrator. 264 The 
Analytical Commentary submits that "participation in the appointment" 
also includes a less direct involvement, 265 such as that which operates 
under the list procedure envisaged in the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. 266 (The list procedure involves an appointing authority 
submitting a list of potential arbitrators to the parties, each party having 
the right to veto any name on the list. The appointing authority then 
selects the arbitrator(s) from the list of `approved' names. ) Article 14(1) 
provides that any party may request the court to decide on the 
termination of an arbitrator's mandate if he becomes de jure or de facto 
unable to perform his functions, or for other reasons fails to act without 
undue delay. The Secretariats' understanding of the phrase "fails to act" 
is that it includes, but is not limited to simple delay. The Analytical 
264 Doc. A/CN. 91246, para. 34. 
265 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, Article 12, nr. 6. 
266 Doc. A/cn. 9/264, Article 12, nr. 6. 
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Commentary mentions among the relevant considerations in judging 
whether an arbitrator has failed to act, the question whether, in the light 
of the arbitration agreement and the specific procedural situation, "his 
, conduct 
fell clearly below the standard of what may reasonably be 
expected from an arbitrator". 267 
l 
1996 Act: Under the 1996 Act, s. 23 (1) provides that the parties are free 
to agree in what circumstances the authority of an arbitrator may be 
revoked, and in the absence of such agreement they may always act 
jointly to revoke such authority. Moreover, a single party may always 
apply to the court to remove an arbitrator. Section 24 (1) provides that 
the court may remove a challenged arbitrator only on one of the 
following grounds: (a) that circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality; (b) that he does not possess the 
qualifications required by the arbitration agreement; (c) that he is 
physically or mentally incapable of conducting the proceedings or there 
are justifiable doubts as to his capacity to do so; (d) that he has refused 
or failed- (i) properly to conduct the proceedings, or (ii) to use all 
reasonable despatch in conducting the proceedings or making an award, 
and that substantial injustice has been or will be caused to the applicant. 
The first ground refers only to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator's 
267 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, Article 14, p. 34, para. 4. See Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,67. 
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impartiality, without mentioning his independence. The DAC Report 
(para 101) suggests that it is possible for an arbitrator to be impartial 
without being wholly independent; and unless an arbitrator demonstrates 
partiality, his lack of independence is irrelevant. Thus reference to 
independence is unnecessary. 268 There is a view that the internationally 
accepted requirement of independence aims to ensure impartiality, rather 
than to actually achieve it, and in that sense, the DAC were correct not 
to set independence as a further requirement. 269 However, an 
arbitrator's lack of independence is relevant if it is such as to give rise to 
justifiable doubt as to his impartiality. It might be argued that the lack of 
the requirement of independence will create no practical difficulty, since 
the parties can agree to make it a ground for challenge either expressly 
or by applying institutional rules which import the requirement of 
independence. However, I suggest that the requirement of independence 
should be enshrined in law, as lack of independence is much easier to 
detect than partiality. By avoiding appointing an arbitrator who lacks 
independence, partiality can be, to a certain extent, avoided in the first 
place. 
Chinese Law: Under Chinese arbitration law, the parties are free to 
268 Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose & Jonathan Tecks, Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, 
Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 3rd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003, 
111. 
269 Harris, BruceJPlanterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3nd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,113. 
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agree on the grounds for challenge, 270 but their agreement must be 
consistent with Article 34 of the Arbitration Law 271 In the absence of 
such agreement, a party may challenge the authority of an arbitrator if 
he has justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or 
independence. 272 I suggest that in the absence of agreement on the 
grounds for challenge, the law should be changed so" that lack of 
qualifications required by the agreement of the parties should be 
regarded as a ground for challenge. 
C. Challenge Procedure 
Model Law. Under the Model Law, where the ground for challenge falls 
within Article 12(2), i. e., circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess 
qualifications agreed to by the parties, 273 Article 13(1) explicitly gives 
the parties the freedom to agree upon a challenge procedure. Such 
agreement is subject to the provisions of Article 13(3), which provides 
270 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
271 
Article 34 of the Arbitration Law provides: An arbitrator shall be revoked and the parties 
concerned have the right to request revocation, whereas: 1. The arbitrator is a party involved in the 
case or a blood relation or relative of the parties concerned or their attorneys. 2. the arbitrator has vital 
personal interests in the case. 3. the arbitrator has other relations with the parties or their attorneys 
involved in the case that might effect the fair ruling of the case. 4. the arbitrator meets the parties 
concerned or their attorneys in private or has accepted gifts or attended banquets hosted by the parties 
concerned or their attorneys. 
272 Article 26 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
273 
Article 12 (2) of the Model Law provides that an arbitrator may be challenged only if 
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence, or if he 
does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties. A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed 
by him, or in whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which he becomes aware 
after the appointment has been made. 
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that if a challenge is not successful, the challenging party may, within 
thirty days of receiving notice of the rejection of the challenge, request 
the court to decide on the challenge. The court's decision shall be 
subject to no appeal. 
Where there is no agreed challenge procedure, Article 13(2) provides 
that a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen 
days after becoming aware of either the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal or the existence of a ground of challenge, send a written 
statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. The 
arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge. The Working Group 
agreed that such decision should be entrusted to all members of the 
arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator. 274 If a challenge is 
not successful, Article 13(3) provides that the challenging party may, 
within 30 days of receiving notice of the rejection of the challenge, 
request the court to decide on the challenge, the court's decision not 
being capable of being appealed. 275 The tribunal can continue the 
proceedings and even make an award, while the court's decision is 
pending. As regards the appropriateness of court control during the 
arbitral proceedings, the prevailing view was that the system adopted by 
the Working Group "struck an appropriate balance between the need for 
274 Doc. A/CN. 9/246, paras. 36 and 38. 
275 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,65. 
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preventing obstruction with dilatory tactics and the desire to avoid 
unnecessary waste of time and money. " 276 Although the possibility of 
the court reviewing the tribunal's decision on a challenge curbs the 
dangers of allowing a challenged arbitrator to participate in that decision 
- and of course of allowing a sole arbitrator to rule on any challenge to 
him, I submit that it would still be better if the challenged arbitrator 
were excluded from the deliberations and decision on any challenge. 
The Law might provide that where the arbitral tribunal consists of more 
than one arbitrator, the other arbitrators shall make the decision. If that 
leads to a deadlock between an even number of arbitrators, the 
challenging party may refer the challenge to the court. Where the 
arbitral tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator, the challenging party would 
obviously have to refer the challenge directly to the court. 
1996 Act. Section 23(1) of the 1996 Act also gives the parties freedom 
to agree on a challenge procedure by providing that the parties are free 
to agree in what circumstances the authority of an arbitrator may be 
revoked. Where there is no such agreement, by virtue of s. 23 (3)(b), a 
challenging party may apply to any institution or person vested by them 
with powers to revoke an arbitrator's authority. If the ground for 
challenge is one of those specified in s. 24(1), the parties may apply to 
the court to remove the arbitrator. Where the parties have vested any 
276 Commission Report, para. 124. 
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institution or person with the power in that regard, the court shall not 
exercise its power of removal unless satisfied that the applicant has first 
exhausted any available recourse to that institution or person. 77 The 
leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court 
under Section 24.278 If the parties have vested in the arbitral tribunal the 
power to revoke an arbitrator's authority, they have the right to decide 
whether the challenged arbitrator shall be excluded from the 
deliberations and decision on the challenge, and how any deadlock is 
broken. 
It can be seen that, under both the Model Law and the 1996 Act the 
court may only decide on a challenge on specified grounds. There are 
four main differences between the court's role in the Model Law and the 
1996 Act. First of all,. the grounds of challenge are different. Secondly, 
under the Model Law, while in relation to certain grounds, the court may 
exercise its power only after an unsuccessful challenge to the tribunal, in 
relation to the grounds that an arbitrator has become de lure or de facto 
unable to perform his functions, or for other reasons has failed to act 
without undue delay, the court shall itself make the primary decision. 
Under the 1996 Act, the court plays the same role as regards all grounds 
specified in the Act. If the parties have invested an institution or person 
277 Section 24 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
278 Section 24 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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(arbitral or otherwise) with the power to revoke an arbitrator's authority, 
the court may only intervene once the parties have firstly exhausted their 
recourse to such institution or person. Only if the parties have not vested 
such power, may the court make the primary decision. Thirdly, the 
court's decision under the Model Law shall be subject to no appeal, 
while under the 1996 Act there may be an appeal with the leave of the 
court. Fourthly, there are time limits for challenges involving the court 
under the Model Law, but not under the 1996 Act. 
I suggest that the regime of the 1996 Act is more integrated than that of 
the Model Law. It is unnecessary for the court to play different roles 
when different grounds of challenge are involved, as every ground leads 
to the same outcome - the removal of the arbitrator. Yet if even after the 
parties have exhausted recourse to any institution or person they have 
empowered to remove arbitrators, the decision of the court can be 
appealed, the procedure for removal takes too long, and one of the main 
advantages of arbitration, the saving of time, is lost. Thus, I suggest that 
as under the Model Law, the court's decision shall not be subject to 
appeal. There is also a need to specify time limits for challenge, as this 
can effectively prevent abuses of challenge procedure. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the court does not play a 
role in removing arbitrators. The Chairman of CIETAC makes the 
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decision, which is final. (If the Chairman himself is an arbitrator, the 
revocation shall be decided upon collectively by the arbitration 
commission. ) I believe that if parties cannot agree on a challenge 
procedure, their autonomy is damaged. So Chinese arbitration law 
should adopt the stance of the 1996 Act, and give the parties this 
freedom. Moreover, it is sensible to give the challenging party an 
opportunity of appeal when he is unsatisfied with the Chairman's 
decision, so that I recommend that the court should be able to review the 
Chairman's decision and make the final decision. To prevent the court 
from overly interfering in the arbitral process, Chinese arbitration law 
should state that the court may remove the arbitrator only on the grounds 
specified in the law, as in the Model Law and the 1996 Act. Since the 
grounds specified by the 1996 Act are more integrated than under the 
Model Law, it is better for Chinese arbitration law to adopt the former 
grounds, subject to adding lack of independence as a ground. To avoid 
abuse of the challenge procedure, Chinese arbitration Law should also 
adopt the approach of the Model Law in providing that a party may only 
challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in whose appointment he 
has participated, for reasons of which he becomes aware after the 
appointment has been made. 
D. Joint Termination and Resignation 
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Model Law. Article 13(2) of the Model Law provides that where an 
arbitrator is challenged on the grounds specified in Article 12, the 
challenged arbitrator may withdraw from his office or the other party 
may agree to the challenge. Article 14(1) states that if an arbitrator 
becomes de lure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other 
reasons fails to act without undue delay, his mandate terminates if he 
withdraws from his office or if the parties agree on the termination. 
Article 14(2) continues that if, under this article or article 13(2), an 
arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the termination 
of the mandate of an arbitrator, this does not imply acceptance of the 
validity of any ground referred to in this article or article 12(2). 
1996 Act. Under s. 23(3) of the 1996 Act the authority of an arbitrator 
may be revoked by the parties acting jointly. The agreement to revoke 
that authority must be in writing, in line with the general requirement set 
out in s. 5(1). 279 An agreement to terminate the arbitration is an 
exception to the general requirement and need not to be in writing, as it 
is not practical for parties who mutually want the arbitration to lapse to 
make such an agreement in writing. Accordingly, if the agreement to 
revoke the arbitrator's authority is made in the context of an agreement 
279 Section 5 (1) of the 1996 Act provides: the provisions of this Part apply only where the 
arbitration agreement is in writing, and any other agreement between the parties as to any matter is 
effective for the purposes of this Part only if in writing. the expressions `agreement', 'agree', and 
`agreed' shall be construed accordingly. 
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to terminate the arbitration, neither of them should be in writing. 280 The 
Act does not explicitly provide that the resignation of an arbitrator will 
terminate his mandate, but it is considered implicit. There is no rule as to 
whether the joint termination by the parties or the resignation of a 
challenged arbitrator implies acceptance of the validity of any ground 
for challenge. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, it is explicit that where an 
arbitrator is challenged by one party, and the other party agrees to the 
challenge, or the arbitrator being challenged withdraws from his office, 
such an arbitrator is no longer on the arbitral tribunal and neither case 
implies that the challenge made by the party is sustainable. 281 
E. Resigned Arbitrator's Entitlement to Fees or Expenses or 
Liability 
Model Law. Where an arbitrator resigns, the Model Law does not give 
rules as to his entitlement to fees or expenses, or any liability thereby 
incurred by him. 
1996 Act. By contrast, s. 25(1) of the 1996 Act provides that where an 
280 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,109. 
281 Article 26(5) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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arbitrator resigns, the parties are free to reach agreement with him on 
these issues. It should be noted that an agreement between one party and 
its own appointee would not fall within this section. 282 Where there is 
no such agreement, the arbitrator who resigns his appointment may 
apply to the court to grant him relief from any liability thereby incurred 
by him, and to make such order as it thinks fit with respect to his 
entitlement to fees or expenses or the repayment of any fees or expenses 
already paid. 283 If the court is satisfied that in all the circumstances it 
was reasonable for the arbitrator to resign, it may grant such relief on 
such terms as it thinks fit 284 The leave of the court is required for any 
appeal from its decision285. If an arbitrator is removed by the court, the 
court may make such order as it thinks fit with respect to the arbitrator's 
entitlement to fees or expenses, or the repayment of any fees or 
expenses already paid. 286 The leave of the court is again required for 
any appeal from its decision. 287 
Chinese Law. If Chinese arbitration law permitted the court to play a 
role in removing arbitrators, it may adopt the stance of the 1996 Act 
regarding the liabilities incurred by the arbitrator and his entitlement to 
282 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,116. 
283 Section 25 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
284 Section 25 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
285 Section 25(5) of the 1996 Act. 
286 Section 24 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
287 Section 24 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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fees or expenses. 
F. Continuation of Arbitral Proceedings. 
Model Law. Article 13(3) of the Model Law provides that where a party 
requests the court to decide on a challenge, while such a request is 
pending, the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, may 
continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award. It is not made 
clear whether the arbitral tribunal shall continue or stay the arbitral 
proceedings while the request is pending, where the party requests the 
arbitral tribunal to decide on a challenge. 
1996 Act. Under the Act s. 24(3) similarly provides that the arbitral 
tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award while 
an application to the court is pending. Yet once more where a party 
applies to an institution or person invested with the power to decide 
challenges, it is not clear whether the arbitral tribunal may continue or 
stay the arbitral proceedings while the request is pending. 
Chinese law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the parties are free to agree 
such matters while the request is pending. If there is no such agreement, 
the challenged arbitrator shall continue to fulfill the functions of 
arbitrator until a decision on the challenge has been made by the 
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Chairman of the CIETAC. 288 If Chinese arbitration law permits the 
court to play a role in the challenge procedure, it should also indicate 
whether a challenged arbitrator should continue to perform his function 
until the court makes the decision. 
G Effect of Death of an Arbitrator. 
Model Law. The Model Law gives no rules regarding the situation 
where an arbitrator dies, or the person who appointed him dies. 
1996 Act. Under the 1996 Act s. 26 provides that while the authority of 
an arbitrator is personal and ceases on his death; unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties, the death of the person by whom an arbitrator was 
appointed does not revoke his authority. It is better for Chinese 
arbitration law to adopt this provision. 
H. Appointment of a Substitute Arbitrator. 
Model Law. Under the Model Law, the parties have no right to decide 
whether a substitute arbitrator should be appointed where an arbitrator is 
removed. Article 15 provides that where the mandate of an arbitrator 
terminates under article 13 or 14, or because of his withdrawal from 
office for any other reason, or because of the revocation of his mandate 
288 Article 26 (7) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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by agreement of the parties, or in any other case of termination of his 
mandate, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules 
that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. 
The Working Group wanted to cover all cases in which a mandate has 
been terminated. As a result, the structure of that article is rather 
awkward. 289 In my view, it is unnecessary to have Article 15 say more 
than that a substitute must be appointed, whenever a mandate terminates. 
It is not necessary to specify the cases in which the mandate of an 
arbitrator would terminate. The passage commencing with the words 
"under Article 13 or 14" and ending with the words "termination of his 
mandate" could be deleted, so that the content of the provision could be 
reduced to its essentials, namely the appointment of a substitute 
arbitrator to fill any vacancy. Article 15 makes it clear that a substitute 
arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable 
to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. 
1996 Act. Under the 1996 Act s. 27(1) states that where an arbitrator 
ceases to hold office, the parties are free to agree whether and if so how 
the vacancy is to be filled. 290 If or to the extent that there is no such 
agreement, the provisions of ss. 16 (procedure for appointment of 
arbitrators) and 18 (failure of appointment procedure) apply in relation 
289 Doc. A/CN. 9/246, para. 45. 
290 Section 27 (1) (a) of the 1996 Act. 
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to the filling of the vacancy as in relation to an original appointment. 291 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, any agreement as to the 
filling of a vacancy may not conflict with Article 37 of the Arbitration 
Law, which provides that where an arbitrator is removed or unable to 
perform his duty due to other reasons, another arbitrator shall be chosen 
or appointed. Where there is no such agreement, the Chairman of 
CIETAC shall make the final decision. 292 It can be seen that although 
the parties are free to agree on the procedure of appointment of a 
substitute arbitrator, 293 they are not free to decide whether the vacancy 
shall be filled. If there is no such agreement, a substitute arbitrator shall 
be appointed pursuant to the procedure applicable to the appointment of 
the arbitrator being replaced. 294 I suggest that in line with the principle 
of the autonomy of the parties, they should be free to decide whether the 
vacancy should be filled. Chinese arbitration law should thus adopt the 
approach of the 1996 Act. 
I. Standing of Previous Proceedings. 
Model Law. Where a substitute arbitrator is appointed, the Model Law 
291 Section 27 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
292 Article 27 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
293 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
294 Article 27 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC(2005). 
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does not indicate whether the previous proceedings shall stand. 
1996 Act. The 1996 Act provides that the parties are free to agree 
whether and if so to what extent the previous proceedings should stand. 
295 Where there is no such agreement, the new tribunal shall determine 
whether and if so to what extent the previous proceedings should 
stand. 296 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, it is for the new tribunal to 
make its own decision as to whether or not the arbitration proceedings 
shall stand and the parties are not at liberty to agree on this issue. Again, 
in line with the principle of the autonomy of the parties, Chinese 
arbitration law should adopt the stance of the 1996 Act on this matter. 
IV. Conclusion 
To resolve certain problems of Chinese arbitration law, it is useful to 
look to the Model Law and the 1996 Act. In Chinese arbitration law, the 
court does not play a role in the challenge procedure and in most cases 
the Chairman shall make the decision in the first place and that decision 
is a final one. Where the challenge is unsuccessful, the challenging party 
has no recourse. Thus Chinese law might permit the court to review the 
295 Section 27 (1) (b) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC(2005). 
296 Section 27 (4) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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Chairman's decision and provide necessary supervision of the arbitral 
process, on the lines of the Model Law and the 1996 Act. If it permits 
the court to play a role in the challenge procedure, the law should also 
specify grounds on which the court may remove the arbitrator, to ensure 
that the court would not interfere with the arbitral process too much. 
Chinese law might adopt the grounds laid down by the 1996 Act, subject 
to making lack of independence a ground of challenge. Under Chinese 
law, where an arbitrator ceases to hold his position, the parties have no 
freedom to agree whether a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed, and, 
where a new tribunal constitutes, whether the previous proceeding shall 
stand. I suggest that, like the 1996 Act, Chinese law should give the 
parties these powers. Chinese law might also fill obvious gaps by 
adopting the approach of the 1996 Act as to such matters as the 
liabilities and entitlement to fees of an arbitrator who resigns, the effect 
of the death of an arbitrator or the person who appointed him, and the 
effect of an arbitrator's ceasing to hold his position on any appointment 




Where arbitrators turn out to be disqualified or act inequitably, the 
parties may exercise supervisory powers. In particular, a party may 
challenge the authority of any arbitrator, where the arbitrator has a vital 
personal interest in the case, 297 or where the party has justifiable doubts 
as to the impartiality or independence of an arbitrator. 298 Damage may 
result to the parties where an arbitrator is unqualified, or has acted 
inequitably, or has delayed unduly. For example, delay by an arbitrator 
may leave a party waiting for payment which is due to him, while if an 
arbitrator extorts a bribe from a party, the loss to that party is obvious. 
Moreover, the process of revocation will cost the parties time, money 
and energy. Thus a crucial issue which arises is whether arbitrators 
should be liable for such costs. In Chinese practice, arbitrators are not 
liable for acts or omissions other than those specified in those Articles. It 
can be seen that the matters for which arbitrators may be liable are very 
limited in scope. The rationale of arbitral immunity is that there is no 
doubt that judges acting in their judicial capacity are immune from suit 
and since arbitrators have long been treated as akin to judges, they have 
297 Article 34 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
298 Article 26 (2) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005).. 
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therefore been presumed to be entitled to the same immunity as judges. 
However, even if the. functions of judges and arbitrators are very similar, 
there are differences between judges and arbitrators, in particular the 
source of their power and authority. It is worth discussing whether 
arbitrators should be entitled to the same immunity as judges. This 
chapter aims to discuss whether arbitrators should have complete 
immunity, and if not, for what sort of behaviour and to what extent they 
should be liable. As ever, the Chinese approach to the above questions 
will be compared with the approach taken in English Law and the Model 
Law 
I. The Chinese Approach to Arbitral Immunity 
A. Immunity of Arbitrators 
There are no clear rules as to the immunity of arbitrators. In practice, an 
arbitrator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the discharge or 
purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator unless the act or 
omission breaches Articles 34(4), 38 or 58(6) of Arbitration Law of the 
PRC. Those articles provide in effect that an arbitrator shall bear legal 
responsibility where `the arbitrator meets the parties concerned or their 
attorneys in private, or has accepted gifts or attended banquets hosted by 
the parties concerned or their attorneys', or where the parties have 
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evidence `showing that arbitrators have accepted bribes, resorted to 
deception for personal gain or perverted the law in their ruling'. 
B. To What Extent Should They be Liable? 
Criminal, Administrative, or Civil Liability: The circumstances in 
which arbitrators should be liable are discussed above. But to what 
extent should they be liable? Should they bear criminal, administrative, 
or civil liability? Since arbitrators are not judicial officers, Article 399 of 
the Criminal Law will not apply. 299 Therefore in Chinese law, arbitrators 
cannot bear criminal liability. In the light of Articles 10 and 14 of the 
Arbitration Law 300 , an arbitral award is not an administrative 
299 Article 399 of the Criminal Law of the PRC (1997 revised amendment) provides that any judicial 
officer who, bending the law for selfish ends or twisting the law for a favor, subjects to investigation 
for criminal responsibility a person he knows to be innocent or intentionally protects from 
investigation for criminal responsibility a person he knows to be guilty or, intentionally running 
counter to the facts and law, twists the law when rendering judgments or orders in criminal 
proceedings shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal 
detention. if the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not 
less than five years but not more than 10 years. if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be 
sentenced to f ixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 
Whoever, in civil or administrative proceedings, intentionally runs counter to the facts and law and 
twists the law when rendering judgments or orders, if the circumstances are serious, shall be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention. if the 
circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less 
than five years but not more than 10 years. 
Any judicial officer who takes a bribe and bends the law and commits any act mentioned in the 
preceding two paragraphs, which also constitutes a crime as provided for in Article 385 of this Law, 
shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the provisions for a heavier punishment. 
300 Article 10 of the Arbitration Law provides: An arbitration commission may be set up in the 
domicile of the people's governments of municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the central 
government (hereinafter referred to as "municipalities"), provinces and autonomous regions or in 
other places according to needs. It shall not be set up according to administrative levels. 
An arbitration commission shall be set up by the relevant departments and chambers of commerce 
under the coordination of the people's governments of the cities prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph. 
Article 14 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994 provides: An arbitration commission shall be 
independent of any administrative organ, without any subordinate relationship with administrative 
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determination. Thus arbitrators cannot bear administrative liability either. 
Consequently, they only bear civil liability. 
The Amount of Damages: Neither the Arbitration Law nor the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules prescribe the amount of damages payable by 
arbitrators. In my view, to avoid making arbitrators so worried about 
potential awards of damages that the arbitration is adversely affected, it 
should be made clear how damages will be calculated according to the 
types and consequences of default. If an arbitrator's behaviour does not 
cause actual loss to the parties, he should merely be obliged to repay any 
remuneration he receives. If his behaviour causes delay in a party 
receiving due payment, the amount of his repayment should include not 
only his remuneration, but a sum representing the interest lost by that 
party. If his behaviour causes any other damage to the party, he should 
be also liable for that damage. If he extorts a bribe, he must return the 
money or other benefit to the party. If he simply receives a bribe, the 
money or other benefit should be confiscated by the authorities, or given 
to the innocent party. It is not uncommon for a party to be implicated in 
the arbitrator's unlawful behaviour. If that is the case, that party should 
also be liable to the other for the damage caused. Similarly, if the 
arbitration agency is implicated, it should also be liable. 
organs. Neither would there be any subordinate relations thereof. 
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Security: To avoid or reduce fraudulent or retaliatory action against 
arbitrators, it is suggested that an applicant shall be required to provide 
security before bringing an action against an arbitrator. The security 
includes two parts: (1) the fees and expense of the arbitrator, (2)an 
amount of money which will be a penalty paid by the applicant if he 
loses the lawsuit against the arbitrator. Before the judgment as to 
whether the arbitrator shall be liable for the damage or cost concerned, 
the fees and expenses of the arbitrator shall be paid from the security. If 
the arbitrator loses the lawsuit against him, he must repay his fee and 
expenses to the applicant. If the applicant loses the lawsuit, he shall pay 
an amount of money as a penalty from the security. Since there is a 
possibility of paying a penalty, the party will consider whether it is 
worth bringing an action against arbitrators, and fraudulent or retaliatory 
action can be effectively avoided or reduced. 30' 
II. Disadvantages of the Chinese Approach 
1. Chinese arbitration law does not deal adequately with the immunity 
of arbitrators, in that it is not clear whether arbitrators are liable for acts 
or omissions other than those specified in Articles 34(4), 38, and Article 
301 Ding Ying, `Research on the Arbitrators' Delay of Arbitration Proceedings in International 
Commercial Arbitration', 6 Law Science 2000,69. 
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58(6) of the Arbitration Law. 
2. There are no rules in the Arbitration Law or the CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules regarding the extent of liability of arbitrators. 
3. There is no requirement in the Arbitration Law or the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules that a party bringing an action against an arbitrator 
should provide security. 
III. The Approach of the Laws Operating in the UK 
A. Introduction 
As ever we refer to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which offers 
two models for consideration - the 1996 Arbitration Act and the Model 
Law. The traditional position under English common law was that 
arbitrators were treated akin to the judiciary and provided with 
immunity from suit. However, certain doubts as to this state of absolute 
immunity arose from the speeches of two Law Lords in Sutcliffe v. 
Thackrah302 and Arenson v. Arenson L; Casson, Beckman, Rutley is 
302 [1974] A. C. 727. 
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Co. 303 The matter is now put on a statutory footing by the 1996 Act, so 
that arbitrators generally have immunity, but not absolute immunity. 
The Act provides that an arbitrator is not liable for anything done or 
omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as 
arbitrator, unless such act or omission is shown to have been in bad 
faith 304. By contrast, the Model Law says nothing about arbitral 
immunity. 
B. The Traditional Position 
In English law, there is no doubt that judges when acting their judicial 
capacity are immune from suit, whether in negligence or on the grounds 
that they have acted maliciously or corruptly. The reason for immunity 
is that the law takes the view that the system of public justice would be 
compromised if litigation could be brought against a judge, so that party 
who has lost an action might effectively have the matter retried. 
Arbitrators had long been treated as akin to judges and had therefore 
been presumed to be entitled to the same immunity as judges. 305 As 
Lord Salmon observed in Sutcliffe, 
"It is well settled that judges, barristers, solicitors, jurors and witnesses 
enjoy an absolute immunity from an form of civil action being brought 
303 [1977]A. C. 405. 
304 Section 29 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
305 Lew, Julian D. M., The Immunity of Arbitrators, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd with the 
School of International Arbitration , 1990,22. 178 
against them in respect of anything they say or do in court during the 
course of a trial. This is not because the law regards any of these with 
special tenderness but because the law recognizes that, on balance of 
convenience, public policy demands that they shall all have such an 
immunity... The immunity which they enjoy is vital to the efficient and 
speedy administration of justice. " 
Continuing, 
"Since arbitrators are in much the same position as judges, in that they 
carry out more or less the same functions, the law has for generations 
recognized that public policy requires that they too shall be accorded the 
immunity of which I referred. "306 
There are several bases on which arbitral immunity might be justified. 
First of all, the doctrine of immunity of arbitrators has been in existence 
for many years. Second, it is accepted by all major industries and users 
of arbitration. 307 There have been no cases where dissatisfied parties 
have sought to sue the arbitrator. Rather they have sought to have the 
308 arbitrator removed or the award overturned. Thirdly, if arbitrators 
were not immune from such actions and they were exposed to an 
open-ended liability to the parties, considerable harm would be done to 
306 [1974] A. C. 727 at p. 757 -758. 307 For example, commodity shipping and construction arbitrations. One must distinguish here 
between arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement and the architect or surveyor issuing a 
certificate on a construction site and a valuer. 
308 Lew, Julian D. M., The Immunity of Arbitrators, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd with the 
School of International Arbitration ,1 990,26. 179 
the finality of the arbitral process, and it might be difficult to find 
arbitrators willing to serve at all. 309 
C. Challenge to Immunity 
This certain doubts as to arbitral immunity at common law arose from 
the speeches of two Law Lords in Sutcliffe v. Thackrah310 and Arenson 
v. Arenson Ls Casson, Beckman, Rutley Zs Co. 311 These two cases 
involved architects and auditors respectively acting as valuers, and were 
referred to in the speeches in the House of Lords as "quasi arbitrations". 
The essential issue was whether architects and auditors should be 
immune from suit, and the discussion was extended to the whole 
question of whether the previously unquestioned immunity of arbitrators 
was in fact justified. In Sutcliffe, rejecting the architect's entitlement 
to immunity, Lord Reid stated: 
"There is nothing judicial about an architect's function in determining 
whether certain work is defective. There is no dispute. He is not jointly 
engaged by the parties. They do not submit evidence as contentions to 
him. He makes his own investigations and comes to a decision. "312 
309 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,128. 
310 [1974] A. C. 727. 
311 [1977]A. C. 405. 
312 Op. cit. [1974] A. C. 727, at p. 737 -738. See similarly Lord Morrison of Borth -y-Gest, op. cit., 
at p. 752 -753. 180 
In Arenson313 it was held that the accountants were acting as valuers 
and in that context were not immune from an action in negligence, Lord 
Simon stating, 
"A person adversely affected by a negligent valuation (possibly for rich 
reward) is left without remedy. He is, in fact, in a worse position than 
under a formal arbitration, where he has the right to demand a case to be 
stated for the opinion of the court. , 
314 
As regards the immunity of arbitrators, Lord Kilbrandon argued that he 
could see no difference between a valuer appointed by one person and a 
valuer appointed by both parties (who was considered akin to an 
arbitrator and therefore immune for suit). He said, 
" The question which puzzled me as the argument developed was, what 
was the essential difference between the typical valuer (the auditor in the 
present case) and an arbitrator at common law or under the Arbitration 
Acts? It is conceded that an arbitrator is immune from suit, aside from 
fraud, but why? I find it impossible to put weight on such 
considerations as that in the case of an arbitrator (a) there is a dispute 
between parties, (b) he hears evidence, (c) he hears submissions from 
the parties, and that therefore he, unlike the valuer, is acting in a judicial 
capacity. As regards (a), I cannot see any judicial distinction between a 
313 [1977]A. C. 405. 
314 Op. cit. [1974] A. C. 405, at p. 421. This argument may be weakened by the abolition of the case 
stated system by the Arbitration Act 1979 but the appeal procedure, though narrower, will be equally 
appropriate where it applies and questions of law are in issue. 
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dispute which has actually arisen and a situation where persons have 
opposed interests, if in either case an impartial person has had to be 
called in to make a decision which the interested parties will accept. As 
regards (b) and (c), these are certainly not necessary activities of an 
arbiter. Once the nature and the limits of the submission to him have 
been defined, it could well be that he would go down at his own 
convenience to a warehouse, inspect a sample of merchandise displayed. 
to him by the foreman and return his opinion on its quality or value. I 
have come to be of the opinion that it is a necessary conclusion to be 
drawn from Sutcliffe v. Thackrah... and from the instant decision that an 
arbitrator at common law or under the Acts is indeed a person selected 
by the parties for his expertise thereof and that if he is negligent in that 
exercise he will be liable in damages. If this conclusion were to be 
established by law, I do not think the consequences would be dramatic 
or even noticeable. It would become a generally accepted term of 
reference to arbitration - because the referee would insist on it - that he 
be given by the parties immunity from suit for negligence at the instance 
of either of them. " 315 
Lord Fraser contrasted arbitrators and valuers and concluded: 
"the main difference between them is that the arbitrator, like the judge, 
315 Op. cit. [1974] A. C. 405, pp. 432 - 433. 
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has to decide a dispute that has already arisen, and he usually has rival 
contentions before him, while the mutual valuer is called in before a 
dispute has arisen, in order to avoid it. He may be employed by parties 
who have little or no idea of the value of the property to be valued and 
who rely entirely on his skill and judgment as an expert. In that respect 
he differs from some arbitrators. But many arbitrators are chosen for 
their expert knowledge of the subject of the arbitration, and many others 
are chosen from the legal profession for their expert knowledge of the 
law or perhaps because they are credited with an expertise in holding the 
balance fairly between parties. It does not seem possible, therefore, to 
distinguish between mutual valuers and arbitrators on the ground that 
the former are experts and the latter are not. I share the difficulty of my 
noble and learned friend, Lord Kilbrandon, in seeing why arbitrators as 
a class should have immunity from suit if mutual valuers do not. "316 
D. The Current State of English Law 
If certain speeches in Sutcliffe and Arenson had left arbitral immunity in 
doubt, the issue was soon overtaken by the passing of the 1996 Act. 
Thus s. 29 (1) provides that an arbitrator is not liable for anything done 
or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as 
arbitrators unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith. 
316 Op. cit. [1974] A. C. 405, at p. 442. 
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Section 29(2) continues that subsection (1) applies to an employee or 
agent of an arbitrator as it applies to the arbitrator himself. These 
provisions resolve the previous uncertainty. It can be seen that an 
arbitrator's immunity does not extend to acts or omissions that are 
shown to have been in bad faith. The term "bad faith" is not further 
defined, and may have a variety of meanings in different contexts. It 
remains to be seen whether, in the context of the Act, the courts will 
decide that bad faith must have a moral ingredient, and connotes, for 
example, malice or dishonesty, or whether it will bear a wider 
interpretation. It is notable that Section 29 has mandatory status, so 
that the parties are not able to agree to -deprive an arbitrator of this 
protection. 
E. My Opinion 
Under Chinese arbitration law, the situations where arbitrators should be 
liable are exhaustive. My opinion is that it is not sensible to enumerate 
the situations where arbitrators should be liable, as the range of potential 
cases is too complex and multifarious. Therefore, I suggest that it is 
preferable for the Chinese arbitration law to recognize and adopt the 
concept of bad faith. Here I would like to divide the problem of arbitral 
immunity into two separate problems: first, whether arbitrators shall be 
liable for damage caused by action or omission which is shown to have 
184 
been in bad faith; secondly, whether arbitrators shall be liable for 
damage caused by negligence. 
Bad faith. There is no doubt that judges are absolutely immune from 
any action, whether in negligence or on the grounds that they have acted 
maliciously or corruptly. This practice is not intended to exclude the 
judge from any sort of supervision. Judges are appointed by the state 
and exercise their powers on its behalf. A judge owes a duty to the state 
to uphold the law and to administer justice accordingly. Therefore, the 
State would supervise the action of a judge by requiring him to be 
answerable to his peer group, by removing or "impeaching" him in 
certain circumstances, and by making his decision subject to review by a 
court of higher jurisdiction. The absolute immunity of a judge only 
means that a party is not entitled to bring any action against him 
regarding his actions in the discharge of his judicial function. In other 
-words, a judge is not liable for losses caused by his actions. The reason 
for such immunity is to prevent litigation being brought against a judge 
with a view to having a matter retried by a dissatisfied and litigious 
party who has lost an action. 317 
Even if the functions of judges and arbitrators are the same or very 
similar, the source of their power and authority is fundamentally 
317 Lew, Julian D. M., The Immunity of Arbitrators, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd with the 
School of International Arbitration, 1990,21. 
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different. An arbitrator is appointed by the parties, directly or indirectly, 
and owes his duties to them. An arbitrator has no duty other than to 
perform the task with which the parties have entrusted him; 318 i. e., to 
hear their arguments, weigh up the evidence and render an award on 
their respective rights and obligations under the arbitration agreement. 319 
Furthermore, in performing the task with which the parties have 
entrusted him, although an arbitrator must apply the mandatory rules of 
arbitration law, where there is no mandatory rule in that respect, an 
arbitrator shall perform his task according to the parties' own agreement. 
As a matter of fact, most of the rules of arbitration law are 
non-mandatory, and therefore, in most cases, an arbitrator would 
perform his task in accordance with the parties' own agreement. Since 
the power of an arbitrator is given by the parties, and owns a duty to 
perform the task with which the parties have entrusted him, the parties 
have the right to supervise the action of an arbitrator, e. g., the parties are 
entitled to challenge the authority of an arbitrator and apply to revoke 
that authority in certain circumstances. Similarly, a party has the right to 
demand compensation from an arbitrator for any losses the arbitrator 
causes him. It is admitted that if arbitrators were not immune from suit, 
318 This author has elsewhere argued that in international commercial arbitration arbitrators are the 
guardians of the international commercial order, and have a duty to uphold the fundamental standards 
of international trade, customs of international trade and the fundamental moral and ethical values 
which underlie every level of commercial activity i. e., international public policy: see Lew, Julian 
D. M., Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 
1978, para. 413??????. 
319 Lew, Julian D. M., The Immunity of Arbitrators, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd with the 
School of International Arbitration, 1990,22. 
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and were exposed to an open-ended liability to the parties, some harm 
would be done to the finality of the arbitral process and the enthusiasm 
of arbitrators would be adversely affected. However the problem could 
be resolved by limiting the scope of the situations in which arbitrators 
shall be liable for damage. To be specific, it is preferable to provide that 
an arbitrator shall be liable for losses caused by any action which is 
shown to have been in bad faith. Arbitrators can effectively avoid being 
sued and can protect the finality of the arbitral process by not acting in 
bad faith. It is not difficult for arbitrators to avoid acting in bad faith. 
Negligence. As discussed above, theoretically, since the power of an 
arbitrator is conferred by the parties and he owes duties to them, an 
arbitrator should be liable for loss caused by him. However, if an 
arbitrator were liable for loss caused by his negligence, it might be 
difficult to find arbitrators willing to serve, as it is difficult to completely 
avoid negligence in performing the arbitral function. It might be 
helpful to permit arbitrators and parties to confer immunity for 
negligence on arbitrators by agreement. However, if that were the case, 
most arbitrators would make such an agreement with the parties. 
Therefore, it might be more convenient for the law to give such 
immunity to arbitrators directly. 
IV. Conclusion 
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Under the 1996 Act, arbitrators are immune from suit unless the act or 
omission is shown to have been in bad faith. The term "bad faith" may 
have a variety of meanings in different contexts. In Chinese law, the 
situations in which arbitrators may be liable for damage are enumerated. 
In my view, in this regard the approach of the 1996 Act is more sensible 
than that of Chinese law. However, considering the fundamental 
differences between arbitrators and judges, I don't think that arbitrators 
should be entitled to the same immunity as judges. Rather, arbitrators 
should be liable for damages in negligence like other providers of 
professional services. To protect the finality of arbitral awards and to 
avoid or reduce fraudulent or retaliatory action against arbitrators, it 
should be possible for arbitrators to be granted immunity from suit by 
agreement with the parties. In the situations where there is no such 
agreement, a party should be obliged to provide security before bringing 
an action against an arbitrator. 
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CHAPTER 9 
QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION 
In practically every legal system, the determination of contractual 
disputes is, prima facie, entrusted to the courts. Yet most legal systems 
nowadays concede the possibility that the parties may agree to achieve a 
binding resolution of their dispute through the institution of arbitration. 
Still, while the jurisdiction of the court is inherent and fundamental, the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is rooted in and limited by the 
agreement of the parties. This means that it is by no means uncommon 
for a tribunal to be faced with a party suggesting that it has no 
jurisdiction, or that. it has exceeded its jurisdiction. Thus the law must 
feature mechanisms for dealing with such jurisdictional challenges. This 
chapter aims to consider what mechanisms are provided by the Chinese 
law, and how these compare to those provided by the laws of the UK. 
I. The Chinese Approach to Jurisdiction 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, to make the arbitration agreement valid, the 
arbitration agreement must satisfy a number of conditions. If the 
arbitration agreement is found to be invalid, the dispute cannot be 
resolved by arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal would have no 
jurisdiction over the dispute concerned. If a party has any doubt 
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concerning the validity or existence of an arbitration clause or 
agreement, or the scope of such clause or agreement, he may make a 
jurisdictional challenge. The crucial question then is, which institution 
can entertain that challenge? 
A. The Institutions Allowed to Entertain a Jurisdictional 
Challenge 
In China, if a party wishes to make a jurisdictional challenge, three 
institutions could potentially be involved - the arbitration agency, the 
court and the arbitral tribunal. 
1. Arbitration agency. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are many arbitration agencies in China. 
The main two ones are CIETAC and CMAC. The main functions of 
arbitration agencies are accepting a case upon a written application and 
constituting arbitral tribunal. 
The principle that an arbitration agency has power to determine the 
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction has recently been established by CIETAC 
and CMAC. The Arbitration Provisions of the CIETAC [1988] provided 
for the first time that the Arbitration Commission shall have the right to 
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rule on the validity of an arbitration agreement and on jurisdictional 
matters in a case320. More recently, the Arbitration Rules of the CIETAC 
[2005] provides that the arbitration committee has the right to decide on 
. the existence, validity and jurisdiction of the case put to arbitration 
321 
This provision enlarges the power of the arbitration agency. It not only 
has the right to make a decision on the validity of arbitration agreement 
and on the extent of the tribunal's jurisdiction, but also can even decide 
whether the arbitration agreement exists. Equally, the Arbitration 
Provisions of CMAC(1988) provided for the first time that the 
Arbitration Commission shall have the right to rule on the validity of an 
arbitration agreement and on jurisdiction over an arbitration case322, 
while the Rules of CMAC[1995] now provides that the Arbitration 
Commission has the right to make decisions on the existence and effect 
of any arbitration agreement and upon jurisdictional matters in 
arbitration 323. 
The power of these arbitration agencies to decide upon the arbitral 
tribunal's jurisdiction has also been approved by legislation. Article 20 
of the Arbitration law of the PRC also provides that whereas parties 
concerned have doubt on the validity of an arbitration agreement, a 
320 
Article 2 of the Arbitration Provisions of CIETAC (1988). 
321 Article 6 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
322 Article 2(5) of the Arbitration Provisions of CMAC(1988). 
323 Article 4 of the Rules of CMAC(1995). 
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request can be made to the arbitration commission for a decision or to 
the people's court for a ruling. 
2. The Arbitral tribunal 
China adhered to the 1966 Washington Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States in 
1992. Article 41 of that Convention provides that, the Tribunal shall be 
the judge of its own competence; and any objection by a party to the 
dispute that that dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, or 
for other reasons is not within the competence of the Tribunal, shall be 
considered by the Tribunal which shall determine whether to deal with it 
as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute. 
Thus according to the article, the arbitral tribunal should have right to 
decide its own jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Convention applies in a 
very specialized set of circumstances - where the PRC is itself a party to 
an investment dispute with a foreign national - and seeks to create an 
entirely a-national arbitration system entirely free from supervision by 
the courts of any legal system. By contrast, under the Arbitration law of 
the PRC" and the arbitration rules of China, arbitrators have no power to 
decide upon their own jurisdiction in the first instance. The purpose of 
Chinese arbitration rules and regulations is to vest jurisdiction in the 
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arbitration agency and the people's court, rather than in the arbitrators. 
While Article 19 of the Arbitration Law of the Republic of China 
provides that the arbitration tribunal has the power to confirm the 
validity of the contract, the tribunal may not consider the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. 
3. The court 
The Arbitration law of the PRC provides that, where the parties have 
doubt as to the validity of an arbitration agreement, a request can be 
made to the arbitration commission for a decision or to the people's 
court for a ruling324. As a result of this provision, the court is entitled to 
make a decision on such matters irrespective of the will of the parties. 
Yet, if the parties have agreed in the arbitration clause to confer 
jurisdiction on the arbitration agency rather than the court, is the court 
still entitled to accept the claim? Due to the autonomy of arbitration, the 
arbitration agency is thought to be uniquely appropriate to adjudicate 
upon the jurisdiction of dispute by virtue of the agreement of the 
parties. 325 
As to the appropriate court to approach for a ruling on jurisdiction, the 
324 Article 20 of the Arbitration law of the PRC 1994. 
325 Feng, Kefei, `Doctrine of Competence-Competence and Its Practice in China', 78(1) Arbitration 
and Law 2002,95-105. 
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SPC delivered "official and written reply to the question that which 
court shall the parties request when they have doubt on the validity of 
arbitration agreement" (July 20th, 2000) to the Shandong Province High 
Court. The Reply said, "We have received the report `which court 
shall the parties request when they have doubt on the validity of 
arbitration agreement and how the court shall make a ruling'. Our 
response to the report is as following: if the parties choose an arbitration 
institution in China to resolve disputes and one party requests the 
people's court to make a ruling on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, the intermediate court of the area where the arbitration 
institution is located would have jurisdiction. If the parties have not 
chosen any arbitration institution, the intermediate court of the area 
where the defendant is domiciled would have jurisdiction. " The official 
and written reply continues that if the parties have made an agreement to 
refer future disputes to CIETAC and they requests the people's court for 
a ruling, Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court would have jurisdiction upon 
the request. 
326 
Should the court hold a hearing as regards the validity of the arbitration 
agreement? No clear guidance can be found in "the Arbitration law of 
the PRC". Yet, in light of considerations of due process, the court shall 
326 Wang, Shenchang, arbitration Agreement and Its Validity (One volume edition of 2001) 




hearing. 327 Are the parties entitled to appeal once the court has 
made a ruling about the validity of the arbitration agreement? No related 
section can be found in "the Arbitration law of the PRC". However, 
Article 140 of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC provides that an 
appeal may be made against the following: 
a. rejection of a lawsuit; 
b. objection to the jurisdiction of a court; 
c. rejection of a complaint; 
Questions regarding the validity of arbitration agreement do not appear 
covered by such headings. Consequently, it is submitted that, on the 
basis of Article 140, the parties are not entitled to appeal. 328 The SPC 
has promulgated "Notice about treatment of the courts as regards the 
arbitration concerning foreign affairs and foreign arbitration". This 
establishes the "Report System" with regard to arbitration concerning 
foreign affairs, and the refusal of courts to enforce foreign awards or 
awards concerning foreign affairs. The Report System operates as 
follows with regard to arbitration concerning foreign affairs. - If the 
people's court makes a ruling that an arbitration agreement or 
arbitration clause is invalid or impossible to perform, the court shall 
submit the ruling to the High Court of its area. If the high court agrees 
327 Wang, Shenchang, rbitration Agreement and Its Validity (One volume edition of 2001) 
Arbitration and Law 2001,280. 
328 Deng, Jie, `Discussion about Competence-Competence Principle', 5 Chinese Yearbook of Private 
International Law and Comparative Law 2002,405. 
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with the ruling, it shall submit it to the SPC. Until the SPC responds, 
the court of first instance may not assert jurisdiction over the case. 
These provisions are clearly designed to protect the arbitral process 
from undue court interference, by ensuring that lower courts cannot 
intervene without the sanction of the very highest court. 329 
B. Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
1. Conflict between the arbitration agency and the court 
The Arbitration law of the PRC says that, whereas parties concerned 
have doubt on the validity of an arbitration agreement, a request can be 
made to the arbitration commission for a decision or to the people's 
court for a ruling. 
A 
If one party requests that the arbitration commission makes a decision 
while the other party requests the people's court makes a ruling, the 
people's court shall make a ruling330. Equally, the Rules of CMAC[1995] 
narrate that, if the parties have any doubt about the effect of an 
agreement to arbitrate, and one of them requests the Arbitration 
Commission to make a decision, while the other party asks the people's 
329 Deng, Be, 'Discussion about Competence-Competence Principle', 5 Chinese Yearbook of Private 
International Law and Comparative Law 2002,406. 
330 Article 20 of the Arbitration law of the PRC 1994. 
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court to make a ruling, the people's court shall rule331. 
Yet the "official and written reply to questions about validity of 
arbitration agreement made by the SPC on October 21s` , 1998" states 
that, whereas parties have doubts as to the validity of an arbitration 
agreement, should one party request the arbitration agency for a decision, 
while the other party requests the people's court for a ruling, if the 
arbitration agency makes a decision before the people's court accepts the 
request, the people's court shall not accept the request. If the arbitration 
agency has not made a decision, the court shall accept the request and 
instruct the agency to stay the proceedings. If, after the arbitration 
agency makes its decision on jurisdiction, a party appeals to arbitration, 
while the other party requests the people's court for a ruling regarding 
the validity of the arbitration agreement, the court shall accept the case 
and instruct the arbitral institution to stay the proceedings. After making 
a ruling, the court shall serve that ruling in writing on the arbitral 
institution. The arbitral institution shall then resume or withdraw from 
the arbitration on the basis of the ruling. If the court makes a ruling that 
the arbitration agreement is invalid, then that precludes a dissenting 
party from seeking to proceed with the arbitration. If the arbitration 
institution, which has been served with the ruling that the agreement is 
not valid, refuses to withdraw, the court is entitled to adjudicate 
331 Article 4 of the Rules of CMAC[1995]. 
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regardless of that refusal. 332 
In Hongkong Cotton Textiles Company v. Hongkong Company, after 
CIETAC accepted the case, the Hongkong Company challenged the 
arbitrators' jurisdiction, claiming that there was no arbitration agreement. 
It commenced an action against Hongkong Cotton Textiles Company in 
Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court, making a request to the people's court 
for a ruling that CIETAC had no jurisdiction over the case. Meanwhile, 
CIETAC had already made a decision on the jurisdiction. Beijing No. 2 
Intermediate Court held that in respect that Hongkong Company had 
already made a request to the arbitration commission for a decision, it 
was not entitled to make the same request to the court. Consequently, the 
court would not accept the application. According to the decision made 
by Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court in Hongkong Cotton Textiles 
Company v. Hongkong Company, if the party at first asks an agency to 
consider the issue of jurisdiction, and then makes a similar application to 
the court, the court should not accept the application. The parties must 
choose one institution to rule on this issue. 333 
332 Deng. Jie. 'Discussion about Competence-Competence Principle', 5 Chinese Yearbook of Private 
International Law and Comparative Law 2002,403. 333 
Feng, Kefei. 'Either the Court or the Arbitration Agency should be chosen by Party for Arising an 
Objection to Jurisdiction'. 82(5) Arbitration and Law 2002,117. 
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2. Conflict between the arbitration agency and the arbitral 
tribunal 
Obviously, should any party challenge the validity of the arbitration 
agreement or the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal before the tribunal is 
composed, the matter cannot be dealt with by the tribunal, and so must 
be referred to the arbitration agency. If any jurisdictional issue is raised 
after the tribunal is composed, even after the agency has made a 
decision on the issue, the tribunal will hold a jurisdictional hearing, and 
must report the result in writing to the arbitration agency. This will still 
be so even if the agency has ruled that the tribunal has no jurisdiction, as 
the tribunal is regarded as better able to supply a definitive answer on 
this issue. The arbitration agency will then make a final decision based 
on the report made by the tribunal. Up till now, neither CIETAC nor 
CMAC has made a decision runs contrary to the report of the arbitral 
tribunal. 334 
In order to reconcile the roles of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitration 
agency in jurisdictional matters, scholarly opinion recommends - 
a. The arbitration agency can make a preliminary decision on the basis 
of prima facie evidence. If after hearing the evidence, the arbitral 
33+ 
Gao Fei. 'Discussion about Arbitration Agreement'. I Arbitration and Law Reports 1996,11-12; 
also see CIETAC ed. Selections of the Decisions on Jurisdiction by CIETAC, Beijing: China 
Commercial Press. 2004. 
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tribunal comes to the opposite conclusion, the agency could change its 
preliminary decision. 
b. If the tribunal has already been constituted, unless the agency 
considers the position straightforward, it shall discuss it with the tribunal, 
in order that the tribunal and the agency do not reach contrary decisions. 
c. Any decision made by the agency shall be communicated to the 
tribunal without unnecessary delay. 
d. If, after hearing the evidence, the tribunal considers the preliminary 
decision made by the agency to be erroneous, the tribunal shall report 
this to the agency in writing. The agency shall then reconsider its 
decision, and decide whether to affirm, alter or disaffirm it. - In theory, 
the agency has the final decision, but as noted above, it will not in 
practice disagree with the tribunal. 
C. Restrictions on the Right to Make Jurisdictional 
Challenges 
There is no doubt that jurisdictional challenges can be an abuse of the 
arbitral process, causing substantial delay and extra cost. Chinese law 
seeks to deal ' ith this problem as follows - 
1. Time limit for raising challenge 
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The Arbitration law of the PRC provides that a doubt to the 
effectiveness of an arbitration agreement, should be raised before the 
first hearing at the arbitral tribunal. 335 The Arbitration Law also 
provides that after the respondent has received the copy of the 
application for arbitration, he shall file a counter-claim with the 
arbitration commission. After the commission has received the 
counter-claim, it shall deliver it to the claimant within the time limit set 
in the relevant arbitration rules. If a respondent fails to submit a 
counter-claim, it does not affect the arbitration proceedings. 336 The 
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC provides that a counterclaim questioning 
the validity of the arbitration agreement, contesting the tribunal's 
jurisdiction may be put forward before the opening of the first arbitral 
hearing. Equally, a counterclaim contesting jurisdiction in a case 
proceeding on the basis of documents only shall be put forward before 
the first substantive defence by the respondent. 337 
2. Abandonment of the right to dissent 
The Arbitration law of the PRC (1994) provides that if a party knows or 
should have known that relevant arbitration rules, or any clauses or 
details of the arbitration agreement, are not observed, but still 
335 
Article 20(2) of the Arbitration law of the PRC 1994. 
336 
Article 25(2) of the Arbitration law of the PRC 1994. 
337 
Article 6 of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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participates in the arbitration proceedings, without taking timely and 
explicit 'written exception to the non-observance, he shall be regarded as 
having given up the right to take exception. This provision could extend 
to situations where the tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction. 338 
3. The Effect of a challenge 
Article 6 (4) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) provides that 
challenges to the arbitration agreement or'jurisdiction generally, need 
not lead to the suspension of arbitration proceedings. 
II. Disadvantages of the Chinese System 
It is suggested that the Chinese system features many disadvantages, in 
that its rules are incomplete and of doubtful functionality. The system 
must also be dauntingly alien in appearance for foreign users, used to 
some version of the principle of competence-competence. The following 
are the main disadvantages of the system. 
1. The fact that the arbitrators appointed by the parties cannot 
decide upon the extent of their own jurisdiction infringes the autonomy 
of the arbitral process. 339 
338 
Article 45 of Arbitration law of the PRC 1994, 
339 
Deng, Jie, 'Discussion about Competence-Competence Principle'. S Chinese Yearbook of Private 
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2. In some cases, a jurisdictional decision can only be made after 
hearing evidence, rather than on a prima facie basis. In those cases, it is 
necessary for the arbitral tribunal to make the decision, as strictly 
speaking, the arbitration agency is not a judicial organization and cannot 
hold a hearing. 340 In practice, the secretariat of arbitration agency would 
appoint coordinated secretary who is not expert in the field of the 
dispute to investigate. The agency's decision will be based in this badly 
informed and imperfect process 341 
3. If the decision is made by the arbitration agency, the arbitral 
proceedings would be suspended, adversely affecting the flexibility of 
arbitration. Were the arbitral tribunal permitted to continue the 
proceedings pending the decision on jurisdiction, such delay may be 
avoided 312 
4. Jurisdictional challenges are often an abuse of the arbitral process, 
making it possible for a party to prolong that process. 343 A doubt to the 
International Law and Comparative Law 2002,408- 
340 III Jian, 'Discussion about the Challenge against Jurisdiction in International Commercial 
Arbitration', 3 Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 2000,476. 341 Ilan. Depei (ed), Current Issues of Private International Law, Wuhan: Publishing [louse of 
Wuhan University, 2004,338. 
342 
Han. Depei (od). Current Issues of Private International Law. Wuhan: Publishing House of 
Wuhan University. 2004,358. 
343 
Han, Jian. 'Discussion about the Challenge against Jurisdiction in International Commercial 
Arbitration'. 3 Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 2000,474. 
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effectiveness of an arbitration agreement, should be raised before the 
first hearing at the arbitral tribunal. In some cases, the parties raise the 
challenge just several minute before the first hearing and the tribunal 
proceedings has to stay. This can be an abuse of the arbitral process, 
causing substantial delay and extra cost. 344 
5. Should issues of substance and jurisdiction be decided by different 
institutions, it is very possible that the decisions will be incompatible, 
especially where those issues cannot be separated completely. For 
example, an arbitration agency may decide that the parties have capacity, 
where that issue is raised before it. However when the arbitral tribunal 
hears the case, it may be persuaded that a party in fact lacks capacity. 345 
6. The fact that the agency must make the decision on the basis of the 
adjudication of arbitral tribunal makes the process more complex.. 346 
7. There is no guidance in the Arbitration law of the PRC regarding how 
to deal with challenges which do not impugn the validity of arbitration 
agreement but raises other jurisdictional issues, such as the scope of the 
agreement, or questions of arbitrability. However, the Arbitration Rules 
344 Zhang. Yi. 'Discussion about the Prevention of Delaying and Disturbing the Arbitral Process', 
ne volume edition of 2001). Arbitration and Law 2001.206. 45 Kan Ming. 'Ad Hoc Arbitration and its development in China', in Arbitration and Law, March, 
346 
(2000). 
Han, Jian. 'Discussion about the Challenge against Jurisdiction in International Commercial 
Arbitration', 3 Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 2000,478. 
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of CIETAC does explicitly confer jurisdiction to deal with such issues. 
Chinese arbitration law system is thus confusing and opaque in this area. 
One solution is to adopt the competence- competence principle which is 
enshrined in most developed legal systems and thus would be 
recognised and valued by foreign users of the Chinese system. But what 
version of that principle is most convenient to adopt. That is the question 
which the next section will attempt to answer. 
III. Competence-Competence in the UK 
It is submitted that it is useful to look to the United Kingdom for a 
paradigm which may be followed, as it offers two models for 
consideration - the Arbitration Act 1996 in England, and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the 
Model Law), which has been adopted in Scotland. 
A. The Institutions with Jurisdiction to Determine the 
Tribunal s Jurisdiction 
The principle of competence-competence, whereby the arbitral tribunal 
may rule on its own competence, has long been recognized by all of the 
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world's major arbitral jurisdictions347. The central idea is that any 
objection that a tribunal does not have jurisdiction should be dealt with, 
at least initially, by the tribunal itself. A statutory statement of the 
principle helps avoid the logical conundrum of how a tribunal, which 
rules that it has no jurisdiction, can be said to have jurisdiction to make 
such a ruling in the first place. 
In England, s. 30(1) of the 1996 Act provides that, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own 
substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to- 
(a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, 
(b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and 
(c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with the arbitration agreement. 
It is noteworthy that the parties may choose to deprive the tribunal of 
this power. In other words, the principle of competence-competence is 
not regarded as so fundamental that it must apply whatever the wishes of 
the parties3'. It may also be noted that s. 7 of the 1996 Act enshrines the 
principle of separability - the idea that the arbitration agreement is quite 
separate from the contract of which it forms part, and that the invalidity 
of the latter does not deprive the arbitration agreement of force. The 
e. g. Article 1052(1) of Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986. Article 178(3) of Swiss Private International 
Law Act 1987. Article 1466 of french Code of Civil Procedure. 348 
See the 1996 Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report on the Arbitration 
Bill (hereinafter `the DAC Report') pan 139. 
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practical idea which underpins it is that the tribunal acting under the 
arbitration clause in an invalid agreement should not be deprived by that 
invalidity of competence to rule on its jurisdiction. The issue of the 
separability of the arbitration agreement is rather more controversial and 
less universally accepted than that of competence-competence349. What 
is thus particularly noteworthy is that, although the principle of 
separability has obvious links to the principle of 
competence-competence, and is vital in order to allow the tribunal fully 
to exercise its competence350, the framers of the English Act were 
careful to emphasise the independence of the two principles 351. 
Moreover, s. 7 equally only applies unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties. Once again therefore, the principle of separability is not 
regarded as so fundamental that it must apply whatever the wishes of the 
parties. It is therefore possible for the parties to choose to have 
separability without competence-competence, or vice versa, or indeed to 
choose to have neither. 
By contrast, Article 16(1) of the Model Law provides, 
"The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration 
agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of 
s" Davidson. Fraser P. Arbitration. Edinburgh: W. Green, 2000,11-16.. 
350 
As was indeed aclnoNledged by the English Court of Appeal in recognizing in Harbour 
Assurance Co (UK ) (1993j Q. B. 705. that the two principles operated in tandem at common law. 351 
See the DAC Report pars 43. 
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contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms 
of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null 
and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration 
clause. " 
It will be seen than that the Model Law in this provision runs together 
two quite distinct ideas - the competence of the tribunal to rule on its 
own jurisdiction and the principle of separability - and treats one as the 
inevitable consequence of the other. Moreover, Article 16 is a mandatory 
provision, from which the parties cannot derogate. In other words, under 
the Model Law, the parties have to accept both separability and 
competence-competence, whether they like it or not. 352 It would further 
appear that the Model Law features an extreme form of the doctrine of 
separability. Thus the Analytical Commentary on Article 16 states 353 9 
`that the principle of separability .... applies whatever the nature of the 
defect'. This seems to have encouraged the courts in states which have 
adopted the Model Law to take the idea of competence-competence to 
its logical extreme. So Henry J. states in the Ontario case of Rio Algom 
Ltd 1: Samnri Steel Co. 354: 
"The Courts in matters of contract interpretation do not appear to have a 
role in determining matters of law or construction; jurisdiction and 
352 
Brocha, Aron. Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,78. 
333 
U. N. AJCN. 9,264, Analytical Commentary on Article 16, para 3. 
354 
(1991) 47 C. P. C. 231 at 256. 
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scope of authority are for the arbitrator to determine in the first instance, 
subject to later recourse to set aside the ruling or award. " 
So the Canadian courts have allowed the arbitrator to rule on even such 
fundamental jurisdictional objections as sovereign immunity. "' Courts 
elsewhere have regarded the tribunal's jurisdictional competence under 
the Model Law as extending beyond simple questions of whether the 
dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration clause to entirely more 
fundamental issues such as the validity or even the existence of the 
arbitration agreement itself. 356 
The English Act and the Model Law take very different approaches here. 
Which is the more appropriate? At first sight the answer might appear 
obvious. One of the key principles which has driven the modernization 
of the world's arbitration systems has been that of party autonomy, the 
right of the parties to shape the arbitral process as they choose, a 
principle which is indeed espoused by both the Model Law and the 
355 
See International Civil Aviation Organisation v Tripal Systems Pty Ltd (1998) 23 Yearbook of 
Commercial Arbitration 226. 
356 
See Tung Sang Trading Ltd V Kai Sun Sea Products & Food Co Ltd [1992] A. D. R. U. 93. 
Canada Packers v Terra Nova Tankers (1992) 11 O. R. 382. - It is worth pointing out, however, that 
courts under the English Arbitration Act have thus far adopted a fairly liberal view of 
competence-competence, holding that it is up to the tribunal to rule not only on matters which might 
be thought to be straightforwardly w ithin the scope of the principle. such as whether the tribunal is 
properly constituted - Minermet SpA Milan vLuckfield Shipping 
Corporation SA [2004] EWHC 729 
(Comm). the scope of the arbitration agreement -Al Naimi v Islamic Press Agency [2000] 1 
Lloyd's 
Rep. 122. whether the arbitration agreement has been repudiated -ABB LUMMUS Global Ltd v 
Keppel Fels Ltd [199912 Lloyd's Rep. 24, and whether the arbitration clause is valid XL Insurance 
Ltd V Owens Coming [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 500. but also more fundamental matters, such as whether 
the necessary preconditions for arbitration have been met - Mackley & Co v Gosport Marina Ltd 
[2002] EWIIC 1313.. and even whether particular matters are arbitrable at all - Azov Shipping Co v 
Baltic Shipping Co [1999) 1 All E. R. (Comm) 716. 
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English Act3S7. As the Act concedes autonomy to the parties in this 
regard, while the Model Law does not, it seems simple to conclude that 
the Act is to be preferred. Yet it might be asked whether it is sensible to 
insist that the centrality of the principle of competence-competence 
should be undermined, so that the principle of party autonomy might be 
carried to its logical extreme. One might also ask whether, given the 
inevitable relationship between the principles of 
competence-competence and separability, it makes sense to distinguish 
between the two concepts merely because it is logically possible to do so. 
In terms of Article 16 of the Model Law, an argument by a party that a 
fundamental flaw in the agreement between the parties deprived the 
arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction would be considered in the first instance 
by the tribunal itself. Even if it agreed that there was such a flaw, this 
would not rob it of jurisdiction under the arbitration clause which 
formed part of this agreement, and it would be entitled to make a final 
disposal of the matter between the parties by dismissing the case of the 
party seeking to arbitrate an issue arising under the agreement. (Equally, 
if it disagreed that such a flaw existed, it could proceed to try the 
substantive issue between the parties. ) Prima facie, the position would 
be the same under the Act. Yet if the parties were allowed to exclude the 
principles of competence-competence and separability, and did so, then 
the court rather than the tribunal would have to consider any 
337 
explicitly so in the case of Section 1(b) of the 1996 Act. 
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jurisdictional issue which was raised, and would be bound to conclude 
that any serious flaw in the main agreement undermined the arbitration 
agreement. This would tend to make a mockery of the parties' decision 
to arbitrate rather than litigate, and permit endless jurisdictional 
challenges358. The results might be even more absurd if the parties 
excluded only the principle of separability, since although the tribunal 
would retain the power to consider any jurisdictional objection, any 
conclusion that the main agreement was a nullity would rob it of the 
power to proceed further. The exclusion of only the principle of 
competence-competence would of course mean that such flaws in the 
main agreement would not undermine the arbitration clause, but that 
only the court, not the tribunal, would be empowered to make that ruling. 
There also remains the problem of whether certain commonly worded 
arbitration clauses serve to exclude (or worse still, partly exclude) either 
principle359. 
Both the Act and the Model Law then, offer workable models. Adopting 
either one would represent a major step forward for the Chinese legal 
system. While the approach taken by the Act is superficially more 
attractive, in light of the implications outlined above, it is suggested that 
China may wish to consider carefully whether that taken by the Model 
358 
"a fact Mhich is indeed recognized by the drafters of the Act -seethe DAC Report para 138. 359 
See Robert Mertin. Arbitration law, Informa Legal Publishing UK, paras 7-5.4.6 (1st edition 
Zoom. 
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Law is not in practice more straightforward and best designed to serve 
the needs of a modem arbitration system. It is what foreign users might 
tend to expect, and has the value of certainty. No real difficulties have 
been created by Article 16 in any of the many states which have adopted 
the Model Law. 
B. Dealing with Jurisdictional Objections 
In what circumstances should the arbitral tribunal take notice of 
jurisdictional questions? Under the Arbitration Act 1996, the arbitrator 
should only do so if they are raised by agreement of the parties, or are 
the subject of an objection or challenge by a party. In the latter event, the 
party making the challenge has the burden of proof regarding any matter 
in relation to which he challenges the tribunal's jurisdiction. By contrast, 
UNCITRAL was of the view that the tribunal need not wait until a party 
raises a jurisdictional issue, but could raise such an issue of its own 
motion360. For example, a tribunal operating under the Model Law in 
Scotland could raise the issue under Article 16(1), if it believed that the 
subject of the dispute was not arbitrable under Scots law. 
Turning to specifics, Article 16(2) demands that a plea that the tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction must be raised no later than the submission of a 
360 
U. N. A140/17. pars 154. 
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statement of defence to a claim or counterclaim, specifically conceding 
that a party is not barred from raising such a plea merely by appointing 
or participating in the appointment of an arbitrator - just in case such a 
step might otherwise be regarded as an admission of jurisdiction. Should 
a party take the view that a tribunal has jurisdiction at the outset, but 
then proceeds to exceed its authority, Article 16(2) requires that the 
objecting party must raise the plea as soon as the matter alleged to be 
beyond its authority is raised361 in the arbitral proceedings. UNCITRAL 
concedes however, 
"In some cases the governing law and therefore limitations on 
arbitrability of certain disputes might not be determined until the time of 
the award, making an earlier plea impossible". 362 
In other words, lack of initial jurisdiction or the fact that the tribunal 
has exceeded its jurisdiction may only become clear when the award is 
made. In such cases the award can still be challenged on a jurisdictional 
basis. 
Moreover, in all cases, Article 16(2) permits the tribunal to entertain a 
later plea if it considers the plea to be justified, thus allowing the 
tribunal to save the merely hapless from the consequences of their 
inadvertence. UNCITRAL comments363, 
361 




"The concern was expressed that parties who were not sophisticated in 
international commercial arbitration might not realise that a matter 
exceeding the tribunal's jurisdiction had been raised and that they were 
compelled to object promptly. " 
What are the consequences of failing to raise a jurisdictional plea at the 
. 
proper time? Disappointingly, Article 16 does not make this clear. 
However, Article 4, stating a principle of general application, provides, 
"A party who knows that any provision of this law from which the 
parties may derogate or any requirement under the arbitration agreement 
has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration 
without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue 
delay, or if a time limit is provided therefore, within such period of time, 
shall be deemed to have waived his right to object. " 
It seems fairly certain then, that if a party does not raise a jurisdictional 
plea timeously, he is barred from doing so at a later stage, e. g. in the 
form of a challenge to an award, and this is certainly how courts have 
interpreted the Model Law364. Nonetheless, during the drafting process 
there seemed to be broad agreement that while, this should normally be 
the result of such a failure by a party, certain jurisdictional defects were 
so fundamental, e. g. violation of public policy or non-arbitrability, that 
364 So in Case 214/1993 the Moscow City Court refused to entertain an action to have an award set 
aside on the basis that the applicant was not a party to the arbitration agreement, as the plea had not 
been raised before the tribunal. 
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they would provide grounds for attacking an arbitral award at any stage, 
even though they had not been raised at the proper time36s It was even 
mooted that this be made clear by an explicit provision to this effect366. 
Ultimately however, UNCITRAL367, 
"decided not to embark on an in depth discussion with a view to 
elaborating a comprehensive provision covering all eventualities and 
details. It was agreed not to modify the text and, this to leave the 
question to the interpretation and possibly regulation by the States 
adopting the Model Law. " 
It is possible to sympathise with UNCITRAL on this point. The idea that, 
while failure to raise pleas which only involve the interests of the parties 
should preclude their consideration later in the arbitral process, 
jurisdictional issues involving the public interest cannot be a matter 
capable of being waived by a party, is easy to understand, but much 
harder to cast in the form of a rule. Yet the failure to make explicit what 
is implicit in the Model Law is here something of a weakness, and a 
state which was considering its adoption might indeed wish to consider 
a specific provision on this point 
Article 16(3) of the Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal may 
365 A/CN 9/246, para 51. 
366 U. N. A/40/17, para 288. 
367 U. N. A/40/17, para 289. 
215 
rule on a jurisdictional plea either as a preliminary question or in an 
award on the merits, subject to the right of the parties to agree on the 
appropriate procedure. Where the tribunal rules on the plea as a 
preliminary question, if it rules that it has jurisdiction, it should continue 
the arbitral proceedings; if it rules that it has no jurisdiction, it should 
refuse to continue with the arbitration, or at least decline to consider the 
particular issue to which its jurisdiction does not extend. Where the 
tribunal decides to rule on the plea in an award on the merits, it may 
state that it is continuing with the arbitration on the assumption that it 
has jurisdiction, rather than ruling on the question of jurisdiction. Where 
a tribunal considers that a jurisdictional plea is plainly without merit, it 
will probably not issue a ruling at the preliminary stage, since there is 
little danger that the proceedings will be rendered pointless by the 
setting aside of the award. As UNCITRAL comments 368: "such 
flexibility is desirable since it would enable the arbitral tribunal to assess 
in each particular case whether the risk of dilatory tactics was greater 
than the opposite danger of waste of money and time". 
Yet, while the power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction 
may effectively prevent specious jurisdictional objections from being 
resorted to as a means of obstructing the proceedings, if the tribunal's 
determination of this issue were unreviewable, the potential for abuse 
368 U. N. A/40/17, para. 159. 
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would be immense. No serious legal system could permit an arbitral 
tribunal be the final determinator of its own jurisdiction. Thus any 
jurisdictional ruling, whether a separate ruling or as part of an award on 
the merits of the dispute, may be appealed to the courts. If the tribunal 
has dealt with jurisdiction as part of an award on the merits, then the 
appropriate form of challenge is an action to have the award set aside 
under Article 34(2)(a)(iii), which is considered in more detail in chapter 
12 below. Where the tribunal issues a separate ruling on its jurisdiction, 
Article 16(3) provide that a party may within 30 days of having received 
notice of that ruling ask the court to issue a final ruling on the matter - 
the decision of the court not being subject to further appeal. Article 16(3) 
continues that while such a request is pending, the tribunal may continue 
with the proceedings, and may even make an award. Once again, this 
aspect of Article 16(3) is designed to ensure that unscrupulous parties do 
not use plainly unmeritorious appeals to delay the arbitral process. It 
would be a bold tribunal which would continue the proceedings, far less 
make an award, if it felt that a pending appeal stood a reasonable chance 
of success, given that in such an event its efforts would prove a waste of 
everyone's time and money. 
It may be noted that the version of the Model Law promulgated by 
UNCITRAL permits an appeal to the court where the tribunal rules that 
it has jurisdiction, but not where it rules that it has no jurisdiction. The 
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view of UNCITRAL was369, 
"It was recognized that a ruling by the arbitral tribunal that it lacked 
jurisdiction was final as regards its proceedings since it was 
inappropriate to compel arbitrators who had made such a ruling to 
continue the proceedings. " 
Yet the Scottish Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law (the SAC), 
which recommended the adoption of the Model Law in Scotland, noted 
that if the parties, having been informed by the tribunal that it lacked 
jurisdiction, resorted to litigation, either could suggest to the court that 
there was a valid and binding arbitration clause. If the court agreed, it 
would in terms of Article 8, be bound to refer the matter to arbitration. 
The SAC opined 370 31 
"This appears to be a very roundabout way to achieve a ruling by the 
court on whether or not the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction. " 
Accordingly, in the version of the Model Law adopted in Scotland, a 
ruling by the tribunal that it has no jurisdiction is also open to appeal. It 
may be suggested that the logic of the Scottish position is impeccable, 
and that if China were thinking of adopting a provision on the lines of 
' Article 16(3), the Scottish version is commended. 
Once more the Model Law provides no answer to the question of 
369 U. N. A/40/17, para. 163. 
370 In its Joint Consultation Document with the DAC, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1987) p. 57. 
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whether a party who does not appeal against a jurisdictional ruling 
within the specified time limit is thereafter barred from raising the 
matter in an action to set aside the final award. It is by no means clear 
what the answer is in this instance. Nor is it clear whether the court's 
rejection of an appeal against a ruling by the tribunal that it has 
jurisdiction will preclude that issue being raised in an action to set aside 
the award, although any other conclusion would appear absurd. These 
are gaps which any Chinese legislation on the subject might address. 
In comparing the position under the Arbitration Act 1996, it must first be 
observed that its provisions on this matter are directly inspired by 
Article 16, and thus very similar. Thus s. 31(1) insists that an objection 
that the tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction must be raised by a party 
as soon as he takes any step to contest the merits371. He is not precluded 
from raising such an objection merely by appointing or participating in 
the appointment of an arbitrator. Again, should a party take the view that 
a tribunal has jurisdiction at the outset, but then proceeds to exceed that 
jurisdiction, s. 31(2) requires that the objecting party must raise the plea 
as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond its jurisdiction is raised in the 
arbitral proceedings372. And just like Article 16(2), s. 31(3) permits the 
371 See Athletic Union of Constantinople v National Basketball Association (2001) unreported. 
372 See JSC Zestafoni G Nikoladze Ferralloy Plant v Ronly Holdings Ltd [2004] EWHC 245 
(Comm). 
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tribunal to entertain a later plea if it considers the plea to be justified373. 
S. 31(4) then provides that where an objection is duly taken to the 
tribunal's substantive jurisdiction, if the parties agree on the course of 
action the tribunal should take, the tribunal shall proceed accordingly. If 
there is no such agreement, the tribunal has the discretion as to whether 
it rules on the matter in an award as to jurisdiction, or deal with the 
objection in its award on the merits374 
Yet despite the obvious similarities with the Model Law, the provisions 
of the Act contain subtle but important differences. In the first place, 
s. 30(1) of the Act speaks of a tribunal's `substantive jurisdiction' and 
goes on to define that term as referring to 
9 whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, or 
" whether the tribunal is properly constituted, or 
9 what matters have been submitted to arbitration. 
It can be appreciated that more fundamental objections to the arbitral 
proceedings such as arbitrability are not regarded as properly 
jurisdictional375. Moreover, s. 73 of the Act explicitly provides376 that 
only in relation to certain specified matters - including lack of 
substantive jurisdiction- does a party lose his right to appeal against an 
373 See Hussmann (Europe) Ltd v Al Ameen Development & Trade Co [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 83. 
374 And the tribunal's exercise of that discretion cannot be challenged - see AOOT Kalmneft v 
Glencore International AG [2002] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 577. 
375 See DAC Report pars 139. but see Mackley & Co Ltd v Gosport Marina [2002] EWHC 1315. 
376 See also Section 67(1) of the 1996 Act. 
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award by failing to object at the appropriate time. Therefore the issue of 
whether fundamental questions such as arbitrability can still be raised to 
challenge an award, despite not being raised earlier in the proceedings, 
which issue is so obscure under the Model Law, is dealt with very 
clearly under the Act37. Moreover, the Act indicates that any ruling by 
the tribunal on jurisdiction shall itself take the form of an award. This 
means that any appeal will mean that the matter is res judicata and 
cannot be raised again in challenging the final award378. Once more then, 
the Act is clear where the Model Law is obscure. It is also clear that 
appeals can be made against negative as well as positive jurisdictional 
rulings, while the court as well as being able to confirm or set aside the 
award, has in terms of s. 67(3) the power to set the award aside only in 
part, or to vary it379. 
At the same time, however, there are certain aspects of the regime 
introduced by the Act which are more questionable. First of all, although 
this is not clear from the terminology employed by the Act, it was 
always intended that in reviewing a tribunal's decision on jurisdiction, it 
would be open for a court to reconsider the tribunal's view of the facts 
as well as the law380. This has certainly been the approach taken by the 
377 See DAC Report para 297. 
378 See DAC Report para 142. 
379 
See Peterson Farms Inc vC&M Farming Ltd [204] EWHC 121 (Comm). 
380 
See DAC Report para 143. 
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English courts, who have reserved the right in jurisdictional appeals to 
rehear all the evidence on the question - an approach which may 
obviously add significantly to the cost and duration of the process . 
More importantly, while the determination of the court under the Model 
Law is final, the court's decision under the Act is, by virtue of s. 67(4), 
subject to appeal just like any other decision of the court, albeit that the 
court must give permission for that appeal. Given that one of the 
attractions of arbitration is its relative finality, anything which carries 
the potential of further extending the process is to be deplored. 
Mention should also be made of s. 72 which provides in effect that a 
party who disputes a tribunal's substantive jurisdiction may simply 
decline to take part in the arbitral proceedings and yet retain his right to 
question the tribunal's jurisdiction either by seeking an appropriate 
declaration or injunction, or by challenging the award. Describing this as 
`a vital provision' the DAC comment 382 t 
"A person who disputes that an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction cannot 
be required to take part in the arbitration proceedings or to take positive 
steps to defend his position, for any such requirement would beg the 
question whether or not his objection has any substance and thus be 
likely to lead to gross injustice. Such a person must be entitled, if he 
wishes, to ignore the arbitral process. " 
381 Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co [1999] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 716. 
382 See DAC Report para 295. It has since been held that raising an objection to the arbitration does 
not amount to participation in arbitral proceedings - see Caparo Group Ltd v Fagor Arrasate Sociedad 
Cooperative [2000] ADRLJ 254. 
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One can understand the logic of the DAC in this matter, and it is perhaps 
useful that they have made this position explicit. Yet the above approach 
surely represents a major inroad upon the principle of 
competence-competence383. 
One further peculiarity of the English regime is that while both the Act 
and the Model Law envisage that in most circumstances the tribunal will, 
at least initially, rule on its own jurisdiction, the Act also contemplates 
that the court may sometimes have a role. Thus, s. 32(1) of Arbitration 
Act 1996 provides that the court may, on the application of a party to 
arbitral proceedings, (upon notice to the other parties), determine any 
question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal. This provision 
is mandatory, and thus will represent the only available means of 
challenge if the parties have deprived the tribunal of power to rule on its 
own jurisdiction 384. Yet it is intended that only in rare would an 
application to the court under s. 32 would be justified in preference to 
seeking an award from the tribunal. 385 To permit in most cases tribunals 
to rule on their own jurisdiction pursuant to ss. 30 and 31, s. 32 
procedure is narrowly drawn and limited. By virtue of s. 32(2) the 
application is required to be made either by agreement of all the parties 
383 Although it does represent the view taken by the English courts prior to the passing of the Act - 
see The Gladys [1990] 1 All E. R. 397. See however Valedo Rio Duce Navegacos SA v Shanghai Steel 
Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [2000] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 70. 
384 See Esso Exploration and Production UK Ltd v Electricity Supply Board [2004] EWHC 787 
(Comm). 
385 See DAC Report para 146. 
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or the permission of the tribunal. In the latter case, s. 32(2)(b) requires 
the court to be satisfied that, 
9 the application was made promptly; 
9 it will save costs, and 
" there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the court. 
The DAC386 expresses the hope `that the Courts will take care to 
prevent this exceptional provision from becoming the normal route for 
challenging jurisdiction'. No appeal will lie against a decision as to 
whether these conditions have been complied with, unless the court 
gives leave387. And no appeal lies from the decision of the court on the 
question of jurisdiction without its leave, which leave shall not be given 
unless the court considers that the question involves a point of law 
which is one of general importance or is one which for some other 
special reason should be considered by the Court of Appea1388. This 
provides a clue to the possible circumstances in which s. 32 will apply. 
While the Act embraces the idea of competence-competence, it also 
recognises that there may be situations where it would be useful for the 
court, rather than the tribunal, to make the initial ruling on jurisdiction. 
This could be where both parties recognise that this is the case, such as 
where a difficult issue of jurisdiction is concerned, particularly a 
technical legal issue, and it is clear that one or both parties will not be 
386 See DAC Report para 147. 
387 Section 32(5) of the 1996 Act. 
388 Section 32(6) of the 1996 Act. I 224 
satisfied with the tribunal's view of the issue. More importantly, where a 
point of law of general application may be at issue, - e. g. the meaning 
and scope of a standard form of arbitration clause389, or the question of 
whether standard contract terms which incorporate standard terms from 
other standard form contracts are apt to incorporate an arbitration 
clause390 - the framers of the Act regard it as valuable that such matters 
should be definitively determined by the courts, so that subsequent 
parties and arbitral tribunals may have guidance on such matters. Finally, 
it may be added that while an application is made to the court under s. 32, 
the tribunal, subject to the contrary agreement of the parties, has a 
discretion either to stay the arbitral proceedings, or to continue them and 
make an award 391. The DAC comments 392 that by reason of this 
provision `a recalcitrant party will not be able to mount a spurious 
challenge as a means of delaying the arbitral process'. 
The question whether a provision such as s. 32 is useful depends on one's 
view of the role of the court in the arbitral process. Although the 1996 
Act represents a dramatic move on the part of English law in the 
direction of party and tribunal autonomy, traditionally the courts have 
played a significant supervisory role in English arbitration law and it 
389 See e. g. Asheville Investments Ltd v Elmer Construction Ltd [1988] 2 All E. R. 577. C. A. 
390 See e. g. Babcock Rosyth Defence Ltd v Grootcon (United Kingdom) Ltd 1998 S. L. T. 1143. 
391 Section 32(4) of the 1996 Act. 
392 At pars 148. 
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remains the case that they play much more of a role than in other 
developed arbitration systems. This can be seen not only in s. 32 but also 
in provisions such as s. 45393, which adopts a very similar model to s. 32, 
and which allows a party to apply to the court to determine a 
preliminary point of law arising in the course of the proceedings which 
the court is satisfied substantially affects the rights of one of the parties, 
and s. 69 which permits, albeit in very limited circumstances, an appeal 
against an arbitral award on a point of law394. To some degree, what 
drives English law here, is a conviction that part of its attraction as the 
governing law for many international commercial contracts, and part of 
the attraction of England as an arbitral forum is the view that English 
commercial law and English arbitration law in particular is extremely 
well developed due to the continued role of the courts in shaping its 
form395. This type of relationship between arbitration and the courts is 
therefore peculiar to England. Certainly, the courts in China do not share 
this tradition of assisting the development of arbitration law. Thus, while 
it might be argued that there may be merit, given that the decisions of 
tribunals on jurisdiction are reviewable by the courts in any case, in 
allowing the court rather than the tribunal in certain circumstances to 
rule on jurisdictional questions, any benefit gained thereby is probably 
393 Which re-enacts in slightly different form 2 of the Arbitration Act 1979, which itself replaces the 
consultative case procedure ( abolished by s. 1 of the Arbitration Act 1979) established by s. 21 of the 
Arbitration Act 1950. See the DAC Report paras 217-221. 
394 See the DAC Report paras 284-292. 
395 See the Commercial Court Committee Report on Arbitration 1978 (Cmnd 7284). 
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lost by the damage such a possibility does to the principle of 
competence-competence. Suppose, however, the provision was modified 
so that the court could only play such a role, when invited to do so by 
both parties? Surely, it would be an extreme position to insist that the 
court could play no role here, even when this was the wish of the parties? 
Yet that is in effect the position taken by the Model Law, and such is the 
symbolic value of the principle of competence-competence that it must 
prevail over party autonomy in this context. It is difficult to believe that 
the attractiveness of China as an arbitral forum would be enhanced if 
there was any suggestion that its courts and not the tribunal could in any 
circumstances be the initial determinors of matters of jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that there is no merit, despite its superficial 
attractions, in commending the adoption of a provision like s. 32 (or any 
modification thereof) in China. It might be added that it is the case that 
s. 32 represents a qualification to the basic principles of 
competence-competence established by ss. 30-3 1, rather than an 
indispensable element of the English regime, so that the provisions of 
ss. 30-31 could be adopted without the addition of s. 32 to create a 
perfectly workable regime. 
IV. Conclusion 
It has been seen that the provisions of existing Chinese law on the 
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question of jurisdiction are obscure, fragmented and sometimes 
contradictory. In considering whether China could develop a new, 
modern, unified arbitration regime, reference has been had to the models 
of the Arbitration Act 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration. It has been seen how both 
systems have adopted the principles of competence-competence and 
separability, now universally accepted by the world's leading arbitration 
systems. It was noted how, while Model regarded those concepts as 
mandatory and interdependent, the Act saw them as non-mandatory and 
logically distinguishable. While at first sight the latter position appeared 
more attractive, it was concluded that the position adopted by the Model 
Law was practically more beneficial, as better supporting the arbitral 
process. Both regimes indicate how jurisdictional objections should be 
raised and the stage at which this should be done. However, the Model 
Law is less explicit than the Act as to what constitutes a jurisdictional 
plea, and thus correspondingly less clear as to the consequences of 
failing to raise a timely objection. If China were to consider adopting the 
provisions of the Model Law here, they might usefully adapted to offer 
similar clarification. It is not suggested that the provisions of the English 
Act are adopted wholesale, as they contemplate too extensive a role for 
the court. In particular, it is advised that China not adopt the procedure 
whereby a court on application by a party may render the initial decision 
on jurisdiction, as this represents too major an inroad upon the principle 
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of competence-competence, and since China does not feature the 
peculiar relationship between arbitration and the courts which is unique 
to English law. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS, 
INCLUDING THE POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL 
AND THE COURT 
Where a party refers a dispute to arbitration, if the other party does not 
challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal over the case, or if the 
arbitral tribunal is ruled to have jurisdiction in the face of such a 
challenge, the arbitral proceedings will be conducted. What role, if any, 
should the court have in the conduct of the arbitral proceedings? The 
main issues which will be dealt with in this chapter are, the discretion of 
the parties/arbitral tribunal, the need for each party to be treated equally 
and have an opportunity to present his case, the language of the 
proceedings, the role of statements of claim and defence, including 
supplementary claims and defences, rules of evidence, the power to 
order interim measures of protection, rules as to copies of evidential 
material, the location of arbitral proceedings, advance notice of hearings 
and meetings, the form and scope of hearings. As ever, the Chinese 
approach as to the above questions will be considered, and compared 
with the approach taken in English Law and the Model Law. 
I. The Chinese Approach to the Conduct of Proceedings 
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A. The Need to Be Treated Equally and Have an Opportunity 
of Presenting One s Case 
By virtue of Article 4 (2) of the CIETAC Rules 2005, the parties are free 
to agree on any issue, unless that agreement is inoperative or conflicts 
with the mandatory provisions of the law of the place of arbitration. 
Article 7 of the Arbitration Law, which is mandatory, provides that 
arbitration shall be made based on true facts and should be conducted 
according to the rules of law to reach a fair and reasonable settlement 
for parties concerned. Where the parties have no such agreement, Article 
29 of CIETAC Rules 2005 applies, and provides that the arbitral tribunal 
shall examine the case in any way that it deems appropriate, but must act 
impartially and fairly, and afford reasonable opportunities to all parties 
for presentations and debates. 
B. The Language of the Proceedings 
The Arbitration Law does not say anything about language, leaving the 
parties to make their own agreement. 396 However, while Article 67 of 
CIETAC Rules 2005 allows the parties to agree on the language of the 
arbitral proceedings, it provides that, in the absence of such agreement, 
396 Article 4 (2) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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Chinese shall be the official language of the proceedings. 
C. Statements of Claim and Defence 
Statements of claim. By virtue of article 4 (2) of CIETAC Rules 2005, 
the parties are free to agree on the issues of statements of claim and 
defence, except where such agreement is inoperative or conflicts with a 
mandatory provision. Article 22 of the Arbitration Law provides that in 
applying for arbitration, the parties shall submit copies of the arbitration 
agreement and application to arbitrate to the arbitration agency, while 
Article 23 states that the application shall specify the following matters: 
- the name, gender, age, profession, work unit and residence of each 
party, 
- the name and residence of any party who is a legal person or other 
organization, 
- the name and position of the legal representatives or principal leading 
members. Where the applicant is a corporate body, the application shall 
specify the name and position of the legal representatives. Where the 
applicant is a partnership or an unincorporated association which does 
not have legal representatives, the applicant should specify the name and- 
position of the most important leaders of the partnership or association. ) 
- the nature of the claim and the facts and evidence on which it is based, 
- sources of evidence, and the names and residences of witnesses. 
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By virtue of Article 24, an arbitration agency shall accept an application 
and notify the parties within five days of its receipt, if it deems the 
application to conform to the above requirements. If it deems otherwise, 
it shall notify the parties in writing and state its reasons. Article 25 
continues that after the agency has accepted an application, it shall 
deliver a copy of the relevant arbitration rules and the list of the panel of 
arbitrators to both the claimant and respondent within the time limit 
prescribed in those rules, ensuring the latter also receives a copy of the 
application. If there is no agreement regarding how statements of claim 
and defence are to be handled, the default rules of the CIETAC Rules 
2005 apply. Those Rules do not indicate clearly to whom the statement 
of claim should be submitted, but there are clues in the form of Articles 
5(1) and 9 suggesting that it should be submitted to the arbitration 
agency. Article 5 (1) provides that CIETAC shall, upon receiving a 
written statement of claim from a party, accept a case in accordance with 
an arbitration agreement concluded between the parties. Article 9 states 
that the arbitral proceedings shall commence on the date on which the 
CIETAC or one of its Sub-Agencies receives a statement of claim. As to 
the content of statement of claim, Article 10 states that a party applying 
for arbitration under these Rules shall submit a request for arbitration in 
writing signed by and/or affixed with the seal of the claimant and/or its 
authorized representative(s), which shall, inter alia, include: 
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a. the names and addresses of the claimant and the respondent, including 
the zip code, telephone, telex, fax and telegraph numbers, email 
addresses or any other means of electronic telecommunication; 
b. a reference to the arbitration agreement that is invoked; 
c. a statement of the facts of the case and the main issues in dispute; 
d. details of the claim; and 
e. ) the facts and grounds on which the claim is based. 
I suggest that Article 10(b) and (c) should be deleted, since firstly, as the 
arbitration agreement must be submitted separately anyway, it is 
unnecessary to require the claimant to include a reference to it in the 
statement of claim; and secondly, the facts of the case and main issues in 
dispute are the facts and grounds on which the claim is based, so that (c) 
and (e) are virtually the same. Moreover, the CIETAC Rules also require 
the statement of claim to include details of evidence, its sources, and the 
names and residences of witnesses. Article 11 of the Rules provides that 
upon receipt of the request for Arbitration and its attachments, if 
CIETAC after examination finds the formalities required for an 
arbitration application to be incomplete, it may request the claimant to 
complete them. Where the formalities are found to be complete, 
CIETAC shall send a Notice of Arbitration to both parties together with 
a copy of its Arbitration Rules, panel of arbitrators and arbitration fee 
schedule. The request for arbitration and its attachments shall be sent to 
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the respondent under the same cover. CIETAC or its Sub-Agency shall, 
after accepting a case, appoint a staff-member of its secretariat to assist 
the arbitral tribunal in the procedural administration of the case. Article 
68 of the Rules states that all documents, notices and written materials 
in relation to the arbitration may be sent to the parties and/or their 
representatives in person, or by registered mail or express mail, 
facsimile, telex, cable, or by any other means considered proper by the 
Secretariat of the CIETAC or its Sub-Agency. Any written 
correspondence sent to a party and/or its representative(s) shall be 
deemed to have been properly served on the party if delivered to the 
addressee or delivered at his place of business, registration, domicile, 
habitual residence or mailing address, or where, after reasonable 
inquiries by the other party, none of the aforesaid addresses can be 
found, the written correspondence is sent by the Secretariat of the 
CIETAC or its Sub-Agency to the addressee's last known place of 
business, registered address, domicile, habitual residence or mailing 
address by registered mail, or by any other means that provides a record 
of the attempt of delivery. 
Statement of defence. The parties are free to agree on the issues of 
statement of defence, but their agreement cannot be inconsistent with the 
Arbitration Law. 397 Article 25 of the Arbitration Law provides that after 
397 Article 4 (2) of Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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the respondent has received the copy of the application for arbitration, he 
shall file a statement of defence with the arbitration agency. After the 
agency has received that statement of defence, it shall deliver it to the 
claimant within the time limit set in the arbitration rules. If a respondent 
fails to submit a statement of defence, it does not affect the arbitration 
proceedings, which will continue, and an award will be made. If there -is 
no such agreement, the CIETAC Rules apply. Article 12(l) of those 
Rules provides that within 45 days of the date of receipt of the Notice of 
Arbitration, the respondent shall file a statement of defence in writing 
with the Secretariat of the CIETAC or its Sub-Agency. The statement of 
defence shall be signed by and/or affixed with the seal of the Respondent 
and/or its authorized representative(s), and shall, inter alia, include: 
a. the names and addresses of the Respondent, including the zip code, 
telephone, telex, fax and telegraph numbers, email addresses or any 
other means of electronic telecommunications; 
b. the defence to the Request for Arbitration setting forth the facts and 
grounds on which the defence is based; and 
c. the relevant evidence supporting the defence. 
Article 12 (2) continues that the arbitral tribunal may accept a statement 
of defense submitted after expiration of the above time limit. It should 
be noted that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a Summary 
Procedure shall apply to any case where the amount in dispute does not 
exceed RMB 500,000 yuan, or where the amount exceeds that sum, but 
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one party applies to arbitrate under the Summary Procedure, and the 
other agrees in writing. Where no monetary claim is specified or the 
amount in dispute is not clear, the CIETAC shall determine whether or 
not to apply the Summary Procedure after a full consideration of such 
factors as the complexity of the case and the interests involved, etc. 398 
Where the amount in dispute under an amended claim or a counterclaim 
exceeds RMB 500,000 Yuan, the procedure shall be changed from the 
Summary Procedure to the general procedure, unless the parties have 
agreed to the continuous application of the former. 399 Under the 
summary procedure, the respondent shall submit its Statement of 
Defense and relevant evidence to the Secretariat of the CIETAC within 
twenty days from the date of receipt of the Notice of Arbitration, 
although the arbitral tribunal may extend this period if it considers it 
justified. 400 Article 12 (3) states that failure of the respondent to file a 
statement of defence shall not affect the arbitral proceedings. 
Statement of Counter-claim. There are no rules as regards 
counter-claims in the Arbitration Law. Thus parties can make their own 
agreement on such issues as to whom a counter-claim should be 
submitted, what its content should be, time-limits for submission, and 
398 Article 50 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
399 Article 57 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
400 Article 53 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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how a counter-claim should be served and accepted. 401 In the absence of 
such agreement, the CIETAC Rules apply. Article 13(1) provides that 
counterclaim within 45 days of the date of receipt of the notice of 
arbitration, the respondent shall file with CIETAC any counterclaim in 
writing. The arbitral tribunal may extend time period if it believes that 
there is justification. Article 13(2) states that when filing a counterclaim, 
the respondent shall specify that counterclaim in a written statement of 
counterclaim, stating the facts and grounds upon which the counterclaim 
is based, with relevant evidence attached thereto. In summary procedure, 
counterclaims shall be filed with supporting evidence within 20 days, 
although again the tribunal may extend this period if it considers it 
justified. 402 Article 13 also provides that when filing a counterclaim, the 
respondent shall within a specified time period pay an arbitration fee in 
advance, according to the fee schedule of CIETAC. 403 Where the 
formalities required for filing a counterclaim are found to be complete, 
CIETAC shall send the statement of counterclaim and its attachments to 
the claimant. 
404 
The Statement of Defence to a Counterclaim. As there are no rules in 
the Arbitration Law as to statements of defence to counterclaims, the 
401 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
402 Article 53 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
403 Article 13 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
404 Article 13 (4) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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parties are at liberty to agree on such issues. 405 If there is no such 
agreement, the CIETAC Rules apply. Article 13(4) provides that the 
claimant shall, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the statement 
of counterclaim and attachments, submit in writing its statement of 
defence to the counterclaim. The arbitral tribunal has the power to 
decide whether to accept a statement of defence submitted after 
expiration of the above time limit. 406 In summary procedure, the 
claimant shall file its statement of defence to the counterclaim within 20 
days. 407 Article 13(6) states that failure of the claimant to file a 
statement of defence to a counterclaim shall not affect the arbitral 
proceedings. 
D. Supplementary Claim and Defence. 
The Arbitration Law is silent on supplementary claims and defences, but 
under Article 4(2) of the CIETAC Rules 2005, the parties are free to 
agree on supplementary claims and defences. Where there is no such 
agreement Article 14 of the CIETAC Rules provides that a claimant may 
amend its claim and a respondent its counterclaim. However, the arbitral 
tribunal may not permit any such amendment if it considers that it is too 
late and may delay the arbitral proceedings. 
405 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
406 Article 13 (5) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005) . 407 Article 53 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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E. Evidence 
There are no detailed rules as to evidence in Chinese arbitration law. In 
practice, arbitrators conduct proceedings according to the system of 
evidence of the Civil Procedural Law. "Regulation of Evidence in Civil 
Procedure by SPC" (hereinafter referred to as "Regulation of Evidence 
by SPC") 408 lays down detailed rules as to burden of producing 
evidence, time-limits within which evidence should be produced, etc. 
Although arbitrators in China have been conducting arbitration 
according to the Regulation of Evidence by SPC, I suggest it would be 
better if the arbitration law could adopt some of the rules of the 
Regulation of Evidence by SPC, such as the burden of producing 
evidence, the power of tribunal to collect evidence, appraisal, and 
cross-examination, so that arbitration law could be made more 
developed. 
1. The Burden of producing evidence 
. The parties are free to agree on the burden of producing evidence409, 
but 
their agreement should not conflict with the Arbitration Law. Article 43 
408 tAýveral Rules on Evidence in Civil Procedure by the SPC', Law Interpretation No. 33 (2001), 
Dec. 21,2001. The Regulations came into force on April 1,2002. 
409 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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of which provides that parties shall provide evidence to support their 
respective claims. If there is no agreement, the CIETAC Rules 2005 
apply, and Article 10(2) provides that a party applying for arbitration 
shall attach to the request for Arbitration relevant evidence supporting 
the facts on which his claim is based. Article 13(2) deals similarly with 
counterclaims. Article 36(1) states that each party shall have the burden 
of proving the facts relied on to support its claim, defence or 
counterclaim. The arbitral tribunal may specify a time period for the 
parties to produce evidence, and refuse to admit any evidence produced 
beyond the period. A party finding it difficult to produce evidence within 
the specified time period may apply for an extension before the 
expiration of the period, and the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether or 
not to extend the period. 410 If a party with the burden of proof of any 
issue fails to produce evidence within the specified period, or produces 
insufficient evidence to support its claim or counterclaim, it shall bear 
the consequences thereof 411 
2. The Power of tribunal to collect evidence 
. Again, the parties are free agree on this matter, as 
long as that 
agreement is consistent with the Arbitration Law, and Article 43 
provides that if an arbitration tribunal deems it necessary to collect 
410 Article 36 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
411 Article 36 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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evidence, it can do so on its own initiative, and the parties may not agree 
to deprive it of this power. Where there is no agreement on this issue, the 
CIETAC Rules apply, Article 37 providing that an arbitral tribunal may, 
on its own initiative, undertake investigations and collect evidence as it 
considers necessary. It can be seen that the CIETAC Rules envisage an 
inquisitorial role for the tribunal, which is in contrast with the 
adversarial approach favored by Anglo-American systems. From my 
point of view, to protect the autonomy of the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
should not be assigned an inquisitorial role, and the parties should be 
given the freedom to agree to preclude the tribunal from collecting 
evidence of its own motion. When thus investigating and collecting 
evidence, the tribunal shall inform each party of his right to be present at 
such investigation if it considers his presence necessary In the event that 
one or both parties fail to be present, the investigation and collection 
shall proceed without being affected. The arbitral tribunal shall, through 
the Secretariat of the CIETAC, transmit the evidence it collects to the 
parties and afford them an opportunity to comment. 
I suggest that, to protect the autonomy of the parties, the parties shall be 
permitted to preclude the tribunal from collecting evidence on its own 
initiative. Where the parties have no such agreement, the tribunal may 
collect evidence if it considers it necessary. It is not possible to prescribe 
exhaustively the circumstances in which the tribunal may decide to 
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collect evidence. The following are some examples of those 
circumstances: 
a. Where the evidence produced by the parties is conflicting, so that after 
the hearing, the tribunal is still incapable of deciding upon the evidence, 
the tribunal might have thepower to decide whether to collect evidence 
on its own initiative, or to make an award against the party with the 
burden of proof on that issue, as would happen in a common law system. 
b. The parties or their attorneys are incapable of collecting evidence for 
objective reasons, and apply to the tribunal to collect the evidence. For 
example, where one party refuses to co-operate in supplying evidence, 
the other may want to ask the tribunal to collect the evidence. 
b. The evidence is concerned with technical matters, and the tribunal 
needs to ask the expert agreed by the parties or appointed by it to assess 
the evidence. 
It is not clear who should be liable if the tribunal cannot collect the 
evidence concerned. I suggest that it must be the party who is subject to 
the burden of producing evidence, as the arbitral tribunal does not have 
an obligation to collect evidence, but is simply helping the parties to do 
so. The arbitration law does not state whether the court should support 
the collection of evidence. I suggest that such support may be apt in 
certain cases. If a party wants to take evidence from a witness who 
refuses to co-operate, he should be able, with the permission of the 
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tribunal, to apply to the court to collect that evidence. If the arbitral 
agency permits the application, it shall submit the application to the 
people's court at the place where the evidence was obtained. The tribunal 
should be able to refuse such an application if it considers that sufficient 
evidence has already been collected, or that the evidence the party wants 
to collect is not crucial. 
F. Powers to order Interim Measure of Protection 
1. Attachment 
As ever, the parties are free to agree on this, as long as their agreement 
does not conflict with the Arbitration Law, 412 Article 28 of which 
provides that if due to the acts of the other party or otherwise, the 
arbitration award cannot be executed or is difficult to execute, a party 
may apply to attach property. Where a claimant applies for attachment, 
the Civil Procedure Law directs that the arbitration agency shall submit 
that application to the people's court. If there are errors in the application, 
the claimant shall compensate the respondent for any losses arising from 
the attachment. The "Notice of the SPC about Several Problems in the 
412 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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Enforcement of the Arbitration Law of the PRC"413 provides that if a 
party applies for attachment, the competent court is the basic-level 
People's Court in the region where the respondent is domiciled or where 
his property is located. If the dispute is foreign, Article 258 of the 
Civil Procedure Law makes the competent court the intermediate 
people's court in the place where the respondent is domiciled or where 
his property is located. 414 Article 94 of the Civil Procedure Law 
provides that property preservation shall be limited to the scope of the 
claim or to the property relevant to the case. Property preservation shall 
be carried out by sealing up, distraining, freezing or other methods as 
prescribed by law. Should the people's court freeze a property, it shall 
notify the person against whom the application is made. Property that 
has already been sealed up or frozen shall not be sealed up or frozen 
again. Article 100 of the "Opinion of the SPC about several problems as 
to the Enforcement of Civil Procedure Law of the PRC" provides that 
the court may order a party to sell seasonal commodities, fresh and live 
goods, perishable articles, and other goods, which are not suitable for 
long-term preservation, the court retaining the money. The court may 
even itself sell goods and retain the money, if it considers it necessary. 
413 See `Notice of Several Problems on Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC' by the SPC, 
Law Issue No. 4 (1997), Mar. 26,1997. 
414 Article 258 of the Civil Procedure Law of PRC 1991 provides that if any party has applied for the 
adoption of property preservation measures, the foreign affairs arbitration agency of the PRC shall 
submit for an order the party's application to the intermediate people's court in the place where the 
person against whom the application is filed has his domicile or where the said person's property is 
located. 
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If there is no agreement, the CIETAC Riles apply, Article 17 stating that 
when any party applies for the preservation of property, CIETAC shall 
forward that application for a ruling by the competent court in the place 
where the respondent is domiciled or where his property is located. 
There are several problems with the rules as to the power to order 
attachment. First of all, there is no rule dealing with attachment before 
arbitration. In practice, attachment before arbitration is vital to protect 
the interests of the applicant, as property may be concealed, transferred, 
sold off, or damaged before an application to arbitrate is made. I suggest 
that parties should be permitted to apply to the court for attachment 
before arbitration has commenced. Additionally, the applicant for 
attachment should be required to refer the dispute to arbitration within a 
specific period of time, otherwise the attachment would be discharged 
automatically, and the applicant obliged to compensate the other party. 
Secondly, the arbitration law does not require an applicant for 
attachment to provide security. I suggest that an applicant should be 
obliged to provide security, to guarantee that the applicant would cover 
any loss suffered by the other party if the arbitral tribunal later decides 
that the attachment is unnecessary or he loses the case. Thirdly, it is 
doubtful whether it is sensible that only the court has the power to order 
attachment, with the arbitral tribunal playing no role in the process. I 
submit that it is necessary for the court to order attachment if the 
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application is made before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or if 
the attachment concerns a third party, or if a party refuses to cooperate 
with an order of attachment made by the tribunal. Where the application 
is made before the tribunal is constituted, clearly only the court could 
make such order. 415 Equally, where the attachment concerns a third 
party, an arbitration agency or tribunal should not have the power to 
order attachment, as the arbitration agreement is only between the 
parties concerned and cannot affect third parties. 416 Finally, where a 
party refuses to honour an attachment, the court, unlike an arbitration 
agency or arbitral tribunal, has the power to force him to do so. Yet the 
approach of Chinese arbitration law to attachment has certain 
disadvantages: (1) the tribunal is more aware of the case than the court; 
(2) the fact that the parties are required to submit the application to the 
arbitration agency, which in turn submits it to the court, makes the 
process unnecessarily long; (3) since the order of attachment issued by a 
court is subject to appeal, the process may be delayed and the interests 
of the applicant may not be well protected; (4) one reason why the 
parties referred the dispute to arbitration may be because they do not 
wish to litigate. Thus, if they have to apply to the court for attachment, 
their preference is to some extent thwarted. Moreover, where the parties 
415 Liu, Yongming, Wang Xianrong, 'A Trend of the Development of the Interim Protection 
Measures in International Commercial Arbitration under `Economic Globalization: Comment on 
Perfecting the Interim Protection Measures in China's International Commercial Arbitration', 21(2) 
Herbei Law Science 2003,106. 
416 Du Chengming, `Discussion of Attachment in Arbitration', 10 Academic Research 2002,87. 
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wish to ask the arbitral tribunal to order attachment, the requirement that 
they have to apply to the court for attachment infringes their autonomy. 
Therefore, I suggest that, the parties should have the right to elect 
whether the arbitral tribunal or the court has the right to order 
attachment. Where the parties have elected for the tribunal, the court 
may only play a role in the process of attachment when the arbitral 
tribunal has not been constituted, or where the attachment is concerned 
with a third party, or after the arbitral tribunal has ordered attachment 
and the party against whom the order is made refuses to enforce it. 
2. Conservation of evidence 
The parties are again free to make their own agreement, unless it 
conflicts with Mandatory Rules. 417 Article 46 of the Arbitration Law 
provides that if evidence is vulnerable to loss or destruction and would 
be hard to recover, a party may apply to put such evidence in custody. 
When a party so applies, the arbitration agency shall submit his 
application to the people's court at the place where the evidence was 
obtained. Article 68 of the Arbitration Law states that if a party involved 
in a foreign arbitration case applies for such custody, the arbitration 
agency shall submit the application to the intermediate people's court at 
the place where the evidence was obtained. In the absence of such 
417 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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agreement, the CIETAC Rules 2005 apply, Article 18 providing that 
when a party applies for the protection of evidence, CIETAC shall 
forward that application for a ruling to the competent court at the place 
where the evidence is located. 
There are some problems in the rules as to the conservation of evidence. 
First of all, no rule can be found as to the conservation of evidence 
before arbitration. I suggest that parties should be permitted to apply to 
the court for the conservation of evidence before arbitration has 
commenced. Any applicant should be required to refer the dispute to 
arbitration within a certain period of time, otherwise the conservation 
would be discharged and he would be obliged to compensate the other 
party. Secondly, the arbitration law does not require the applicant to 
provide security. I suggest that he be obliged to do so, in order that 
compensation for any damage to the other party be assured. Thirdly, I 
suggest that the arbitral tribunal itself should have the power to order 
conservation of evidence, and the court may support the process if the 
application of attachment is made before the constitution of arbitral 
tribunal, or if the attachment concerns a third party, or if a party refuses 
to cooperate with the order of attachment which has been made. 
Fourthly, the arbitration law does not indicate the measures available to 
enforce orders regarding the conservation of evidence. It should provide 
that those measures are the same as those available to enforce 
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attachment orders. 
G. The Location of the Arbitral Proceedings 
Since there are no rules as to the location of arbitral proceedings in the 
Arbitration Law, the parties are free to make their own decision. 418 In 
the absence of such agreement, the CIETAC Rules apply, Article 32(1) 
providing that where the parties have agreed on the place of oral 
hearings, the case shall be heard at that place, except as stipulated in 
Article 69(3). Article 69(3) states that where the parties have agreed to 
hold an oral hearing at a place other than CIETAC's domicile, extra 
expenses including travel and accommodation expenses incurred 
thereby shall be paid in advance as a deposit by the parties. In the event 
that the parties fail to do so, the oral hearing shall be held at the domicile 
of the CIETAC. Article 32 provides that if the parties have not agreed on 
the location of arbitral proceedings, a case accepted by the CIETAC 
shall be heard in Beijing, or if the arbitral tribunal considers it necessary, 
at other places with the approval of the Secretary-General of the 
CIETAC. A case accepted by a Sub-Agency of the CIETAC shall be 
heard at the place where the Sub-Agency is located, or if the arbitral 
tribunal considers it necessary, at other places with the approval of the 
Secretary-General of the Sub-Agency. 
418 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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H. Advance Notice of h\Hearings and Meetings 
The parties are free to agree on the issues of advance notice of hearings 
and meetings, as long as their agreement is consistent with the 
mandatory rules419, and Article 41 of the Arbitration Law provides that 
the arbitration agency shall notify the parties of the date of any hearing 
within the time limit prescribed in the arbitration rules. A party may, for 
good reason, request the postponement of such a hearing, the arbitral 
tribunal deciding whether the hearing is postponed. Article 30 of the 
CIETAC Rules provides that the date of the first oral hearing shall be 
fixed by the arbitral tribunal and notified to the parties by the Secretariat 
of the CIETAC at least 20 days in advance of the oral hearing date. A 
party with good reason may request a postponement of the oral hearing, 
but such a request must be communicated to the arbitral tribunal at least 
ten days in advance of the oral hearing date. The arbitral tribunal shall 
decide whether to postpone the oral hearing or not. A notice of oral 
hearing subsequent to the first oral hearing and a notice of a postponed 
oral hearing shall not be subject to the 20 days time limit. Under 
summary procedure the Secretariat of the CIETAC shall notify the 
parties of the date of an oral hearing at least 15 days in advance. Again, 
a party may for good reason request the arbitral tribunal to postpone the 
419 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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oral hearing, such request to be communicated to the arbitral tribunal at 
least seven days in advance of the oral hearing date. Once more the 
arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to postpone the oral hearing or 
not. 420 A notice of oral hearing subsequent to the first oral hearing, and 
a notice of a postponed oral hearing shall not be subject to that 15 days 
time limit. 421 
I. Form and Scope of Hearings 
The parties are free to *agree on the form and scope of hearings, unless 
their agreement is inoperative or conflicts with mandatory rules. 
Article 39 of the Arbitration Law provides that an arbitration tribunal 
shall hold oral hearings unless the parties agree not to hold oral hearings, 
in which case the arbitral tribunal may render an award based on the 
application for arbitration, claims and counter-claims and other 
documents. Again while Article 40 provides that the arbitral tribunal 
may not hear a case in open session, if the parties so agree, hearings may 
be held openly, except in cases that involve State secrets. Article 42 
states that if a claimant is absent from a hearing without good reason, 
having been duly notified that it was being held, or withdraws during a 
hearing without the prior permission of the tribunal, he may be regarded 
420 Article 55 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
421 Article 55 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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as withdrawing his claim. The absence or withdrawal of a respondent in 
similar circumstances allows the tribunal to render an award by default. 
Article 47 states that the parties have the right to debate during the 
hearing. At the end of the debate, the chief or sole arbitrator shall ask the 
parties for their final statement. Article 48 provides that- the tribunal 
shall record the hearings in writing. If the parties or others involved in 
the arbitration find something in their statements left out of the record or 
misrecorded, they have the right to apply for correction. Even if 
corrections are not made, the application shall be recorded. The written 
records of the hearings shall be signed or affixed with seals by the 
arbitrators, minute keepers, the parties and others participating in the 
arbitration. Article 69 provides that if the dispute is foreign-related, the 
arbitral tribunal may write down its hearings on records or summary of 
records. The records shall be signed or affixed with the seals of the 
parties concerned and others participating in the arbitration. After an 
application for arbitration has been made the parties may settle the 
dispute of their own initiative. By virtue of Article 49, if a settlement 
agreement has been reached, a request may be made to the tribunal for 
an award based on that agreement, or the application for arbitration may 
be withdrawn. Should a party fail to honour the agreement, the other 
may again apply to arbitrate under the arbitration agreement. 422 
422 Article 50 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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Where the parties have not reached agreement as to the form and scope 
of hearings, the CIETAC Rules apply, Article 29 providing that the 
tribunal shall hold oral hearings when examining the case, save that a 
case may proceed on the basis of documents only if the parties so 
request or agree, and the arbitral tribunal also deems that oral hearings 
are unnecessary. 423 Moreover, under summary procedure the arbitral 
tribunal may examine the case in the manner it considers appropriate, 
and thus has discretion to conduct a case on the basis of the documents 
only or to hold oral hearings. 424 Under summary procedure, if the 
arbitral tribunal decides to hear oral evidence, only one oral hearing 
shall be held unless it is truly necessary to hold more than one. 425 
Hearings shall be held in camera. Where both parties request an open 
hearing, the arbitral tribunal has discretion to grant or refuse that 
request. 426 If the Claimant fails to appear at an oral hearing without 
showing sufficient cause for such failure, or withdraws from an 
on-going oral hearing without the permission of the tribunal, he may be 
deemed to have withdrawn his request for arbitration. In such a case, if 
the respondent has filed a counterclaim, the tribunal shall proceed with 
the hearing of the counterclaim and make a default award. If the 
respondent fails to appear at an oral hearing without showing sufficient 
423 Article 29 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
424 Article 54 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
425 Article 55 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
426 Article 33 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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cause for such failure, or withdraws from an on-going oral hearing 
without the permission of the tribunal, the tribunal may proceed with the 
arbitration and make a default award. In such a case, if the Respondent 
has filed a counterclaim, the respondent may be deemed to have 
withdrawn its counterclaim. 427 Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
the arbitral tribunal may adopt an inquisitorial or adversarial approach 
when examining the case, having regard to the circumstances of the 
case. 428 The arbitral tribunal may hold deliberation at any place or in 
any manner that it considers appropriate. 429 The arbitral tribunal may, if 
it considers it necessary, issue procedural directions and lists of 
questions, hold pre-hearing meetings and preliminary hearings, and 
produce terms of reference, etc., unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties. 430 Article 35 of the CIETAC Rules provides that during the oral 
hearing, the tribunal may arrange a stenographic and/or audio-visual 
record. The arbitral tribunal may, when it considers it necessary, take 
minutes stating the main points of the oral hearing and request the 
parties and/or their representatives, witnesses and/or other persons 
involved to sign and/or affix their seals to the minutes. The stenographic 
and/or audio-visual record of the oral hearing shall be available for the 
use and reference by the tribunal. Article 41 states that a party may file a 
427 Article 34 of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
428 Article 29 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
429 Article 29 (4) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
430 Article 29 (5) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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request with the CIETAC to withdraw its claim or counterclaim in its 
entirety. In the event that the respondent withdraws its counterclaim in 
its entirety, the arbitral tribunal shall proceed with the examination of 
the claim and render an arbitral award thereon. 43' Where a case is to be 
dismissed before the formation of the arbitral tribunal, the decision shall 
be made by the Secretary-General of the CIETAC. Where the case is 
to be dismissed after the formation of the arbitral tribunal, the decision 
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal. 432 Where a party files with the 
CIETAC a request for arbitration for a claim which has been withdrawn, 
the CIETAC shall decide whether or not to accept the request anew 433 
II. The Disadvantages of the Chinese Approach 
1. Under Chinese arbitration law, the arbitral tribunal does not have the 
power to order interim measures of protection. I suggest that it should 
have such power, and that the court should only have a role where its 
support is required. 
2. Article 33 of the Arbitration Law, which provides that where both 
parties request an open hearing, the arbitral tribunal has a discretion to 
refuse, breaches the autonomy of the parties. Moreover, it is 
431 Article 41 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
432 Article 41 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
433 Article 41 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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unreasonable that, where both parties request an open hearing, the 
arbitral tribunal may have the power to refuse that request. 
3. It is odd that the Arbitration Law does not contain any rule as to 
statements of counterclaim and the defences thereto, while it contains 
rules as to statements of claim and defence. I suggest that the Arbitration 
Law should lay down rules on statements of counterclaim and defences 
thereto, which rules could be in similar form to the rules on statements of 
claim and defence. 
III. The Approach of the Laws Operating in the UK 
A. Introduction 
As ever we refer to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which offers 
two models for consideration - the 1996 Arbitration Act and the Model 
Law. Chinese arbitration law, the Model Law, and the 1996 Act all 
require the parties to submit statement of claim and defence and to 
produce evidence. The court has the power to order interim measure of 
protection under the three laws. Since there are differences in culture 
and tradition, there are differences between the three laws as to the detail 
of the conduct of proceedings. One main difference is that in Chinese 
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arbitration law, the court is never asked to support the collection of 
evidence, whereas under the 1996 Act and the Model Law, the court can 
play a role in evidence collection. There is also a difference between the 
role of court under the 1996 Act and under the Model Law. The 1996 
Act gives the parties the right to exclude the court's power of collecting 
evidence, whereas under the Model Law, parties are not free to agree to 
prevent the court to collect evidence. Another main difference is that in 
the 1996 Act, the court may make an order requiring a party to comply 
with a peremptory order made by the tribunal and may make 
determination of preliminary point of law, whereas under the Chinese 
Law and the Model Law, the court does not have the power to do so. 
B. The Right to be Treated Equally and the Opportunity to 
Present One s Case 
The Model Law. Article 18 provides that the parties shall be treated 
with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case. 
The 1996 Act. Section 33 of the 1996 Act provides that the tribunal 
shall act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party 
a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his 
opponent, and adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the 
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particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide 
a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined. 434 
The tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the 
arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on matters of procedure and 
evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it. 435 It is 
noteworthy that the 1996 Act has not adopted the term, `a full 
opportunity of presenting his case', used in Article 18 of the Model Law. 
The term `a reasonable opportunity' conveys an objectively viewed 
balance of what is fair to the party, but is also compatible with 
expedition and economya36 
Chinese Law. The Arbitration Law of PRC does not have a rule which 
provides clearly that the parties shall have the opportunity of being 
treated equally and presenting his case. Although the CIETAC Rules 
contains such rule, it is not a mandatory rule. The lack of a mandatory 
rule that the parties shall have the opportunity of being treated equally 
and presenting his case would not produce problem in practice. In very 
rare cases, the parties would make an agreement that they should be 
treated unequally. In the cases where they have no such agreement, if 
the arbitrator treats the parties differently, the parties could apply to the 
court to set aside the award, by virtue of Article 58(3) of the Arbitration 
434 Section 33 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
435 Section 33 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
436 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The'Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,141. 
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Law, which provides that, if the composition of the arbitral tribunal or 
the arbitral proceedings is not conducted according to the law, the 
parties may apply to the intermediate court at the place where the 
arbitration agency is to set aside the award. Also the parties may apply 
to set aside the award under Article 58(6) of the Arbitration Law, which 
provides that, if the arbitrator extorts bribes, receives a bribe, conducts 
irregularities for favoritism, or makes orders and judgments that misuse 
the law, the parties may apply to the intermediate court at the place 
where the arbitration agency is to set aside the award. 
Where the parties have agreed to be treated differently, if a party is 
coerced into the arbitration agreement by the other party, the arbitration 
agreement is invalid, as Article 17 (3) of the Arbitration Law provides 
that the arbitration agreement is invalid if one party is coerced by the 
other party to make the agreement. Article 58 (1) of the Arbitration Law 
states that if there is no valid arbitration agreement, the party may apply 
to the intermediate court at the place where the arbitration agency is to 
set aside the award. 
If the parties have agreed to be treated differently and no party has been 
coerced into the agreement, the arbitration agreement should be deemed 
as valid. In this case, the party is not entitled to apply to set aside the 
award. Considering this situation is very rare, the lack of the rule as to 
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parties being treated equally in the Arbitration Law does not cause any 
practical problem; but to make the Arbitration Law completed and 
sound, I suggest that the rule as to the party's opportunity of being 
treated equally and presenting his case should be added into the Chinese 
Arbitration Law. 
C. Language 
Model Law. Article 22 provides that the parties are free to agree on the 
language or languages to be used in the arbitral proceedings. Failing 
such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the language or 
languages to be used in the proceedings. This agreement or 
determination, unless otherwise specified therein, shall apply to any 
written statement by a party, any hearing and any award, decision or 
other communication by the arbitral tribunal. The Article also provides 
that the arbitral tribunal may order that any documentary evidence shall 
be accompanied by a translation into the language or languages agreed 
upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. 
1996 Act. Similarly, Section 34 (1) and (2) (b) of the 1996 Act states 
that it shall be for the tribunal to decide the language or languages to be 
used in the proceedings and whether translations of any relevant 
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documents are to be supplied, subject to the right of the parties to agree 
any matter. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese Arbitration law, if the parties have not agreed 
on the language, the language to be used in the proceedings would be 
Chinese. I suggest that, since in some circumstances, Chinese may not 
be the most suitable language for the proceedings, it would be more 
sensible for the arbitral tribunal to decide the language or languages, 
considering the particular case. 
D. Statement of Claim and Defence 
Model Law. Article 23(1) provides that within the period of time agreed 
by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal, the claimant shall 
state the facts supporting his claim, the points at issue and the relief or 
remedy sought, and the respondent shall state his defence in respect of 
these particulars, unless the parties have otherwise agreed as to the 
required elements of such statements. The parties may submit with their 
statements all documents they consider to be relevant or may add a 
reference to the documents or other evidence they will submit. Article 
25 states that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if, without showing 
sufficient cause, the claimant fails to communicate his statement of 
claim in accordance with article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall 
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terminate the proceedings; if the respondent fails to communicate his 
statement of defence in accordance with article 23(1), the arbitral 
tribunal shall continue the proceedings without treating such failure in 
itself as an admission of the claimant's allegations. 437 The Analytical 
Commentary states that this rule "seems useful in view of the fact that 
under many national laws on civil procedure, default of the defendant in 
court proceedings is treated as an admission of the claimant's 
allegations. "438 It adds that that rule "does not mean that the arbitral 
tribunal would have no discretion as to how'to assess the failure and 
would be bound to treat it as a full denial of the claim". 439 
1996 Act. Under the 1996 Act, it shall be for the tribunal to decide, 
subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter, whether any and if 
so what form of written statements of claim and defence are to be used, 
and when these should be supplied. 440 
Chinese Law. It can be seen that, in the Model Law and the 1996 Act, 
statements of claim and defence may be supplied separately from the 
request for arbitration, whereas under Chinese arbitration law the 
statements of claim and defence shall be supplied together with the 
437 Article 25 (a) and (b) of the Model Law. 
438 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 56, Article 25, para. 4. 
439 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 56, Article 25, para. 4. 
440 Section 34 (1) and (2) (c) of the 1996 Act. 
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request for arbitration44t. In my view, the approach of the Model Law 
and the 1996 Act gives the parties more time to make statements of 
claim and defence and therefore is more attractive for the parties. 
Chinese arbitration law should adopt such an approach, which might 
make more parties willing to arbitrate in China. Under Chinese 
arbitration law, the parties do not have the right to agree on the content 
of statements of claim442, and therefore the autonomy of the parties is 
damaged. It would be beneficial for the Chinese law to adopt the 
approach of the Model Law, which gives the parties the freedom to 
make their own agreement on this issue, and also provides default rules 
in the lack of such agreement. 
E. Supplementary Claim and Defence 
Model Law: Article 23(2) of the Model Law provides that unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, either party may amend or supplement 
his claim or defence during the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless 
the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment 
having regard to the delay in making it. 
441 Article 22 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994 and Article 10 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005). 
442 Article 23 of the Arbitration Law. 
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1996 Act. The 1996 Act contains a similar rule, which provides that it 
shall be for the tribunal to decide the extent to which such statements 
can be supplied later, subject to the right of the parties to agree on any 
matter. 
Chinese Law. The situation under the Chinese arbitration law is similar 
to the situation under the Model Law and the 1996 Act. 
F. Evidence 
1. Producing evidence 
Model Law. Article 24(1) of the Model Law provides that, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, the claimant shall, within the period of 
time agreed by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal, state 
the facts supporting his claim, and the respondent shall state his defence 
in respect of the particulars. 
1996 Act. Under the 1996 Act, the parties have the freedom to agree on 
producing evidence, and in the absence of such agreement, it is for the 
arbitral tribunal to decide the following issues: 443 
443 Section 34 (1) and (2) (d), (f), (h) of the 1996 Act. 
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a. whether any and if so which documents or classes of documents 
should be disclosed between and produced by the parties and at what 
stage; 
b. whether to apply strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to 
the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material (oral, written or 
other) sought to be tendered on any matters of fact or opinion, and the 
time, manner and form in which such material should be exchanged and 
presented; 
c. whether and to what extent there should be oral or written evidence 
or submissions. 
b. whether any and if so what questions should be put to and 
answered by the respective parties and when and in what form this 
should be done. 
The tribunal may fix the time within which the directions given by it are 
to be complied with, and may if it thinks fit extend the time so fixed 
(whether or not it has expired). 444 
Chinese Law. In the Chinese arbitration law, the parties have no right to 
agree on whether they shall produce evidence445. In my view, if the 
parties have agreed not to produce evidence, there is no reason why they 
shall be forced to do so. In order to protect the autonomy of the parties, 
444 Section 34 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
445 Article 43 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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the approach of either the Model Law or the 1996 Act shall be adopted 
by the Chinese arbitration law. 
2. Investigation by the Arbitral Tribunal 
Model Law. The Model Law does not contain any rule as to 
investigation by the arbitral tribunal. 
1996 Act. Section 34 (1) and (2) (g) states that it shall be for the tribunal 
to decide whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the 
initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law, subject to the right of the 
parties to agree any matter. Section 38 (5) also provides that the tribunal 
may direct that a party or witness shall be examined on oath or 
affirmation, and may for that purpose administer any necessary oath or 
take any necessary affirmation. 
Chinese Law. Under the Chinese arbitration law, the parties are not free 
to agree that the tribunal has no power to investigate. Again, to protect 
the autonomy of the parties, the Chinese law may adopt the instance of 
the 1996 Act and give the parties such freedom. 
3. Court assistance in taking evidence 
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Model Law. Article 27 provides that the arbitral tribunal or a party with 
the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request from a competent court 
of this State assistance in taking evidence. The court may execute the 
request within its competence and according to its rules on taking 
evidence. 
1996 Act. Section 43 provides that, with the permission of the tribunal 
or the agreement of the other parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may 
use the same court procedures as are available in relation to legal 
proceedings to secure the attendance before the tribunal of a witness in 
order to give oral testimony or to produce documents or other material 
evidence. A person shall not be compelled by virtue of this section to 
produce any document or other material evidence which he could not be 
compelled to produce in legal proceedings. Section 44 (1) and (2) (a) 
indicates that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court has for 
the purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of 
making orders about the taking of the evidence of witnesses as it has for 
the purposes of and in relation to legal proceedings. It should be noted 
that in any case the court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral 
tribunal, and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the 
parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for the time 
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being to act effectively. 446 If the court so orders, an order made by it 
under this section shall cease to have effect in whole or in part on the 
order of the tribunal or of any such arbitral or other institution or person 
having power to act in relation to the subject-matter of the order. 447 
Under the Model Law, the parties are not free to agree to preclude the 
court's power of taking evidence, whereas they are at liberty to do so 
under the 1996 Act. To protect the autonomy of the parties, they shall 
have the right to agree to preclude the court from taking evidence. 
Under the 1996 Act, the court may not only take evidence, but also 
secure the attendance of witness. The parties cannot preclude the power 
of the court to secure the attendance of witness by agreement. It is more 
beneficial that the court can also secure the attendance of witness, but it 
is odd that the parties are not free to agree to preclude such power of the 
court, while they are free to agree to preclude the court's power of 
taking evidence. Under the 1996 Act, the courts power of taking 
evidence is more strictly limited. To avoid too much intervention by the 
court to the arbitration, it is admirable to strictly limit the court's power 
in this regard. 
446 Section 44 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
447 Section 44 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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Chinese Law. In China, the court can play no role in taking evidence. In 
my view, it is essentially important for the court to take evidence or 
secure the attendance of witness where the parties or the arbitral tribunal 
are unable to do so. The Chinese arbitration law may adopt the approach 
of the 1996 Act with a small change, which is to give the parties the 
freedom to agree to preclude the court from securing the attendance of 
witness. 
G. Power to Order Interim Measures of Protection 
Model Law. Article 17 states that the parties are free to agree to 
preclude the power of tribunal to order interim order. If they have no 
such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order 
any party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral 
tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the 
dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide 
appropriate security in connection with such measure. Article 9 provides 
that it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to 
request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim 
measure of protection and for a court to grant such measure. The 
Working Group agreed that the interim measures of protection would 
include measures of conservation of the subject matter of the dispute 
and measures in respect of evidence as well as pre-award attachments, 
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but that it was not necessary to list the various measures. A general 
formula would be more appropriate. 448 It also noted that the range of 
measures in Article 9 was much wider than the interim measures of 
protection which an arbitral tribunal might grant under Article 17 of the 
law. 449 It is not clear whether Article 9 would invalidate an agreement 
between the parties precluding an application to a court for interim 
measures. The Commission Report states: 
" While the article should not be read as precluding such exclusion 
agreement, it should also not be read as positively giving effect to any 
such exclusion agreement. " 450 
The Secretariat pointed out that properly analyzed, the articles in 
themselves did not create a conflict, but there was always the possibility, 
given the fact that Article 9 applied regardless of the place of arbitration, 
that a conflict might arise when a party had requested an order from the 
arbitral tribunal and the opposing party obtained a conflicting order from 
a court in another State. 45' The Commission decided that the Model 
Law should not embody a solution for such conflicts. This was a matter 
for each State to decide. 452 
448 Doc. A/CN. 9/245, para. 188. The Geneva Convention uses the expression `interim measures or 
measures of conservation'. 
449 Doc. A/CN. 9/246, para. 26. 
450 Doc. A/CN. 9/246, para. 97. 
451 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 316, para. 38. 
452 Commission Report, para. 169. 
271 
1996 Act. Section 38 provides that the parties are free to agree on the 
powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal for the purposes of and in 
relation to the proceedings. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties the 
tribunal has the following powers: 
a. The tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs 
of the arbitration. 453 
b. The tribunal may give directions in relation to any property which is 
the subject of the proceedings or as to which any question arises in the 
proceedings, and which is owned by or is in the possession of a party to 
the proceedings for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody 
or detention of the property by the tribunal, an expert or a party, or 
ordering that samples be taken from, or any observation be made of or 
experiment conducted upon, the property. 454 
c. The tribunal may give directions to a party for the preservation for 
the purposes of the proceedings of any evidence in his custody or 
control. ass 
It appears that the tribunal may exercise these powers of its own motion, 
as well as upon the application of a party. 
Section 44 (1) and (2) indicate that the parties are free to preclude the 
power of the court to order interim measures of protection; in the lack of 
453 Section 38 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
454 Section 38 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
455 Section 38 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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such agreement, the court has for the purposes of and in relation to 
arbitral proceedings the same power of making orders about the matters 
listed below as it has for the purposes of and in relation to legal 
proceedings: 
a. the preservation of evidence; 
b. making orders relating to property which is the subject of the 
proceedings or as to which any question arises in the proceedings for the 
inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or detention of the 
property, or ordering that samples be taken from, or any observation be 
made of or experiment conducted upon, the property; and for that 
purpose authorising any person to enter any premises in the possession 
or control of a party to the arbitration; 
c. the sale of any goods the subject of the proceedings; 
d. the granting of an interim injunction or the appointment of a 
receiver. 
Section 44 (3) provides that if the case is one of urgency, the court may, 
on the application of a party or proposed party to the arbitral 
proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of 
preserving evidence or assets456. If the case is not one of urgency, the 
court shall act only on the application of a party to the arbitral 
proceedings (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) made 
with the permission of the tribunal or the agreement in writing of the 
456 Section 44 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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other parties. 457 In any case the court shall act only if or to the extent 
that the arbitral tribunal, and any arbitral or other institution or person 
vested by the parties with power in that regard, has no power or is 
unable for the time being to act effectively. 458 If the court so orders, an 
order made by it under this section shall cease to have effect in whole or 
in part on the order of the tribunal or of any such arbitral or other 
institution or person having power to act in relation to the subject-matter 
of the order. 459 The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a 
decision of the court under this section. 
460 
To some extent, the powers of the tribunal in s. 38 run in parallel with 
the corresponding powers of the court in s. 44, the scheme of the Act 
being, so far as possible, to enable the tribunal to act rather than require 
the parties to submit to the inconvenience and expense of an application 
to the court. 461 It should also be noted that unlike those powers which 
may exercised by both the tribunal and by the court, the tribunal alone 
has power to order security for costs, the court having no such power. 462 
457 Section 44 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
458 Section 44 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
459 Section 44 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
460 Section 44 (7) of the 1996 Act. 
461 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,158. 
462 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,158. 
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Moreover, the court may support the enforcement of peremptory orders 
of tribunal by making an order requiring a party to comply with a 
peremptory order made by the tribunal. Section 41 provides that the 
parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal in case of a party's 
failure to do something necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct 
of the arbitration. 463 In the absence of such agreement, if without 
showing sufficient cause a party fails to comply with any order or 
directions of the tribunal, the tribunal may make a peremptory order to 
the same effect, prescribing such time for compliance as it considers 
appropriate. 464 If a claimant fails to comply with a peremptory order of 
the tribunal to provide security for costs, the tribunal may make an 
award dismissing his claim. 465 If a party fails to comply with any other 
kind of peremptory order, then, without prejudice to s. 42 (enforcement 
of the tribunal's peremptory orders by the court), the tribunal may do 
any of the following - 
a. direct that the party in default shall not be entitled to rely upon any 
allegation or material which was the subject matter of the order; 
b. draw such adverse inferences from the act of non-compliance as the 
circumstances justify; 
c. proceed to an award on the basis of such materials as have been 
properly provided to it; 
463 Section 41 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
464 Section 41 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
465 Section 41 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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d. make such order as it thinks fit as to the payment of costs of the 
arbitration incurred in consequence of the non-compliance. 466 
Section 42 states that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court 
may make an order requiring a party to comply with a peremptory order 
made by the tribunal. 467 An application for an order under this section 
may be made by the tribunal (upon notice to the parties), or by a party to 
the arbitral proceedings with the permission of the tribunal (and upon 
notice to the other parties), or where the parties have agreed that the 
powers of the court under this section shall be available. 468 The leave of 
the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under 
this section, 469 This section permits the court to supplement the 
sanctions available to the tribunal by applying those sanctions that are 
available to the court for breach of a court order. For example, the court 
would be able to fine a party, or send him to prison for contempt. 470 To 
prevent much intervention of the court to arbitration, the power of the 
court to support the enforcement of peremptory orders of tribunal is 
restricted. The court shall not act unless it is satisfied that the applicant 
has exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of failure to 
466 Section 41 (7) of the 1996 Act. 
467 Section 42 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
468 Section 42 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
469 Section 42(5) of the 1996 Act. 
470 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3'd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,174. 
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comply with the tribunal's order. 471 Moreover, no order shall be made 
under this section unless the court is satisfied that the person to whom 
the tribunal's order was directed has failed to comply with it within the 
time prescribed in the order or, if no time was prescribed, within a 
reasonable time. 472 At para. 212 of their Report, the DAC said: `In our 
view there may well be circumstances where in the interests of justice, 
the fact that the court has sanctions which in the nature of things cannot 
be given to arbitrators (e. g. committal to prison for contempt) will assist 
the proper functioning of the arbitral process'. There is difficulty in 
envisaging circumstances where it will be necessary for tribunal or party 
to look beyond the powers available to the tribunal in Section 41. A 
possible example might be where a party refused to comply with a 
peremptory order for discovery and was prepared to suffer such 
sanctions as the tribunal could impose; however, the continuing 
non-availability of the documents affected another party's right to 
recover. Only the threat of imprisonment might actually produce the 
documents. 473 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, the tribunal has no power to 
order interim measure of protection and the parties are not free to agree 
to preclude the power of the court to order attachment or conservation of 
471 Section 42 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
472 Section 42 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
473 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,174. 
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evidence. I suggest that, unless other wise agreed by the parties, the 
tribunal should have such power, and the court should only have a role 
where its support is required. In other words, the approach of either the 
Model Law or the 1996 Act shall be adopted. As far as the role of the 
court is concerned, the Chinese may adopt the instance of the 1996 Act, 
and give the court the power which run in parallel with the power of the 
tribunal and also the power to support the enforcement of peremptory 
order of the tribunal. The Model Law permits the arbitral tribunal to 
require any party to provide appropriate security in connection with such 
measure. It is admirable for the Chinese arbitration law to adopt this 
instance. 
H. Location of Arbitral Proceedings 
Model Law. Article 20 (2) provides that the arbitral tribunal may, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers 
appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, 
experts or the parties, or for inspection of goods, other property or 
documents. 
The 1996 Act. Section 34 (1) and (2) (a) states that (1) It shall be for the 
tribunal to decide when and where any part of the proceedings is to be 
held, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter. 
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Chinese Law. Under the Chinese arbitration law, where the parties have 
no agreement as to the location of proceedings, the proceedings shall be 
conducted in the places indicated by the CIETAC Rules and the tribunal 
has no power to decide the location of arbitral proceedings; and if the 
tribunal intends to hold proceedings in the places rather than those 
indicated by the CIETAC Rules, the permission of the Secretary- 
General is needed. In my view, the Secretary- General may not be aware 
of the details of the case as much as the tribunal does, therefore, it is 
more sensible for the tribunal to decide where to hold the proceedings if 
the parties have no agreement on this issue. Thus, either the instance of 
the Model Law or that of the 1996 Act shall be adopted by the Chinese 
arbitration law. 
I. Advance notice of hearings and meetings 
Model Law. Article 24 (2) provides that the parties shall be given 
sufficient advance notice of any hearing and of any meeting of the 
arbitral tribunal for the purposes of inspection of goods, other property 
or documents. 
1996 Act. There is no rule as to advance notice of hearings and meetings 
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in the Act. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, the arbitral tribunal shall give 
the parties sufficient advance notice of hearings and meetings, similar as 
the situation under the Model Law. 
J. Forms and Scope of Hearings 
Model Law. Article 24 provides that, subject to any contrary agreement 
by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold oral 
hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or 
whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents 
and other materials. However, unless the parties have agreed that no 
hearings shall be held, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an 
appropriate stage of the proceedings, if so requested by a party. 474 
The Article incorporates the following ideas: 
a. that the parties should be free to decide whether an oral hearing 
should take place; 
b. that if not expressly prohibited by the parties, either party had a 
right to an oral hearing upon request; 
c. that if the parties took no decision on the matter and neither applied 
for an oral hearing, the arbitral tribunal could decide how the 
474 Article 24 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
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proceedings were to be conducted. 475 
It must also be noted, however, and was so noted by the Commission, 
that Art. 18 of the Law may in exceptional circumstances provide a 
compelling reason for holding an oral hearing. The Report then goes on 
to say: 
`It was understood that parties who had earlier agreed that no hearings 
should be held were not precluded from later modifying their agreement, 
thus to allow a party to request oral hearings. " 476 
Article 25 (c) states that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if, 
without showing sufficient cause, any party fails to appear at a hearing 
or to produce documentary evidence, the arbitral tribunal may continue 
the proceedings and make the award on the evidence before it. This 
subparagraph does not state time limits either directly or by reference to 
another provision. The Analytical Commentary states that "failure to 
appear at hearing" presupposes that the party was given sufficient 
advance notice as required by Art. 24 (3) and that "failure to produce 
documentary evidence" presupposes that the party was requested to do 
so within a specified period of time which was reasonable in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of Art. 18 of the Law 477 
475 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 324, para. 1. 
476 Ibid., para. 205. The Tanzanian delegate, supported by a few other delegations, had expressed the 
view that a party which had originally agreed that no hearing should be held might subsequently 
decide that one was necessary after all (Doc. A/CN. 9/233, paras. 55 and 57. ) 
477 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 264, para. 5. 
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1996 Act. Section 34 provides that, subject to the right of the parties to 
agree any matter, it shall be for the tribunal to decide when and where 
any part of the proceedings is to be held478; whether and to what extent 
there should be oral or written evidence or submissions479; and whether 
any and if so what questions should be put to and answered by the 
respective parties and when and in what form this should be done. 480 
Section 41 provides that the parties are free to agree on the powers of 
the tribunal in case of a party's failure to do something necessary for the 
proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration. Unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the following provisions apply. If the tribunal is 
satisfied that there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part 
of the claimant in pursuing his claim and that the delay gives rise, or is 
likely to give rise, to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a 
fair resolution of the issues in that claim, or has caused, or is likely to 
cause, serious prejudice to the respondent, the tribunal may make an 
award dismissing the claim. If without showing sufficient cause a 
party fails to attend or be represented at an oral hearing of which due 
notice was given, or where matters are to be dealt with in writing, fails 
after due notice to submit written evidence or make written submissions, 
the tribunal may continue the proceedings in the absence of that party or, 
478 Section 34 (1) and (2) (a) of the 1996 Act. 
479 Section 34 (1) and (2) (e) of the 1996 Act. 
480 Section 34 (1) and (2) (h) of the 1996 Act. 
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as the case may be, without any written evidence or submissions on his 
behalf, and may make an award on the basis of the evidence before it. 
Section 35 provides that the parties are free to agree that the arbitral 
proceedings shall be consolidated with other arbitral proceedings, or that 
concurrent hearings shall be held, on such terms as may be agreed. 48' 
Unless the parties agree to confer such power on the tribunal, the 
tribunal has no power to order consolidation of proceedings or 
concurrent hearings. 82 The structure of the section reflects the fact that 
the parties may themselves agree to consolidate arbitrations or have 
concurrent hearings either at a stage prior to the appointment of the 
tribunal or thereafter. Alternatively they may agree to confer the 
relevant powers on the tribunals. 483 The rationale behind this approach 
is that the parties should not have to find their agreed procedure for the 
private resolution of their own disputes being used to deal with other 
parties and their disputes, or to find themselves part of someone else's 
arbitration, unless they specifically so agree. Consolidation in the 
absence of agreement could operate as a disincentive to arbitrate. On an 
international level it might equally result in the award being 
unenforcable, where the tribunal, for instance, had been imposed on an 
481 Article 35 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
482 Article 35 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
483 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,151. 
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unwilling party. The DAC Report (para. 180) also noted that difficulties 
over discovery might arise. 
484 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not contain rules dealing 
with consolidation of proceedings and concurrent hearings. To fill the 
gap it would be beneficial for China to adopt a provision on the lines of 
s. 35 of the 1996 Act. 
It is noteworthy that the 1996 Act gives the court the power to determine 
preliminary points of law. Section 45 provides that, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the court may on the application of a party to 
arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties) determine any 
question of law arising in the course of the proceedings which the court 
is satisfied substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties. 
An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal's award shall be 
considered an agreement to exclude the court's jurisdiction under this 
section. Section 45 also limits the court's power to determine 
preliminary point of law by providing that an application under this 
section shall not be considered unless it is made with the agreement of 
all parties to the proceedings, or it is made with the permission of the 
tribunal and the court is satisfied that the determination of the question 
484 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,152. 
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is likely to produce substantial savings in costs, and that the application 
was made without delay. 485 The application shall identify the question 
of law to be determined and, unless made with the agreement of all 
parties to the proceedings, it shall state the grounds on which it is said 
that the question should be decided by the court. 486 Unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral 
proceedings and make an award while an application to the court under 
this section is pending. 87 Unless the court gives leave, no appeal lies 
from a decision of the court as to whether the conditions specified in 
subsection (2) are met. 488 The decision of the court on the question of 
law shall be treated as a judgment of the court for the purposes of an 
appeal. But no appeal lies without the leave of the court which shall not 
be given unless the court considers that the question is one of general 
importance, or is one which for some other special reason should be 
considered by the Court of Appeal. 489 The usefulness of the section 
would arise, for example, where a particular point of law is central to the 
arbitration, and an authoritative decision one way or the other will 
effectively determine the whole or a large part of the dispute between 
the parties. It may also be invoked where a particular question is central 
to a large number of arbitrations, and early and definitive consideration 
485 Section 45 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
486 Section 45 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
487 Section 45 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
488 Section 45 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
489 Section 45 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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thereof by the court would assist a large number of parties to different 
proceedings, subject of course to the proviso that there must be a 
substantial effect on the rights of one or more parties to the arbitration in 
question 490 However, in my view, it is unnecessary to give the court the 
power to determine preliminary point of law, as in all of the above 
situations the tribunal can deal with the issue itself. Moreover, it is 
notable that s. 40(2)(b) refers to this section as a specific example of the 
general duty of the parties to proceed with expedition. Delay is likely to 
be measured from the time when the question of law might first be 
identified, such as the close of any pleading stage. If substantial progress 
has been made in the arbitration, and particularly if there have been 
steps towards the determination of the question of law in the course of 
the arbitration itself, it is likely that the court would refuse the request to 
hear the application. 49 1 It can be seen that since the power of 
enforcement of the court is not needed in those situations, even if the 
court does not intervene, the tribunal can resolve the problems by itself. 
Intervention of the court will not save time and energy, as the process in 
the court might be more complex than that in the arbitration and the 
determination would have to be transferred from the court to the 
tribunal. 
490 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,183. 
491 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,183-184. 
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IV. Conclusion 
To resolve the problems existing in Chinese arbitration law, it might be 
useful to look to the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 1996 Act. In 
Chinese arbitration law, the parties cannot agree to exclude the arbitral 
tribunal's power to collect evidence. To protect the autonomy of the 
parties, Chinese arbitration law might adopt the position of the 1996 Act 
permitting the parties to prevent the arbitral tribunal from collecting 
evidence on its own initiative. Chinese arbitration law does not give the 
court the power to collect evidence. Since under some circumstances, 
the support of the court in this regard is needed, Chinese law might 
usefully adopt the approach of the 1996 Act and give the court such 
power, subject to the agreement of the parties. In Chinese arbitration law, 
the arbitral tribunal cannot order interim measure of protection. 
Considering the utility of giving the tribunal such power, it would be 
beneficial for Chinese law to adopt the approach of either the Model 
Law or the 1996 Act and give the tribunal this power. Under the 1996 
Act, where a party fails to obey a peremptory order of the tribunal, the 
court may intervene and make an order requiring the party to comply 
with the tribunal's order. Chinese arbitration law follow this lead. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE ARBITRAL AWARD 
The ultimate goal of arbitration is the making of an arbitral award. This 
chapter aims to discuss different types of awards, and the substance of 
awards, including the power to award damages, interest, and expenses, 
and to make other orders, plus the delivery, correction and effect of the 
award. As ever, the Chinese approach as to the above questions will be 
considered, and compared with the approach taken in English Law and 
the Model Law. 
I. The Chinese Approach to Arbitral Award 
A. Types of Awards 
1. Partial arbitral award, 
Article 55 of the Arbitration Law provides that, in arbitrating disputes, 
the arbitration tribunal may rule on those facts that are already clear, 
while Article 44 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 provides that a partial 
award may be made on any issue before the final award is made, if 
considered necessary by the arbitral tribunal, or if the arbitral tribunal 
288 
accedes to the request of the parties to do so. A partial award is a part of 
the final award and has the same effect. Neither the Arbitration Law nor 
the CIETAC Rules indicates the sort of problems a partial award can 
deal with. However, since a partial award is a part of the final award, it 
must deal with matters related to the substance of the dispute, such as 
whether one party owes the other a sum of money. 492 
2. Interlocutory award 
Article 44 of the CIETAC Rules. states that an interlocutory award may 
be made by the arbitral tribunal on any issue in the case at any time 
before the final award is made either if considered necessary by the 
arbitral tribunal, or if the tribunal accedes to the request of the parties to 
do so. A party's failure to comply with an interlocutory award will not 
affect the continuation of the arbitration proceedings, nor prevent the 
arbitral tribunal from making a final award. Again, the CIETAC Rules 
do not indicate the sort of problems an interlocutory award can deal with. 
In practice, where a procedural problem needs to be resolved before the 
making of the final award, and if the decision regarding the procedural 
problem needs to be explained, the tribunal will make an interlocutory 
award informing the parties of the decision, incorporating the 
492 Song, Hang, Recognition and Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Awards, 
Beijing: Law Press, 2000,55; ; Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modern International Commercial 
Law, Beijing: Law Press, 2000,331. 
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explanation in that interlocutory award. If an explanation is not needed, 
as in the case of audits and valuations, the tribunal will request the 
appropriate secretariat to send the parties a letter, procedural order or 
instruction. Yet in a very small number of cases the tribunal will make 
an interlocutory award to inform the parties of audit and appraisal. It can 
be seen that it is within the discretion of the tribunal to deal with this 
matter either via an interlocutory award, or via a letter, procedural order 
or instruction. 493 
In my opinion, since the CIETAC Rules provide that the arbitral tribunal 
can make an interlocutory award, to make the Rules complete and 
executable, the Rules should define `interlocutory award' and specify 
clearly an interlocutory award shall deal with procedural problem. 
However, as to a particular procedural problem, the arbitral tribunal 
shall remain to have the discretion to decide whether to make an 
interlocutory award or simply send a letter, procedural order or 
instruction. 
Article 4 (2) of the CIETAC Rules states that the parties may agree to 
preclude the arbitral tribunal from making interlocutory award. This is 
also the effective position under the Arbitration Law, as it does not 
contain a mandatory rule giving the arbitral tribunal the power to make 
493 Song, Hang, Recognition and Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Awards, 
Beijing: Law Press, 2000,55. 
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an interlocutory award. 
3. Final award. 
A final award resolves the dispute between the parties. When a final 
award is made, the arbitrators have accomplished their duty and no 
longer have competence over the case. The particular relationship of the 
parties and the arbitrators is terminated. 494 
4. Amicable award 
In international commercial arbitration, the tribunal can only make an 
effective award if the parties agree to confer competence on the tribunal. 
The source of the tribunal's power is the agreement of the parties. Thus, 
during the process of arbitration and before the award is made, the 
parties are free to reach a conciliation agreement, which of course 
cancels the arbitration agreement. To ensure that the conciliation 
agreement is effectively enforced, the parties may ask the tribunal to 
make an award to confirm that agreement. The arbitral tribunal may 
refuse to make an award to confirm the conciliation agreement if it 
considers that the agreement breaches mandatory legal rules or harms 
the rights of a third party. Where parties have referred a dispute to 
494 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modem International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,325. 
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arbitration, and make a conciliation agreement part of which breaches 
mandatory rules or harms a third party's interests, the arbitral tribunal 
shall inform the parties of this fact and suggest that they amend that part. 
If the parties refuse to make such amendment and do not withdraw the 
case, the tribunal shall make an award confirming the non-offending part 
of the agreement, while continuing the arbitration and making an award 
to deal with the offending part. Where parties to an arbitration 
agreement make a conciliation agreement and request the arbitral 
tribunal to make an award to confirm the conciliation agreement without 
referring the dispute to the arbitration, if part of the conciliation 
agreement breaches mandatory rules or harms a third party's interest, the 
tribunal shall inform the parties of the fact and suggest they amend the 
offending part. If the parties refuse to make such amendment and do not 
withdraw their request, the tribunal may only make an agreed award 
confirming the non-offending part of the conciliation agreement, and 
will not commence arbitral proceedings to deal with the rest of the 
agreement. Such an award has the same status as any other arbitration 
award and is called an amicable award. The advantage of an amicable 
award is that it has more sanction than a mere conciliation agreement. 
A conciliation agreement is not legally binding, and any party is 
permitted to change his mind and refuse to abide by the agreement, but 
an amicable award becomes legally binding immediately upon issue. 
Where a party refuses to enforce an amicable award, the other party can 
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apply to the court for enforcement. 495 
5. Default award. 
Article 42 (2) of the Arbitration Law provides that whereas a respondent 
is absent from the hearing without justifiable reasons after receiving the 
written notice, or withdraws from hearing without the prior permission 
by of the tribunal, the tribunal may make an award by default. Article 34 
of the CIETAC Rules 2005 provides that if the respondent fails to 
appear at an oral hearing without showing sufficient cause for such 
failure, or withdraws from an on-going oral hearing without the 
permission of the tribunal, the tribunal may proceed with the arbitration 
and make a default award. 496 Article 34 also states if the claimant fails 
to appear at an oral hearing without showing sufficient cause for such 
failure, or withdraws from an on-going oral hearing without the 
permission of the tribunal, the claimant may be deemed to have 
withdrawn its request for arbitration. In such a case, if the respondent 
has filed a counterclaim, the tribunal shall proceed with the hearing of 
the counterclaim and make a default award. 
497 
B. Substance of Awards 
r 
495 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modem International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,333. 
496 Article 34 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
497 Article 34 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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1. The Process of making awards. 
Article 7 of the Arbitration Law states that an award shall be made on 
the basis of true facts and relevant laws to achieve a fair and reasonable 
settlement for the parties. Article 43 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 provides 
that the tribunal shall independently and impartially make its award on 
the basis of the facts, in accordance with the law and the terms of the 
contract, with reference to international practices and in compliance 
with principles of fairness and reasonableness. 
As to how to make an award where the arbitrators have different views, 
Article 53 of the Arbitration Law provides that an arbitral award shall be 
decided by the majority of the arbitrators and the views of the minority 
can be written down in the record. Where a majority vote cannot be 
reached, the award shall be decided on the basis of the opinion of the 
chief arbitrator. Article 43 of the CIETAC Rules provides that where the 
tribunal is composed of three arbitrators, the award shall be rendered by 
all three or by a majority. Where the arbitral tribunal cannot reach a 
majority opinion, the award shall be rendered in accordance with the 
presiding arbitrator's opinion. In either case, dissenting opinions shall be 
docketed into the file and may be attached to the award, but shall not 
form part of the award. 498 The Arbitration Law does not say whether, 
where the award is decided based on the opinion of the chief arbitrator, 
498 Article 43 (5) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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the other arbitrators' opinion should be written into the record. This is an 
apparent omission, and such a requirement should be added to the 
Arbitration Law. The Arbitration Law does not provide whether the 
written dissenting opinion or the written opinion of other arbitrators 
shall be docketed into the file or may be attached to the award, or shall 
form a part of the award. The Arbitration Law leaves this problem to be 
dealt with by the Arbitration Rules of Arbitral Agency. 
Article 54 of the Arbitration Law provides that the arbitral award shall 
be signed by arbitrators and affixed with the seals of the arbitration 
commission. An arbitrator holding different views may or may not sign 
the award. Article 43 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 states that CIETAC's 
stamp shall be affixed to the award. 499 Unless the award is made in 
accordance with the opinion of the presiding arbitrator or the sole 
arbitrator, the arbitral award shall be signed by a majority of arbitrators. 
An arbitrator who has a dissenting opinion may or may not sign his/her 
name on the award. 500 Article 43 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 does not 
say where the award is made in accordance with the opinion of the 
presiding arbitrator or the sole arbitrator, whether the presiding 
arbitrator or the sole arbitrator shall sign the award. Yet it can be 
inferred from the fact that the majority of arbitrators must sign where a 
499 Article 43 (3) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
500 Article 43 (6) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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majority award is made, that the presiding or sole arbitrator must sign 
the award in the above circumstances. This omission should be 
rectified. Similarly, where the award is made on the basis of the opinion 
of the presiding arbitrator, the other arbitrators may or may not sign the 
award. 
The Arbitration Law is silent regarding time limits for making awards, 
but the CIETAC Rules state that the tribunal shall render an award 
within six months of the date on which the arbitral tribunal is formed. soi 
In summary procedure the tribunal shall render an award within three 
months of the above date. 502 In both cases, upon the request of the 
arbitral tribunal, the Chairman of the CIETAC may extend the time 
period if he/she considers it truly necessary and the reasons for the 
extension truly justified. 503 
2. Content of awards. 
Article 54 of the Arbitration Law provides that the arbitral award shall 
specify the claims, the facts in disputes, the reasons for the award, the 
result of the award, the arbitration expenses and the date of the award. 
Where parties object to the specification of the facts in dispute and 
reasons for the ruling, such specification and reasons may be omitted. 
501 Article 42 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
502 Articles 42(2) and 56 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
503 Article 56 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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Article 43 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 states that the arbitral tribunal 
shall state in the award the claims, the facts of the dispute, the reasons 
on which the award is based, the result of the award, the allocation of 
the arbitration costs and the date on which and the place at which the 
award is made. The facts of the dispute and the reasons on which the 
award is based may not be stated in the award if the parties have so 
agreed, or if the award is made in accordance with the terms of a 
settlement agreement between the parties. The arbitral tribunal is also 
given the power to determine in the arbitral award the specific time 
period for the parties to execute the award and the liabilities to be borne 
by a party failing to execute the award within the specified time. 504 Yet, 
since there is no mandatory rule in the Arbitration Law giving the 
tribunal such a power, the parties may exclude that power by agreement. 
There is an argument that the award should not include reasons, as this 
may encourage the losing party to challenge the award. However, the 
opinion that the parties are entitled to be aware of the reasons for the 
sos award prevails. 
3. Delivery of award. 
Article 68 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 provides that all documents, 
notices and written materials in relation to the arbitration may be sent to 
504 Article 43 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
505 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modem International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,336. 
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the parties and/or their representatives in person, or by registered mail or 
express mail, facsimile, telex, cable, or by any other means considered 
proper by the secretariat of the CIETAC or its sub-commission. 506Any 
written correspondence to a party and/or its representative(s) shall be 
deemed to have been properly served on the party if delivered to the 
addressee or delivered at his place of business, registration, domicile, 
habitual residence or mailing address, or where, after reasonable 
inquiries by the other party, none of the aforesaid addresses can be 
found, the written correspondence is sent by the secretariat of the 
CIETAC or its sub-commission to the addressee's last known place of 
business, registered address, domicile, habitual residence or mailing 
address by registered mail or by any other means that provides a record 
of the attempt of delivery. 507 The Arbitration Law does not deal with the 
delivery of awards, thus the parties are free to make their own 
agreement as to delivery. 508 It may be noted that an award becomes 
effective on the date on which the award is made, whether the award has 
been delivered or not. 
4. Correction of award. 
Article 56 of the Arbitration Law provides that a tribunal may correct 
errors of expression or computation, and add things omitted from the 
506 Article 68 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
507 Article 68 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
508 Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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award. The parties may apply to the tribunal for such correction within 
30 days of receipt of the award. Article 47 of the CIETAC Rules 2005 
states that within thirty days of receipt of the award, either party may 
request in writing a correction of any error of a clerical, typographical, 
calculation or similar nature in the award. The tribunal shall correct any 
such error within thirty days of the date of receipt of such a request. The 
arbitral tribunal may likewise correct any such errors of its own 
initiative within a reasonable time after the award is issued. Such a 
correction shall form a part of the arbitral award. Article 48 of the 
CIETAC Rules 2005 indicates that within thirty days from the date on 
which the ward is received, either party may request the tribunal in 
writing for an additional award on any claim or counterclaim which was 
advanced in the arbitration proceedings but omitted from the award. If 
such omission does exist, the tribunal shall make an additional award 
within thirty days from the date of receipt of the written request. The 
arbitral tribunal may also make an additional award on its own initiative 
within a reasonable period of time after the arbitral award is issued. 
Such additional award shall form a part of the arbitral award previously 
rendered. 
The Arbitration Law does not provide a time limit for making 
corrections. Thus, in light of Article 4 (2) of the CIETAC Rules, the 
parties are free to agree on another time limit rather than the 30 days 
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specified in the Rules. In my view, the parties may not be sufficiently 
aware of how much time the proceedings may take. If they agree to 
require the arbitral tribunal to correct the error in a too short period of 
time, the arbitrators may be under too much pressure and the making of 
any correction may be adversely affected. Therefore, I suggest the 
Arbitration Law should contain a rule which provides that the arbitral 
tribunal shall make a correction in writing within thirty days from the 
date of receipt of the written request for the correction, so that the 
parties have no right to agree on the time limit for making corrections. 
The. Arbitration Law does not provide that the arbitral tribunal may 
correct the error or make an additional award on its own initiative. Thus, 
the parties can by virtue of Article 4 (2) of the CIETAC Rules agree to 
prevent the tribunal correcting the error or making an additional award 
on its own initiative. However, such agreement would be rare, as the 
parties would not benefit. The Arbitration Law does not state that a 
correction in writing or an additional award shall form a part of the 
arbitral award previously rendered, so that the parties are at liberty to 
agree otherwise. Again such agreement would be rare. 
Neither the Arbitration Law nor the CIETAC Rules contains any 
provision regarding the explanation of ambiguities in the arbitral award. 
In practice, CIETAC allows the tribunal to explain ambiguities, if either 
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party applies and the tribunal considers it necessary. sog This is a 
necessary and sensible power, which should be provided for explicitly in 
both the Arbitration Law and CIETAC Rules 2005. 
Neither the Arbitration Law nor the CIETAC Rules deal with correction 
of errors other than clerical and similar errors. In practice, such other 
errors are not and should not be corrected, so that the finality of the 
arbitral award is not adversely affected. 
5. Effect of award. 
Article 9 of the Arbitration Law provides that the arbitration award is 
final. After the award is given, neither the arbitration commission nor 
the courts may entertain any action concerning that dispute. Article 57 of 
the Arbitration Law provides that the award takes legal effect upon its 
issuing. Article 62 provides that the parties shall execute the award. If 
one of the parties refuses, the other may apply to the people's court for 
enforcement. Article 43 of the CIETAC Rules states that the date on 
which the award is made shall be the date on which the award comes 
into legal efect. 510 The award is final and binding upon both parties. 
Neither party may bring a suit before a court or request any other 
509 Han, Tian, Theory and Practice on Modem International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,337. 
510 Article 43 (7) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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organization to revise the award. 51' Article 49 of the CIETAC Rules 
2005 provides that the parties must automatically execute the award 
within the time period specified in the award. If no time limit is 
specified in the award, the parties shall execute it immediately. 512 
Where one party fails to execute the award, the other may apply to a 
competent Chinese court for its enforcement pursuant to Chinese law, or 
apply to a competent court for enforcement of the award according to 
the 1958 United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards or other international treaties that China has 
concluded or acceded to. 513 Since the Arbitration Law does not provide 
that the parties must automatically execute the arbitral award within the 
time period specified in the award, the parties are free to agree to 
execute the arbitral award immediately regardless of the time period 
specified in the award. 
C. Special Substance of Amicable Award 
1. Reconciliation on parties own initiative 
Article 49 of the Arbitration Law provides that after the parties have 
applied for arbitration, they may reach conciliation on their own 
511 
Article 43 (8) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
51 
Article 49 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
513 3 
Article 49 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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initiative. Where a conciliation agreement has been reached, a request 
may be made to the tribunal for an award based on that agreement, or 
the application for arbitration may be withdrawn. Article 50 continues 
that where a conciliation agreement is not observed, either party may 
apply for arbitration according to the arbitration agreement. 
Article 40(5) of the CIETAC Rules 2005, states that a settlement 
agreement reached between the parties during the course of conciliation 
by the arbitral tribunal, but without the involvement of the arbitral 
tribunal, shall be deemed as one reached through conciliation by the 
arbitral tribunal. Thus, under the Rules, there is no difference between 
conciliation on the parties' own initiative and conciliation by the arbitral 
tribunal. The rules as to conciliation by the arbitral tribunal under the 
CIETAC Rules will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
2. Situations under which the arbitral tribunal may conciliate 
Article 51 of the Arbitration Law provides that, where the parties so 
desire, the tribunal may conciliate a case before making the award. 
Article 40 of the CIETAC Rules states that where both parties desire 
conciliation, or one party so desires and the other party agrees when 
approached by the tribunal, the tribunal may conciliate the case during 
303 
the course of the proceedings S14 It can be seen that the parties may not 
agree that the tribunal may conciliate only if a certain condition is 
satisfied, since the mandatory rules of the Arbitration Law give the 
tribunal the power to conciliate. Thus party autonomy is been damaged. 
Accordingly, I suggest that the Arbitration Law should not give the 
tribunal the power to conciliate of its own motion. 
Manner of conciliation. Article 40(3) of the CIETAC Rules states that the 
tribunal may conciliate the case in the manner it considers appropriate, but 
the parties are at liberty to restrict the discretion given by Article 40(3). 
3. Failure of conciliation 
The Arbitration Law states that if conciliation fails, the tribunal shall 
continue the arbitration and make an arbitral award. The CIETAC Rules 
provide that the tribunal shall terminate the conciliation and continue the 
proceedings if one of the parties requests a termination, or if the tribunal 
believes that further efforts to conciliate will be futile. 515 Where 
conciliation fails, the tribunal shall proceed with the arbitration and 
render an award S16 Moreover, any opinion, view or statement, and any 
proposal or expression of acceptance or opposition by either party or the 
514 
Article 40 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
515 
Article 40 (4) of the Arbitration Law 1994. 
516 
Article 40 (7) of the Arbitration Law 1994. 
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tribunal in the process of conciliation, shall not be invoked as grounds 
for any claim, defence or counterclaim in subsequent proceedings, 
arbitral, judicial or otherwise. 517 Since the Arbitration Law does not 
prevent such matters from being invoked as grounds in any subsequent 
proceedings, the parties are permitted to agree that they may be so 
invokeds's. 
4. Success of conciliation 
The Arbitration Law provides that where an agreement is reached 
through conciliation, the tribunal shall produce a reconciliation 
document or make an award based on the results of the agreement. The 
document and the award are equally binding legally. 5 19 As for the 
application for refusing enforcement of a conciliation document or an 
award based on the results of the agreement, it shall be dismissed by the 
people's court. 520 
Article 52 of the Arbitration Law provides that the reconciliation 
document shall specify the arbitration claims and the result of the 
agreement between the parties. It must be signed by the arbitrator and 
517 
Article 40 (8) of the Arbitration Law 1994. 518 
Article 4 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
519 
Article 51 of the Arbitration Law 1994. 
320 Section of the 'Interpretation of SPC on Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC', Law 
Interpretation No. 7. Sept. 8,2006. 
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affixed with the seal of the arbitration commission before being 
delivered to the parties. It becomes legally binding immediately upon 
receipt by the parties. If any party fails to honour the reconciliation 
document before receiving it, the tribunal shall continue the arbitration 
and make an arbitral award. The Arbitration Law leaves the issue of an 
amicable award to be dealt with by the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitral 
Agency. The CIETAC Rules state that where settlement is reached 
through conciliation by the tribunal, the parties shall sign a written 
settlement agreement. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal will close the case and render an arbitral award in 
accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. 521 The 
CIETAC Rules contain no provision as to the making of a conciliation 
agreement. Thus, if the parties decide that a conciliation agreement 
rather than a conciliation award shall be made, the tribunal shall make 
that agreement according to Articles 51 and 52 of the Arbitration Law. 522 
The CIETAC Rules require the agreement to be in writing, unlike the 
Arbitration Law. Therefore, under the Law an oral conciliation 
agreement is valid. 
II. Suggested Improvements to Chinese Law 
521 
Article 40 (6) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
522 
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the DAC suggested in its February 1996 Report, pars 242, that one 
situation might be where they believe the agreed award to be part of an 
elaborate tax fraud by the parties, 536 or to conflict with public policy. If 
arbitrators do refuse to make an agreed award, it would seem that the 
appropriate remedy is an application for their removal under s. 24 of the 
1996 Act, although in practice the real sanction may be a refusal by the 
parties to pay the arbitrators' fees insofar as payment has not been made. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not formally give the arbitral 
tribunal the right to refuse to make an award on agreed terms, but 
arbitrators have such a right in practice. To properly develop the law, it 
is suggested that Chinese arbitration law adopt the stance of either the 
Model Law or the 1996 Act, and explicitly give the tribunal such a right. 
Under Chinese arbitration law, if the dispute is settled through mediation 
by the tribunal, it will make an agreed award unless otherwise agreed by- 
the parties, whether the parties request this or not537. If the dispute is 
settled by the parties themselves, the tribunal may make an agreed 
award only at their request. 538 It can be appreciated that, where the 
dispute is settled through mediation by the tribunal, an agreed award 
will be issued even if one of the parties requests otherwise. In this 
536 Although the DAC also recognized that, if this was the case, the award would scarcely be binding 
on the revenue or customs authorities, as third parites. 
537 Article 51 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994; Article 40 (6) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC 
(2005). 
538 Article 49 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
313 
situation, the autonomy of the parties is damaged. Therefore, I suggest 
that Chinese law could adopt the approach of either the Model Law or 
the 1996 Act and provide that an agreed award should be made only if 
both parties have so agreed, and one or both of them have requested the 
tribunal to do so. 
4. Default Awards 
Model Law. Article 25 of the Model Law provides that unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, if without showing sufficient cause, the 
respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence in accordance 
with Article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings 
without treating such failure in itself as an admission of the claimant's 
allegation 539 If any party fails to appear at a hearing or to produce 
documentary evidence, the arbitral tribunal may continue the 
proceedings and make the award on the evidence before it. 54° 
1996 Act. Section 41 of the 1996 Act states that the parties are free to 
agree on the powers of the tribunal in case of a party's failure to do 
something necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the 
arbitration. 541 If there is no such agreement, 542 if without showing 
539 Article 25 (b) of the Model Law 
540 Article 25(c) of the Model Law 
541 Section 41 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
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sufficient cause, a party fails to attend or be represented at an oral 
hearing of which due notice was given, 543 or where matters are to be 
dealt with in writing, fails after due notice to submit written evidence or 
make written submissions, the tribunal may continue the proceedings in 
the absence of that party or, as the case may be, without any written 
evidence or submissions on his behalf, and may make an award on the 
basis of the evidence before it. 
544 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the tribunal may also 
make default awards. Unlike the Model Law and the 1996 Act, the 
parties have no freedom to agree on the powers of the tribunal in case of 
a party's failure to do something necessary for the proper and 
expeditious conduct of the arbitration. To protect the autonomy of the 
parties, I suggest that the Chinese arbitration law should allow the 
parties to make their own agreement as to the powers of the tribunal in 
such cases. 
C. The Substance of Awards 
1. The Process of Making Awards 
542 Section 41 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
543 Section 41 (4) (b) of the 1996 Act. 
544 Section 41 (4) (b) of the 1996 Act. 
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The principle of majority rule 
Model Law. Article 29 provides that in arbitral proceedings with more 
than one arbitrator, any decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be made, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, by a majority of all its members. 
However, questions of procedure may be decided by a presiding 
arbitrator, if so authorized by the parties or all members of the arbitral 
tribunal. The Analytical Commentary states that this does not mean that 
obviate the need for all arbitrators to take part in the deliberations, or at 
least be afforded the opportunity to do so. 545 It is noteworthy that the 
Model Law does not indicate how an award is to be made if there is no 
majority. It has been suggested that one disadvantage of this is that in 
the event of three different opinions being held, the presiding arbitrator 
may be tempted to agree to a judicially dubious solution in order to 
attain the necessary majority. More problematically, situations may arise 
where no award is made, leading to a total waste of time and expense. 546 
Yet on the other hand, it is more likely that all issues will be fully 
considered as a result of the arbitrators' need to reach agreement. This 
will make the parties more ready to accept the decision, thus reducing 
545 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 64, para. 2. A majority view at the second session of the Working Group 
favoured an express statement that all arbitrators must have had an opportunity to participate in the 
deliberations, although under another view this condition was self-evident. (Doc. A/CN. 9/232, para. 
138). Language in accordance with the majority view was included in a draft provision considered by 
the Working Group at its fourth session, which adopted a simplified version omtting that language 
(Doc. A/CN. 9/245, paras. 101-102). 
546 Doc. A/CN. 9/263, p. 43, Article 29, para. 1. Korea suggested that in cases where no majority can 
be obtained, the arbitration agreement shall come to an end. 
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the likelihood of subsequent litigation or appeals. 547 Moreover, the 
non-mandatory character of Article 29 would permit the parties, where 
the arbitral tribunal was unable to reach a decision, to authorize a 
presiding arbitrator to decide alone. 548 It should be noted that the 
principle of majority rule also applies to an agreed award. 
1996 Act. Section 20 of the 1996 Act provides that where the parties 
have agreed that there is to be a chairman, they are free to agree what 
the functions of the chairman are to be in relation to the making of 
decisions, orders and awards. If or to the extent that there is no such 
agreement, decisions, orders and awards shall be made by all or a 
majority of the arbitrators (including the chairman) The view of the 
chairman shall prevail in relation to a decision, order or award in respect 
of which there is neither unanimity nor a majority of the arbitrators. 
Section 22 states that where the parties agree that there shall be two or 
more arbitrators with no chairman or umpire, the parties are free to 
agree how the tribunal is to make decisions, orders and awards. If there 
is no such agreement, decisions, orders and awards shall be made by all 
or a majority of the arbitrators. There would be a deadlock where a 
tribunal comprising an even number of arbitrators is evenly divided in 
547 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 327, para. 48. 
548 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 327, para. 50. The Analytical Commentary had mentioned as examples of this 
flexibility that parties might authorize a presiding arbitrator, if no majority can be reached, to case the 
decisive vote, or to decide as if he were the sole arbitrator. They might also, for quantum decisions, 
agree on a formula for the calculation of the decisive amount (Doc. A/CN. 9/ 264, p. 64, para. 3). 
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respect of a matter. However, the parties have nothing to gain from 
agreeing a panel with an equal number of arbitrators or from not 
providing for a chairman or umpire, thus deadlock is unlikely to happen 
in practice. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law an arbitral award is made 
according to the opinion of the majority, and where there is no majority 
the Chief arbitrator decides. This is a mandatory rule and the parties 
cannot agree otherwise. On the surface, the autonomy of the parties 
seems to be compromised here. However, in cases of deadlock the only 
practical solution is to entrust the decision to one arbitrator. Since there 
is no `presiding arbitrator' in Chinese law, the Chief arbitrator appointed 
by both parties or the arbitration agency would most likely be chosen to 
make the decision. In other words, where a majority vote cannot be 
reached, the parties are very unlikely to make any other agreement than 
asking the Chief arbitrator to decide. Their choice will mirror the law, so 
that in reality the law does not infringe their autonomy. 
Dissenting opinions 
Model Law. The question of how to deal with dissenting opinions was 
not addressed in the Model Law. The opinion is therefore that this is a 
matter to be determined pursuant to Article 19 by the parties or, failing 
318 
determination by them, by the arbitral tribunal. 549 Thus, the Model Law 
left the problem to be concretely resolved by the parties and national 
law. 
1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not contain any rule as to how to deal with 
the dissenting opinions. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law provides that an arbitral award 
shall be decided by the majority of the arbitrators and the views of the 
minority can be written down in the record. Where a majority vote 
cannot be reached, the award shall be decided on the basis of the opinion 
of the chief arbitrator. The CIETAC Rules provide that in either case, 
dissenting opinions shall be docketed into the file and may be attached 
to the award, but shall not form part of the award. The Arbitration Law 
itself does not indicate whether the written dissenting opinion or the 
written opinion of other arbitrators shall be docketed into the file or may 
be attached to the award, or shall form a part of the award, leaving this 
problem to be dealt with by the Arbitration Rules of Arbitral Agencies. 
It does not say whether, where the award is decided based on the 
opinion of the chief arbitrator, the other arbitrators' opinion should be 
549 Article 19 of the Model Law provides that subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are 
free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings. 
Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal 
includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. 
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written into the record. This is an apparent omission, and such a 
requirement should be added to the Arbitration Law. 
Signature 
Model Law. Article 31(1) provides that the award shall be made in 
writing and signed by the arbitrator(s). In proceedings with more than 
one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of the members of the 
arbitral tribunal shall suffice, provided that the reason for any omitted 
signature is stated. It was said that the requirement that the reason for 
any omitted signature be stated is a compromise between two extreme 
positions: on the one hand, that the majority of the arbitrators could take 
any decision they wished; on the other, that all the arbitrators must sign 
an award. 550 The Analytical Commentary noted that there were two 
different possible causes for a missing signature. The first was that after 
the award was finalized an arbitrator died, became physically unable to 
sign or could not be reached. The second possible reason was that an 
arbitrator dissented from the award and refused to sign. ss' Where the 
award is made by a majority, while it is possible for only the majority to 
sign, all the arbitrators may wish to sign. In that case it will be 
impossible for the parties to discover who was in the majority and who 
dissented, or indeed that the award was not unanimous, unless (as often 
550 Doc. A/CN. 9/ SR. 328, paras. 25-26. 
551 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,162. 
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happens) the award otherwise identifies the dissentient. 
Article 30(2) provides that an award on agreed terms shall be made in 
accordance with the provisions of article 31 and shall state that it is an 
award. Such an award has the same status and effect as any other award 
on the merits. Article 33(5) provides that the provisions of article 31 
shall also apply to a correction or interpretation of the award or to an 
additional award. 
1996 Act. Section 52(3) provides that the award shall be in writing and 
signed by all the arbitrators or all those assenting to the award. It can be 
seen that both the Model Law and the 1996 Act require the arbitrators 
assenting to the award to sign the award. The difference between the 
Model Law and the 1996 Act is that the former requires the reason for 
an omitted signature to be stated, whereas the latter has no such 
requirement. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration Law, minority arbitrators need 
not sign the award, and no reason for any omitted signature is needed. 
However as Chinese arbitration law requires dissenting opinions to be 
recorded, the reason for an omitted signature is obvious in such a case. 
Yet Chinese arbitration law might follow the Model Law in requiring 
that the award should state the reason for an omitted signature if that 
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reason is that the arbitrator concerned died, became physically unable to 
sign or could not be reached. Such a provision is needed where there is 
no dissenting opinion contained in the award, but only two of the 
arbitrators have signed it. In this case parties would probably want to 
know why the third signature is missing, and I submit that they are 
entitled to know the reason. 
Provisions regarding time limits for making awards 
Model Law. There is no such provision in the Model Law. 
1996 Act. While the 1996 Act does not provide a time limit for making 
an award, s. 50(1) provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
the court may extend any agreed time limit. Section 50(2) provides that 
an application for an order under this section may be made by the 
tribunal (upon notice to the parties), or by any party to the proceedings 
(upon notice to the tribunal and the other parties), but only after 
exhausting any available arbitral process for obtaining an extension of 
time. Under certain institutional rules awards must be made within 
certain time limits, and provision is made for extensions to be granted 
by the institution. It will be rare, therefore, for such a matter to come 
before the court since it will normally have been considered by the 
institution first. 552 The court may only grant an extension if it satisfied 
552 
Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
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that a substantial injustice would result if it did not do so. 553 It may 
extend the limit for such period and on such terms as it thinks fit, and 
may do so whether or not the time previously fixed (by or under the 
agreement or by a previous order) has expired. 554 The leave of the court 
is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this 
section. sss It is difficult to see how the effect of s. 50 differs from that of 
s. 79, which generally empowers the court to extend any time limit in 
relation to any matter relating to the arbitral proceedings. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the court has no power to 
extend the time limit for making an award. Since giving the court such 
power subject to strict qualifications provides the parties with another 
means of recourse, with no possibility of adverse effects, I suggest that 
Chinese law should follow the lead of the 1996 Act in this instance. 
Since the parties may agree to exclude this power, their autonomy is not 
infringed. 
Form of agreed awards 
Model Law. Article 30 (2) states that an award on agreed terms shall be 
made in accordance with the provisions of article 31, i. e. just like any 
other award. 
Yd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,196. 
553 Section 50 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
554 Section 50 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
555 Section 50 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
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1996 Act. The effect of s. 51(1) and (4)556 is that, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the provisions of s. 52 (directing the form an award 
is to take) apply to an agreed award. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law makes no provision for this 
matter, although in practice, agreed awards are made in the same way as 
other awards. It is suggested that Chinese arbitration law should adopt 
the approach of the Model Law and the 1996 Act, by making it clear that 
the provisions which apply to the form of awards also apply to the form 
of an agreed award. 
2. Content of awards: date, place and reasons 
Model Law. Article 31(2) provides that an award shall state the reasons 
upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are 
to be given or the award is an award on agreed terms under article 30. In 
the Analytical Commentary the Secretariat suggests that an agreement 
that no reasons are to be given may be implied, for example, by 
submitting a dispute to an established arbitration institution which is 
known not to contemplate the giving of reasons, and or which operates a 
556 Section 51 (1) of the 1996 Act provides that if during arbitral proceedings the parties settle the 
dispute, the following provisions apply unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Section 51 (4) provides 
that the following provisions of this Part relating to awards (sections 52 to 58) apply to an agreed 
award. 
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practice of stating the reasons in a separate and confidential 
document. 557 Article 31(3) states that the award shall state its date and 
the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with article 20 (1). 
The award shall be deemed to have been made at that place. Article 20(1) 
provides that the parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. 
Failing such agreement, the place of arbitration shall be determined by 
the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, 
including the convenience of the parties. At the Commission session, it 
was proposed to extend the second sentence of Article 31(3) to the date 
of the award, and to have it read, `the award shall be deemed to have 
been made at that place and on that date". 558 It was stated in support that 
the date of the award might have legal implications with regard, for 
example, to the payment of interest "from the date of the award", 559 and 
that since the award might be circulated among the arbitrators by mail 
for their signature, it would be difficult to determine its date. However, 
the prevailing view was that the date fixed in the award by the arbitral 
tribunal should be open to rebuttal. 560 
557 Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 67, Article 31, para. 3. The Analytical Commentary and the report of the 
first session of the Working Group (n. 31.6 supra) speak in terms of a "waiver" of the requirement that 
reasons are to be given. In my submission that is too limited a characterization: if an agreement states 
that no reasons are to be given it precludes the giving of reasons. 
558 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 328, paras. 29 and 33. 
559 The date of the award has, on the other hand, no significance for the application of the Law. Time 
limits, including the limit for an application under Article 34 for setting an award aside, run, not from 
the date of award; but from the date on which the party received it. See Broches, Aron, Commentary 
on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1990,164. 
560 Commission Report, para. 255. 
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1996 Act. Section 52(1) gives the parties the freedom to agree on the 
form of an award. In the absence of such agreement, the award shall 
contain reasons, unless it is an agreed award. 561 It is increasingly 
recognized that those making such significant decisions are expected to 
explain the reasons for them. It should be noted that an agreement not to 
have reasons would exclude the jurisdiction of the court to determine a 
preliminary point of law, 562 or to entertain an appeal on a question of 
law arising out of the award. 563 
Section 52 (5) states that the award shall state the seat of the arbitration 
and the date when the award is made. Section 53 provides that unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, where the seat of the arbitration is in 
England, any award in the proceedings shall be treated as made there, 
regardless of where it was signed, despatched or delivered to any of the 
parties. The seat of arbitration means the juridical seat of the arbitration 
designated by the parties to the arbitration agreement, or by an arbitral 
or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in that 
regard, or by the arbitral tribunal if so authorized by the parties, or 
determined, in absence of any such designation, having regard to the 
561 Section 52 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
562 Section 45 (1) of the 1996 Act provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may 
on the application of a party to arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties) determine any 
question of law arising in the course of the proceedings which the court is satisfied substantially 
affects the rights of one or more of the parties. An agreement to dispense with reasons for the 
tribunal's award shall be considered an agreement to exclude the court's jurisdiction under this 
section. 
563 Section 69 (1) of the 1996 Act provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to 
arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a 
question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings. An agreement to dispense with 
reasons for the tribunal's award shall be considered an agreement to exclude the court's jurisdiction 
under this section. 
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parties' agreement and all the relevant circumstances. 564 Section 54 (1) 
indicates that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may 
decide what is to be taken to be the date on which the award was made. 
The `decision' may not be straightforward in all cases. Where there is 
more than one arbitrator, the award is likely to circulate, and may even 
go overseas. Signatures may be days or weeks apart. It will usually be 
most practical for the arbitrators either to ask the last signatory to date 
the award (as has in fact been common practice hitherto), or to return it 
to the chairman, who will do so. 565 Thus s. 54(2) continues to provide 
that in the absence of any such decision, the date of the award shall be 
taken to be the date on which it is signed by the arbitrator or, where 
more than one arbitrator signs the award, by the last of them. 
Section 51 provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an 
agreed award shall state that it is an award of the tribunal, 566 and that 
ss. 52 to 54 apply to an agreed award. 567 The requirement for stating it is 
an award of the tribunal will be satisfied by reciting the appointment of 
the arbitrator(s) and terms of the award, and by the signature(s) of the 
arbitrator(s). 568 
564 Section 3 of the 1996 Act. 
565 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,207. 
566 Section 51 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
567 Section 51 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
568 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,200. 
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Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the date of award is 
required to be contained in an award, but it is silent regarding how to 
determine the date of award. 569 The CIETAC Rules 2005 requires an 
award to contain `the place of award9570 , but 
do indicate how to 
determine the place of arbitration. Although the Rules does not 
explicitly provide that the place of award is actually the place of 
arbitration, that is the case in practice. To -make the Rules clearer, I 
suggest that they should use the term `place of arbitration' concurrently, 
instead of using `place of arbitration' in one provision and `place of 
award' in another. Also, Chinese arbitration law should follow the 1996 
Act and provide how to determine the date of arbitration. Chinese 
arbitration law does not indicate whether the provisions regarding the 
content of awards apply to the making of an agreed award. It is, 
therefore, suggested that Chinese law should make it clear that the 
provisions which apply to the making of an award also apply to the 
making of an agreed award, as under the 1996 Act. 
3. Remedies of Awards 
Model Law. The Model Law does not mention remedies. This problem 
569 Article 54 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994; Article 43 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC (2005). 
570 Article 43 (2) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (2005). 
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has been left to be resolved by the rules of law chosen by the parties as 
applicable to the substance of the dispute. 571 
1996 Act. Section 48 (1) provides that the parties are free to agree on the 
powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal as regards remedies. These 
powers are not restricted to those that are available to the court in court 
proceedings. It is therefore possible for the parties to agree that the 
tribunal should have different, and even greater, powers than the court. 
They may, for example, agree that the tribunal should be able to use a 
remedy on different grounds from those on which it would be available 
to the court; or that the tribunal should be able to adopt remedies that are 
known only in other jurisdictions - for example, punitive damages; or 
that the tribunal should be able to adopt remedies suitable to the type of 
contract - such as the power to `open up, review and revise certificates' 
found in many building contracts. 572 Where the parties have not agreed 
on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal has the 
following powers. 573 It may make a declaration as to any matter to be 
determined in the proceedings574, or order the payment of a sum of 
money in any currency575 (the most commonly used remedy). It also has 
571 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,192. 
572 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
Yd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,190. 
573 Section 48 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
574 Section 48 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
575 Section 48 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
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the same powers as the court to order a party to do or refrain from doing 
anything, and to order specific performance of a contract (other than a 
contract relating to land), and to order the rectification, setting aside or 
cancellation of a deed or other document. 576 Under English law the 
power to order a party to do or refrain from doing anything is 
discretionary. It is to be noted that there are limits on the remedies which 
can be awarded by arbitrators. Where there is no authorization under the 
parties' agreement under either section 46 (1)577or section 48(1) of the 
1996 Act, the arbitrators cannot rewrite the contract between the parties, 
eg, by depriving a buyer of goods of the contractual right to reject them. 
Again, a remedy may not contravene public policy in a manner which 
may affect a third party or society as a whole, eg, by authorizing a 
criminal act578 or requiring the invasion of the rights of a third party. 579 
If the tribunal does decide to make the order, it must be careful to set out 
clearly what the respondent party must do. 58° Specific performance is a 
discretionary remedy by which a party in breach of contract is ordered to 
complete its performance. Its usefulness arises when the subject matter 
of the contract is unique or not readily available elsewhere, such as a 
576 Section 48 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
577 Section 46 (1) of the 1996 Act provides that the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute- (a) in 
accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute, or(b) if 
the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by them or 
determined by the tribunal. 
578 Wood v. Griffith (1818) 1 Swanst 55. 
579 Alder v. Savill (1814) 5 Taunt 454. Turner v. Swainson (1836) 1M&W 572. 
580 Redland Bricks v. Morris [1970] AC 652. 
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rare book or a commodity that is in short supply. 581 The tribunal has the 
same powers as the court to order rectification. 582 Rectification is a 
remedy by which a written contract that does not set out the true 
agreement between the parties in some important respect may be 
amended to reflect that agreement. It therefore operates to correct a 
mistake on the part of the relevant parties that is common to them all. 
The remedies of setting aside or can cancellation of contracts may be 
appropriate where other kinds of mistake are alleged. Such remedies 
may also apply where agreements are challenged by allegations of 
misrepresentation, duress, illegality and so on. 583 One problem not 
expressly dealt with by the 1996 Act is how a court would, on an appeal 
on a point of law under the Arbitration Act 1996, s69, treat the exercise 
of a consensual power to award a remedy not open to the court itself, as 
there are no established judicial criteria against which the exercise of 
such a power can be tested. It must be assumed that, provided that the 
arbitrators have been correct in law in holding that a right has been 
infringed, the remedy for the infringement is a matter for them alone. A 
further potential problem is posed by s. 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
which allows the court to enforce an award as if it were an order of the 
court. It is difficult on the surface for a court to enforce an award where 
581 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
Yd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,192. 
582 Section 48 (5) (c) of the 1996 Act. 
583 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,192. 
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the remedy is not one which could have been awarded by the court itself. 
However, the problem can be overcome by the court granting a 
mandatory injunction enforceable by contempt proceedings. 584 
Chinese Law. There are no comparable provisions under Chinese 
arbitration law, although in practice, arbitrators use the similar remedies 
to those provided by the 1996 Act. To aid the development of Chinese 
arbitration law, it is suggested to follow the example of the 1996 Act and 
expressly indicate that the parties are , 
free to agree on the remedies 
available to the tribunal, and where the parties have no such agreement, 
the tribunal may make a declaration as to any matter to be determined in 
the proceedings585, or order the payment of a sum of money in any 
currency, or order a party to do or refrain from doing anything, and to 
order specific performance of a contract, or order the rectification, 
setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other document. 
4. Delivery of Awards 
Model Law. Article 31(4) provides that after the award is made, a 
signed copy shall be delivered to each party. 
584 The solution suggested by the SPC of Tasmania in Ridler v. Waters [2001] TASSC 98. 
585 Section 48 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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1996 Act. Section 55 provides that the parties are at liberty to agree 
what requirements there should be for the tribunal to notify them of the 
award, but if there is no such agreement, the award shall be notified to 
the parties by service on them of copies of the award without delay after 
the award is made. This is without prejudice to the power conferred by 
s. 56 to withhold the award except upon full payment of the fees and 
expenses of the arbitrators. Section 56 is mandatory, and may not be 
excluded by the parties. Section 56 (2) provides that if the tribunal 
refuses on that ground to deliver an award, on an application by a party, 
the court may order the award to be released against - the applicant 
paying into court the full amount claimed, or such lesser amount as the 
court may specify. This deals with the possibility of a grossly excessive 
claim by the tribunal making it impossible for a party to obtain the 
award. 586 In that case the amount of the fees and expenses properly 
payable shall be determined by such means and upon such terms as the 
court may direct587. Out of the money paid into court there shall be paid 
out such fees and expenses as may be found to be properly payable, with 
any surplus being refunded to the applicant. 588 The amount of fees and 
expenses properly payable is the amount the applicant is liable to pay 
under section 28589 or any agreement relating to the payment of the 
586 Section 56 (2) (a) of the 1996 Act. 
587 Section 56 (2) (b) of the 1996 Act. 
588 Section 56 (2) (c) of the 1996 Act. 
589 Section 28 (Joint and several liability of parties to arbitrators for fees and expenses) provides that 
(1) The parties are jointly and severally liable to pay to the arbitrators such reasonable fees and 
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arbitrators S90 It should be noted that no such application to the court 
may be made where there is a possibility of appeal or review of the 
arbitrators' fees and expenses by some other arbitral process, for 
instance by applying to a relevant institution or appellate arbitral 
tribunal 591 In Section 56, `arbitrators' includes an umpire who has not 
replaced the other arbitrators, and arbitrators who have ceased to act. 592 
Section 56 also applies to any arbitral or other institution or person 
vested by the parties with powers in relation to the delivery of the 
tribunal's award. In such a case, `fees and expenses of the arbitrators' 
shall be construed as including the fees and expenses of that institution 
or person. 593 The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a 
decision of the court under Section 56,594 Nothing in this section shall 
be construed as excluding an application under section 28 where 
payment has been made to the arbitrators in order to obtain the award. 
Parties thus have a choice between an application to the court under 
expenses (if any) as are appropriate in the circumstances. (2) Any party may apply to the court (upon 
notice to the other parties and to the arbitrators) which may order that the amount of the arbitrators' 
fees and expenses shall be considered and adjusted by such means and upon such as it may direct. (3) 
If the application is made after any amount has been paid to the arbitrators by way of fees or expenses, 
the court may order the repayment of such amount (if any) as is shown to be excessive, but shall not 
do so unless it is shown that it is reasonable in the circumstances to order repayment. (4) The above 
provisions have effect subject to any order of the court under section 24(4) or 25(3)(b) (order as to 
entitlement to fees or expenses in case of removal or resignation of arbitrator). (5) Nothing in this 
section affects any liability of a party to any other party to pay all or any of the costs of the arbitration 
(see sections 59 to 65) or any contractual right of an arbitrator to payment of his fees and expenses. (6) 
In this section references to arbitrators include an arbitrator who has ceased to act and an umpire who 
has not replaced the other arbitrators. 
590 Section 56 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
591 Section 56 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
592 Section 56 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
593 Section 56 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
594 Section 56 (7) of the 1996 Act. 
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Section 56 (2), or the payment of the full amount to the arbitrators and 
subsequent challenge under s. 28. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law requires that awards shall be 
delivered to the parties, without explicitly requiring the delivery shall be 
made without delay. To improve Chinese arbitration law, it would be 
beneficial for it to demand explicitly that the award be delivered 
`without delay'. In the Chinese arbitration law, the tribunal does not 
have the power to withhold an award in case of non-payment and there 
is no other method to force the parties to make payment. Since 
withholding an award can force the parties to make payment, the 
Chinese arbitration law might usefully adopt the stance of the 1996 Act, 
and provide that the tribunal has the power to withhold an arbitral award 
upon non-payment, and that in the case, the court may order to release 
the award requiring the applicant to pay into the court the full amount or 
such lesser amount as the court specifies, surplus of which shall be 
refunded to the applicant. 
5. Correction of Awards 
Computational, clerical or typographical errors 
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Model Law. Article 33(1)(a) provides that within thirty days of receipt 
of the award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the 
parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral 
tribunal to correct in the award any error in computation, any clerical or 
typographical error or any errors of similar nature. If the arbitral tribunal 
considers the request to be justified, it shall make the correction or give 
the interpretation within thirty days of receipt of the request. The 
correction shall form part of the award. The arbitral tribunal may extend, 
if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, 
interpretation or an additional award595, and may correct any error of the 
type referred to above on its own initiative within thirty days of the day 
of the award. 596 As to content and form, the provisions of Article 31 
apply to a correction. 597 The provision of Article 18 that the parties 
shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case presumably implies that before the 
tribunal makes a correction, it shall give the other parties a full 
opportunity of making representation. However, it is not completely 
clear that that is how Article 18 is to be interpreted. 598 
595 Article 33 (4) of the Model Law. 
596 Article 33 (2) of the Model Law. 
597 Article 33 (5) of the Model Law. 
598 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 329, para. 54. 
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1996 Act. Unlike the Model Law, s. 57 of the 1996 Act gives the 
parties the freedom to agree on the powers of the tribunal to correct an 
award. 599 Where there is no such agreement, under s. 57(3), acting 
either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, the tribunal 
may correct an award so as to remove any clerical mistake or error 
arising from an accidental slip or omission600. The tribunal must give the 
other parties a reasonable opportunity to make representations before 
exercising any of these powers. Any correction of an award shall form 
part of the award. 601 The meaning of `the other parties' is plain where 
the application is made by one party. It presumably means `all parties' 
where the tribunal acts on its own initiative. This requirement accords 
with the tribunal's duty under s. 33(1)(a) to act fairly and give each 
party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case. Section 57(4) 
provides that any application for the exercise of those powers must be 
made within 28 days of the date of the award or such longer period as 
the parties may agree. Section 57 (5) indicates that any correction of 
an award shall be made within 28 days of the date the application was 
received by the tribunal or, where the correction is made by the tribunal 
on its own initiative, within 28 days of the date of the award or, in either 
case, such longer period as the parties may agree. The `date of award' 
may not always be the date of the (last) signature, but it will often be a 
599 Section 57 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
600 Section 57 (3) (a) of the 1996 Act. 
601 Section 57 (7) of the 1996 Act. 
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date earlier than receipt of notification of the award, and will almost 
always be earlier than receipt of a copy of it. Thus, in practice, the 
applicant will have fewer than 28 days in which to apply. 602 However, 
the time may be extended by the court under Section 79.603 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the parties are not allowed 
to agree that any party may not apply to the tribunal to correct such 
errors, as this right is given by a mandatory rule. In practice it would be 
very rare for the parties to agree to exclude this right, as the parties 
would gain nothing from making such agreement. Additionally, the 
party autonomy would be taken to an extreme if it is elevated over the 
consideration that errors shall be corrected. The Chinese arbitration does 
not allow the parties to agree time limits for applications, and neither the 
tribunal nor the court has power to extend such time limits. I suggest 
that the approach taken by the 1996 Act is dictated by the fact that the 
time limit it sets starts from the date of award, rather than the date of 
602 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,215. 
603 Section 79 of the 1996 Act provides: (1) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the court may by 
order extend any time limit agreed by them in relation to any matter relating to the arbitral 
proceedings or specified in any provision of this Part having effect in default of such 
agreement. This section does not apply to a time limit to which section 12 applies (power of court to 
extend time for beginning arbitral proceedings, &c. ). 
(2) An application for an order may be made- (a) by any party to the arbitral proceedings (upon 
notice to the other parties and to the tribunal), or (b) by the arbitral tribunal (upon notice to the 
parties). 
(3) The court shall not exercise its power to extend a time limit unless it is satisfied-(a) that any 
available recourse to the tribunal, or to any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties 
with power in that regard, has first been exhausted, and (b) that a substantial injustice would 
otherwise be done. (b) that a substantial injustice would otherwise be done. (4) The court's power 
under this section may be exercised whether or not the time has already expired. (5) An order under 
this section may be made on such terms as the court thinks fit. (6) The leave of the court is required 
for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section. 
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receipt of the award, which means that a party has fewer than 28 days in 
which to apply. Therefore, it is unnecessary for Chinese arbitration 
law to give the tribunal and the court the power to extend the time for 
application, as its time limit starts from the date of receipt of award. 
Chinese arbitration law neither requires the applicant to notify the other 
parties nor gives the other parties a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations to the tribunal before a correction is made. The Model 
Law requires the party to notify the other parties when it makes an 
application, and the 1996 Act requires the parties to be given an 
opportunity to make representation before the tribunal. In my view, the 
approach of the 1996 Act in this respect is more better than that of the 
Model Law, as where the other parties are given a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations they will certainly be notified first 
and they also have an opportunity to make representations, which is not 
allowed in the Model Law. Thus Chinese arbitration law would benefit 
from adopting the approach of the 1996 Act. In Chinese arbitration law, 
the parties are free to make their own agreement regarding the time limit 
for a tribunal making a correction. To avoid parties agreeing upon a 
period of time which is unreasonably short and adversely affects the 
conduct of the arbitrators, I suggest that Chinese law should give the 
parties the right only to agree upon a longer period of time, as the 1996 
Act does. Moreover, Chinese arbitration law gives neither the arbitral 
tribunal nor the court the power to extend the time in which it shall 
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make a correction. In my view, if the arbitral tribunal has the power to 
extend the time, the power would potentially be abused and unnecessary 
delay would be caused. Therefore, it is better for the Chinese arbitration 
law to require the arbitral tribunal to apply to the court to extend the 
time where it considers the time limit set by the law too short, as the 
1996 Act does. 
Omissions 
Model Law. Article 33 (3) provides that unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, a party, with notice to the other, may request, within thirty days 
of receipt of the award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award 
as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the 
award. If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall 
make the additional award within sixty days. Article 33(4) gives the 
arbitral tribunal the power to extend the period of time within which it 
shall make an additional award. The provisions of article 31 apply to the 
content and form of an additional award. 604 Again, it is not clear 
whether Article 18 implies that the arbitral tribunal shall give the other 
parties an opportunity to make representations. 
1996 Act. Section 57(3) provides that the tribunal may, on its own 
initiative or on the application of a party, make an additional award in 
604 Article 33 (5) of the Model Law. 
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respect of any claim (including a claim for interest or costs) which was 
presented to the tribunal but was not dealt with in the award. Section 
57(4) indicates that any such application must be made within 28 days 
of the date of the award or such longer period as the parties may agree. 
The period may be extended by the court under s. 79. According to 
s. 57(6), any additional award shall be made within 56 days of the date of 
the original award or such longer period as the parties may agree. Again, 
this time limit may be extended by the court under s. 79. Before making 
an additional award, the other parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations to the arbitral tribunal. 605 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the parties may not 
exclude the right of a party to apply for an additional award. I suggest 
that Chinese arbitration law should adopt the stance of the Model Law 
and the 1996 Act in allowing such exclusion, so that the autonomy of the 
parties would be protected. Again, Chinese arbitration law does not 
require that a party making such an application should notify all other 
parties. Nor does it require the tribunal to give the other parties an 
opportunity to make representations as under the 1996 Act. In my view, 
Chinese law would benefit from adopting the approach of the 1996 Act 
in this regard. Chinese arbitration law allows the parties agree on the 
time in which the arbitral tribunal shall make an additional award. I 
605 Section 57 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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suggest that it should only allow the parties to agree on a period of time 
longer than that laid down by law, as under the 1996 Act. Again, 
neither the arbitral tribunal nor the court may extend time limits under 
Chinese arbitration law. I suggest that it should allow the arbitral 
tribunal to apply to the court to extend such limits, where it considers 
the time limit set by the law too short, as under the 1996 Act. 
Interpretation. 
Model Law. Article 33(1)(b) provides that within thirty days of receipt 
of the award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the 
parties, if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other, may 
request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point 
or part of the award. If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be 
justified, it shall give the interpretation within thirty days of receipt of 
the request. The interpretation shall form part of the award. Article 33(4) 
indicates that the arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of 
time within which it shall make an interpretation. In the drafting process 
it was proposed that this provision be restricted to interpretation "of the 
reasons on which the award is based" rather than of the dispositive part 
of the award. 606 Other delegates suggested its deletion607, since it was 
felt to encourage attempts on the part of both the winner and the loser to 
606 Doc. A/CN. 9/263, p. 45, Article 33, para. 1. Cf. the text at n. 33.01 supra. 607 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 329, para. 41(Tanzania), 44 (German Democratic Republic), 45(Finland), 49 
(Sweden), 50 (Federal Republic of Germany) and 51 (India). 
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change the award, the former to seek to protect the award against 
annulment, the latter to lay a basis for recourse against the award. A 
compromise was reached on the basis that the provision can only be 
invoked with the agreement of both parties. 608 The Chairman indicated 
that the phrase `if so agreed by the parties' meant that the parties should 
either have agreed before the award was made to allow the arbitral 
tribunal to interpret it, or should agree to ask for an interpretation after 
the award was made. 609 It is uncertain whether the parties, by virtue of 
Article 18, should be given an opportunity of making representations 
before the tribunal interprets the award. 
1996 Act. Section 57(3)(a) provides that where the parties have not 
agreed on the powers of the tribunal the tribunal in this regard (which 
agreement might of course be to the effect that it shall have no powers), 
the tribunal may,, on its own initiative, or on the application of a party, 
clarify or remove any ambiguity in the award. This power shall not be 
exercised without first affording the other parties a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations to the tribunal. Any application 
for the exercise of those powers must be made within 28 days of the date 
of the award or such longer period as the parties may agree. 610 However, 
this time may be extended by the court under Section 79. 
608 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 329, para. 45. 
609 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,175. 
610 Section 57 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
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Interpretation shall be made within 28 days of the date the application 
was received by the tribunal or, where the correction is made by the 
tribunal on its own initiative, within 28 days of the date of the award or, 
in either case, such longer period as the parties may agree. 61 
Chinese Law Chinese arbitration law is silent on the issue of 
interpretation. I consider that it should adopt the approach of the 1996 
Act and give the parties the power to ask the tribunal to interpret the 
award, subject to their right to agree to exclude the power. As regards 
the time limit for such application, Chinese law might adopt the 
approach of either the Model Law or the 1996 Act. Chinese arbitration 
law should require the tribunal to give the other parties a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations before making interpretation, and 
permit the arbitral tribunal make interpretations on its own initiative, as 
under the 1996 Act. It should also adopt the stance of the 1996 Act in 
setting a period within which the interpretation must be made, while 
allowing the parties to agree on a longer period and the court to extend 
that period upon application. 
6 Effect of Awards 
Binding effect and termination of the arbitral proceedings 
611 Section 57 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
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Model Law. Article 32(1) provides that the arbitral proceedings are 
terminated by the final award. The point of time of the termination of 
the arbitral proceedings may be relevant, for example, for the 
determination of the running of periods of limitation which, if 
suspended by the institution of arbitral proceedings, would resume upon 
their termination, or in terms of the possibility of instituting legal 
proceedings on the same dispute. 612 An award will not fix that time with 
certainty, as its date is open to rebuttal. 613 A lengthy discussion arose 
about the desirability of adding a definition of the time when an award 
becomes binding and the criteria to be employed in such a definition. A 
number of delegates saw no need for such a provision, although some of 
them saw no objection thereto if a suitable definition were found. 614 
However, the proponents of a definition could not agree on the criteria 
to be employed. The two principal, possible criteria are the date of the 
award and the date on which the award is delivered to the parties. As 
discussed above, the date of the award is a difficult criterion to rely on, 
while the date of delivery would require proof of that fact. Ultimately, 
no provision was added, as it appeared to be impossible to satisfy all 
612 This was, in fact, the reason why the Working Group decided to adopt a provision on termination 
of proceedings, the need for which had been questioned. (Doc. Al CN. 9/245, para. 48). 
613 See Article 31 of the Model Law. 
614 See for details of the discussion Docs. A/CN. 9/SR. 328, paras. 45-48 and SR. 329, paras. 1-25. 
The Commission Report deals with the subject in para. 257. 
345 
points of view. 615 The question when an award became binding then is 
to be determined by the law of the arbitral seat. 616 
Article 32(3) indicates that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal 
terminates with the termination of the arbitral proceedings, subject to the 
provisions of articles 33 and 34(4). 61 If the interpretation of the term 
"final award" includes the decisions of the arbitral tribunal pursuant to 
Arts. 33 and 34(4), the references to those articles in Article 32(3) would 
have been unnecessary. Since Article 33 deals with correction and 
interpretation of the award and the making of additional awards, while 
Article 34(4) deals with the suspension of setting aside proceedings to 
allow the tribunal to take such steps as will eliminate the grounds for 
setting the award aside, the decision or award under those provisions 
would apparently be made later than a final award. Therefore, according 
to Article 32(1), where the tribunal is correcting or interpreting an award 
or making an additional award, or court proceedings for setting aside an 
award are suspended, the arbitral proceedings have been terminated 
already. On the other hand, according to Article 32(3), in those cases, 
the mandate of the arbitral tribunal has not yet terminated. A conflict 
615 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,165. 
616 Broches, Aron, Commentary on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Boston: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990,205. 
617 Article 34 (4) of the Model Law provides that: the court, when set asked to set aside an award, 
may, where appropriate and so requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period 
of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral 
proceedings or to take such other action as in the tribunal's opinion will eliminate the grounds for 
setting aside. 
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thus seemingly arises, but I suggest that the apparent conflict is 
eliminated if in cases where Arts. 33 or 34(4) apply the time of 
termination of the arbitral proceedings is not regarded as the date of the 
"final award", but the time of the decision or award under those articles. 
Consequently, Article 32(1) must be read as if it provides that the 
arbitral proceedings "are terminated by the final award, subject to the 
provisions of Arts. 33 and 34 (4)... etc". In fact, if paragraph (1) had 
been so drafted, paragraph (3) could simply have read: "the mandate of 
the arbitral tribunal terminates with termination of the arbitral 
proceedings. " 
1996 Act. Section 58(1) provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, an award made by the tribunal pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement is final and binding both on the parties and on any persons 
claiming through or under them. Section 58(2) indicates that this does 
not affect the right of a person to challenge the award by any available 
arbitral process of appeal or review or in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act. While the Act does not explicitly state when an award 
becomes binding, since it requires an award to contain its date, it is 
presumably that date on which the award becomes binding. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, an award is binding and 
the parties are not at liberty to agree otherwise. Chinese arbitration law 
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provides clearly that an award becomes binding on the date on which the 
award is made. I consider it is rational to deprive the parties of the right 
to agree that the award is not binding, since it is surely the essence of an 
award that it finally disposes of the issue. Moreover, it is preferable for 
the law rules to make explicit provision as to when an award becomes 
binding, so that the parties and the arbitrators can easily be aware of that 
fact. 
Enforceability 
Model Law. Article 35 (1) provides that an arbitral award, irrespective 
of the country in which it was made, upon application in writing to the 
competent court, shall be enforced subject to the provisions of Articles 
35 and 36.618 Article 35 (2) continues that the party relying on an award 
618 Article 36 of the Model Law - Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement 1. Recognition or 
enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be refused 
only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent 
court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof that: (i) a party to the arbitration agreement 
referred to in Article 7 was under some incapacity. or the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made. or (ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitrator proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case. or (iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be 
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced. or (iv) the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place. 
or (v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a 
court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. or (b) if the court 
finds that: (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law 
of this State. or (ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of this State. 2. If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court 
referred to in paragraph (1) (a) (v) of this Article, the court where recognition or enforcement is 
sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the party 
claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate 
security. 
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or applying for its enforcement shall supply the duly authenticated 
original award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the original 
arbitration agreement referred to in Article 7 or a duly certified copy 
thereof. If the award or agreement is not made in an official language of 
the enforcing State, the party shall supply a duly certified translation 
thereof into such language. The Model Law does not prescribe the 
procedure to be followed in order to enforce an award, leaving this to be 
determined by national procedural law. 619 The Working Group agreed 
that the award should be enforced by the court designated by such 
procedural law "since the function envisaged here was one of 
enforcement for which States have well established systems of 
competence ". 620 
1996 Act. Section 66(1) provides that an award may, by leave of the 
court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the 
court to the same effect. Section 66(2) indicates that where leave is so 
given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award. Apparently, two 
cumulative methods of enforcement of an award are available under 
these sections. The first is that the applicant may apply directly to 
enforce the award in the same manner as a judgment. If leave is given, 
the applicant may seek execution of the award as if it were a judgment, 
619 Cf. Article III of the New York Convention which provides for enforcement "in accordance with 
the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon". 
620 Report of fourth session of Working Group, Doc. A/CN. 9/264, p. 76, para. 4. 
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without actually obtaining a judgment. The second method, where leave 
has been given, is to apply for an actual judgment in terms of the award. 
There may be advantages in the latter process. For example, the 
applicant seek enforcement or recognition of the judgment in a foreign 
court, or may rely on the judgment as a judicial resolution of the issues 
that prevents any further action being brought in a foreign court. 621 
Section 66(3) provides that leave to enforce an award shall not be given 
where, or to the extent that, the person against whom it is sought to be 
enforced shows that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction to make 
the award. 622 Where that defence is successfully raised, the award 
cannot be enforced. Otherwise, the use of the word `may' indicates that 
the court is not required to order enforcement in every case, but has a 
discretion whether to grant or refuse leave. While there are a number of 
other obvious situations in which the person against whom enforcement 
is sought may successfully oppose the grant of leave to enforce the 
award, it was considered that the provision of a non-exhaustive list of 
such grounds would be unsatisfactory, since parties might think that 
matters not mentioned were not covered. Therefore, instead of providing 
a non-exhaustive list, the section gives the court an unfettered discretion 
to grant or withhold leave to enforce in relation to objections made on a 
621 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,243. 
622 Section 66 (3) of the 1996 Act. 
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basis other than lack of substantive jurisdiction. 
623 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the Model Law, and the 
1996 Act, an award is enforceable and the parties are not allowed to 
agree otherwise. In terms of procedure, under Chinese law, the only 
method of enforcement by a party is applying to the court for 
enforcement. It has been seen that the 1996 Act provides two methods of 
enforcement. In light of the advantages of obtaining a judgment in terms 
of the award, Chinese arbitration law might benefit from adopting the 
approach of the 1996 Act to this issue. 
D. Powers to Make Other Orders 
1. Power to make orders to terminate the arbitral proceedings 
Model Law. Article 32 (1) provides that the arbitral proceedings are 
terminated by an order of the arbitral tribunal, while Article 32 (2) 
indicates the circumstances in which the tribunal shall issue such an 
order. The first is where the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the 
respondent objects thereto and the arbitral tribunal recognizes a 
legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the 
dispute. The second is where the parties agree on the termination of the 
623 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,243-244. 
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proceedings. While at one time it was proposed to allow the parties to 
terminate the proceedings by agreement, it was conceded that as a 
matter of legal principle and in order to be consistent with Art. 30, only 
the arbitral tribunal should have power to terminate the proceedings, so 
that the agreement by the parties to terminate is thus made one of the 
bases for an order to that effect of the arbitral tribunal. 624 The third is 
where the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings 
has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible. It was not 
clear why the arbitral tribunal, having made that finding, should 
nevertheless have the right to permit a continuation of the proceedings 
which could only be a waste of time and money. 
1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not address the above issue. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, if the claimant withdraws his 
claim before the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the Secretary-General of 
the Arbitration agency shall decide whether to terminate the arbitral 
proceedings. If the claimant withdraws his claim after the arbitral 
tribunal is constituted, the tribunal shall decide whether to terminate the 
arbitral proceedings. In my view, the tribunal's discretion is too wide, as 
where the claimant wants to withdraw the claim, if respondent does not 
object and the arbitral tribunal does not recognize a legitimate interest 
624 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 329, para. 26. It became subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2). 
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on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute, it is not clear 
why the arbitral proceedings should be continued. Moreover, I consider 
that where the parties agree on the termination or the tribunal finds that 
continuation of the arbitral proceedings has become unnecessary, or 
impossible, the arbitral tribunal should terminate the proceedings. 
Therefore, I suggest the Chinese arbitration law should adopt the stance 
of the Model Law and restrict the discretion of the arbitral tribunal 
accordingly. 
2. Power to make provisional orders 
Model Law. As the framers of the Model Law could not know the range 
of orders available within a state which chose to adopt the Model Law, it 
does not give the arbitral tribunal the power to make provisional orders. 
1996 Act. Section 39(1) states that the parties are free to agree that the 
tribunal shall have power to order on a provisional basis any relief 
which it would have power to grant in a final award, s. 39(4) making it 
clear that, unless the parties agree to confer this power on the tribunal, it 
has no such power. The 1996 Act does not give any indication as to how 
the tribunal's discretion in this regard should be exercised, but it is clear 
that the arbitrators may exercise this power in a manner which may 
diverge from the approach a court would take as regards the making of 
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provisional orders, as long as it fulfills its general duties under 
s. 33. Section 39(2) provides some examples of provisional orders: a 
provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of 
property as between the parties, or an order to make an interim payment 
on account of the costs of the arbitration. It is clearly not exclusive. The 
tribunal should generally be cautious about using any such power, for if 
liability may not be clearly determined where a provisional order is 
sought, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which it would be 
fair to make one, and there is a possibility that long- term injustice could 
be caused. For example, if after a provisional order for the payment of 
money was made and complied with, it was found that in fact a smaller 
sum was due, the respondent might not be able to obtain reimbursement 
because the claimant has become impecunious. 625 Section 39 (4) also 
provides that the power to make provisional awards does not affect its 
powers under s. 47 (awards on different issues). It can be seen that the 
Act specifically distinguishes between provisional orders and awards on 
different issues pursuant to s. 47. The word `provisional' has no doubt 
been carefully chosen to avoid the use of `interim', as an interim award 
is nevertheless final as regards the matters which it determines. It 
follows that although the marginal note to the Act refers to `provisional 
awards', what the section in fact concerns should properly be termed 
`provisional orders'. The terminology is important since the power 
625 Hais, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3rd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,163-164. 
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under s. 39 is subject to later adjustment, whereas awards, unless. 
otherwise agreed, are `final and binding'. Since the power is to make an 
`order', s. 52 which deals with the form of awards does not apply here. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not give the arbitral tribunal 
the power to make provisional awards and the parties may not confer 
that power by agreement. Since such a power is useful for the tribunal to 
arbitrate economic disputes impartially and promptly, I suggest that 
Chinese arbitration law should adopt the stance of the 1996 Act and give 
the tribunal such power. 
IV. Conclusion 
It has been suggested that while in Chinese arbitration law, the tribunal 
has the power to conciliate on its own initiative, to protect the autonomy 
of the parties it might require that the tribunal should conciliate only if 
both parties desire it, or one party so desires and the other party agrees. 
Neither the Model Law nor the Act says anything about conciliation. Yet 
as conciliation is a well established form of dispute resolution in China 
in a way that is not yet the case with arbitration, Chinese law cannot 
afford to ignore this subject. It goes without saying that in Chinese legal. 
culture the assumption by the tribunal of the role of conciliator is not 
regarded as inimical to its role as impartial adjudicator. Secondly, 
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Chinese arbitration law is silent about any power to interpret ambiguities 
in an award, even though in practice the tribunal may make such 
interpretation. To improve the law, it is beneficial for Chinese law to 
adopt the stance of the 1996 Act allowing the tribunal to make such 
interpretation unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Thirdly, in Chinese 
arbitration law the court has no_ power to extend the time within which 
an arbitral award, or an application for correction or an actual correction, 
shall be made. Since sometimes, the time agreed by the parties or 
provided by law is too limited, the tribunal or the parties may need 
recourse to a longer time. Chinese arbitration law might thus usefully 
adopt the approach of the 1996 Act and allow the court to extend such 
periods. Fourthly, the 1996 Act allows the court not only to enforce an 
award in the same manner as a judgment, but also issue a judgment in 
terms of the award. Since the second method of enforcement has the 
advantages which the first lacks, Chinese law should adopt this 
approach. Finally, under the 1996 Act, the arbitral tribunal is allowed to 
withhold an arbitral award in case of non-payment of fees, while the 
court may order the tribunal to deliver the award on the payment into 
court by the applicant. This seems an effective means of obliging 
payment, and since Chinese arbitration law lacks such means, it is 




Ater an arbitral award is made, any dissenting party is entitled to 
challenge it. Whether the challenge is justified depends on the applicable 
procedural law. If the challenge is thus justified, the award may be set 
aside or be subject to any other remedy available under the applicable 
law. Moreover, while a losing party will usually comply with the award 
conscientiously, sometimes that party may refuse to comply. In this case, 
the winning party is entitled to apply to the court to enforce the award. 
r 
This chapter aims to discuss the grounds and procedures for challenging 
an award, adopting the viewpoint that resisting enforcement of an award 
is a type of challenge. It will also consider the possibility of remitting 
challengeable awards for reconsideration by the tribunal. As ever, the 
Chinese approach as to the above questions will be considered, and 
compared with the approach taken in English Law and the Model Law. 
I. The Chinese Approach to Challenging Awards 
According to the Arbitration Law and the Civil Procedural Law, there 
are three sorts of arbitration award - domestic awards, foreign-related 
awards, and foreign awards. 
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A. Cancellation of Awards 
1. Grounds for cancellation 
Domestic Awards. Neither the Arbitration Law or the Civil Procedural 
Law clearly defines domestic awards. However, in both of these laws 
there are special provisions dealing with Foreign-related awards626 
Accordingly, Chinese awards which are not foreign-related must be 
domestic awards. Moreover, the `Opinion as to Several Problems about 
Application of the Civil Procedural Law' of the SPC states that a 
domestic award is an award which fulfills the following requirements: it 
is made in Mainland China; the parties, whether natural persons, legal 
persons, or other organizations must be Chinese; the creation, 
modification, and termination of the juridical relation must happen 
within China; the object of arbitration shall be within China. 627 Article 
58 of the Arbitration Law provides that the parties may apply to the 
court for cancellation of an award if they provide evidence proving that 
the award involves one of the following circumstances: 
a. there is no arbitration agreement between the parties; 
626 Part VII, `Special provisions on Foreign-Related Arbitration', of the Chinese Arbitration Law 
1994. Chapter XVIII, `Arbitration', Part IV, 'Special Provisions on Foreign-related Civil Lawsuit', of 
the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC 1991. 
627 Section 304 of `Opinion on Application of the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC' by SPC, Law 
Issue No. 22 (1992), July 14,1992. 
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b. the matters of the award are beyond the extent of the arbitration 
agreement or not within the jurisdiction of the arbitration commission; 
c. the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure 
is contrary to law; 
d. the evidence on which the award is based is falsified; 
e. the other party has concealed evidence which is sufficient to affect the 
impartiality of the award; and 
f. the arbitrator(s) has (have) demanded or. accepted bribes, committed 
graft or perverted the law in making the arbitral award. 
The peoples' court shall cancel the award if the existence of one of the 
circumstances prescribed in the preceding clause is confirmed by its 
collegiate bench. The people's court shall also cancel the award if it 
holds that the award is contrary to the social and public interests. 
Foreign-related Awards. According to the Civil Procedural and 
Arbitration Laws, an award made by a foreign-related arbitration 
institution or foreign-related arbitration agency is a foreign-related 
arbitration award. Thus under both Laws, the question whether an 628 
award is foreign-related depends on the arbitration institution or agency 
by which the award is made. Yet the SPC issued `Opinion as to Several 
Problems on Enforcement of Civil Procedural Law', on July 14 `x', 1992. 
This provides that an award is foreign-related only if one or more party 
628 Article 257-260 of the Civil Procedural Law (1991). Article 66-68,72 of the Arbitration Law ` 
(1994). 
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is a foreigner, stateless person, foreign corporation or organization; or if 
the creation, modification, ' or termination of the legal relation happens in 
a foreign country; or if the object of arbitration is within a foreign 
country. 629 It can be seen that there is a conflict between the two laws 
and the Opinion made by the SPC. Chinese law lacks any device for the 
resolution of such conflict. In practice arbitrators tend to be guided by 
the views of the SPC, but the theoretical position is unclear. 
Article 70 of the Arbitration Law states that the court shall cancel an 
award if a party provides evidence proving that the arbitration award 
involves one of the circumstances prescribed in Clause 1 of Article 260 
of the Civil Procedural Law. These are: (1) there is no written 
arbitration agreement; (2) the party against whom the application 
for enforcement is made was not given notice for the appointment 
of an arbitrator or for the inception of the arbitration proceedings 
or was unable to. present his case due to causes for which he is not 
responsible; (3) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the 
arbitral procedure was not in conformity with the arbitration rules; 
or (4) the matters dealt with by the award fall outside the scope of 
the arbitration agreement or the power of the tribunal. 
629 'Opinion on Application of the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC' by SPC, Law Issue No. 22 
(1992), July 14,1992. 
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Foreign Awards. A party is entitled to apply to the court to cancel a 
foreign award under the Washington Convention. The combined effect 
of Articles 53(1), 54(1) and 55 is that, the grounds on which a party may 
apply to the court of the country in which enforcement is sought are that 
the award is contrary to the public policy, or public interest of that 
country, or that the award involves a issue of state immunity. 
Interim Award. The Arbitration Law does not state explicitly whether a 
party is entitled to challenge an interim award. However, in `Guangzhou 
President Hotel Ltd. v. Fast & Care Cargo Services'630, the hotel asked 
the intermediate court of Shenzhen to cancel an interim award. The 
court held that an interim award is essentially a procedural ruling, while 
an arbitration award capable of challenge under Article 70 of the 
Arbitration Law or Article 260 of the Civil Procedural Law refers to a 
final award. Thus the legality of an interim award is outwith the scope of 
investigation of the court, and the application to cancel the interim 
award had to be rejected. 631 It can therefore be seen that an interim 
award cannot be challenged under Chinese arbitration law. 
2. Procedure for cancellation 
630 Guangzhou President Hotel Ltd. v. Fast & Care Cargo Services, (1999), heard by the 
Intermediate Court of Shnezhen, Second Economic Tribunal, No. 164. 
631 Han, Jian, Theory and Practice on Modem International Commercial Law, Beijing: Law Press, 
2000,357-358. Ha 
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Domestic awards. Under Article 58 of the Arbitration Law the 
competent court in an application to cancel a domestic award is the 
intermediate court of the place where the arbitration agency is situated. 
Article 59 provides that an application must be submitted within 6 
months of receipt of the award. Article 60 then indicates that the court 
shall cancel the award or reject the application, within 2 months of 
receipt of the application. 
Foreign-related awards. The competent court is the intermediate court 
of the place in which the arbitration institution is located632. The time 
limit within which an application for cancellation of foreign-related 
awards and that within which the court shall render its decision are the 
same as those apply to domestic awards. 
Remitting awards for reconsideration. The Arbitration law allows the 
court which receives an application for cancellation of a domestic or a 
foreign-related award to direct that the case be reconsidered by the 
arbitral tribunal. The court must give the tribunal a certain period of 
time to take this step, and must suspend the cancellation procedure in 
the meantime. If the tribunal refuses to re-arbitrate, the court shall 
resume the cancellation procedure. 633 However, it is unclear how long 
632 Article 58 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
633 
Article 61 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994. 
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shall `a certain period of time' is, and there is no clue as to how that 
question may be decided. 
3. Theories of canceling awards 
shall `a certain period of time' is, and there is no clue as to how that 
question may be decided. 
3. Theories of canceling awards 
Theory of the opposing system of canceling awards. Opponents of 
system of canceling awards claim that there should be no difference 
between grounds for canceling awards and those for refusing 
recognition and enforcement of awards. If a party disagrees with an 
award, he may challenge the process of enforcement of the award, and 
the enforcing court may investigate the award at that stage. Thus, there 
is no need for a process of canceling awards, which effectively ensures 
double supervision of arbitral awards. Even if an arbitral tribunal makes 
computational, clerical or typographical errors, it can itself correct these 
on the application of the parties or of its own motion. In this case, a 
process of canceling awards is also unnecessary. Moreover, if there is a 
process of canceling awards, the dispute is actually not only referred to 
arbitration but also is dealt with by legal proceedings, which is contrary 
to the principle that a dispute should be dealt with by arbitration only or 
litigation only, and the principle that a dispute shall be resolved by a 
single, final arbitral award. 634 
Theory Supporting System of Canceling Awards. Supporters of the 
system of canceling awards suggest first, that Chinese arbitration law 
634 See `Explanation about the Chinese Arbitration Law (Draft)', in `A Complete Set of Material 
about the Chinese Arbitration Law' compiled by the Section of Civil Law of Legal Working 
Committee of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the Department of 
Secretary of Chinese International Economy and Trade Arbitration Agency, Publishing Company of 
Law, 1995,56. 
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should reflect the reality of China. At present in China the number of 
arbitration agencies is too large, the qualifications of arbitrators are not 
very high, and the rules of arbitration need to be improved. Therefore, 
after an arbitral award is made, court supervision is necessary. 
Supervision at the stage of enforcement is not enough and a process of 
canceling awards is necessary. Secondly, canceling awards and refusing 
enforcement are two different procedures and cannot be regarded as the 
same legal simply because they proceed on similar grounds. Thirdly, in 
most of countries in the world, the grounds of canceling awards and 
refusing their enforcement are actually different. Fourthly, maintaining a 
procedure for canceling awards suits the requirement of the system of 
arbitration, and is in accordance with current trends, being consistent 
635 with the arbitration regimes of most of countries in the world. 
The above seems to be the prevailing opinion. The Director of Legal 
Working Committee of Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress, Gu Angran, observed in `Explanation about the Chinese 
Arbitration Law (Draft)' that stipulation of a procedure for cancelling 
awards can help protect the legal interests of the parties and reduce 
mistakes in conduct of arbitration. The laws of many other countries 
635 See 'Explanation about the Chinese Arbitration Law (Draft)', published in 'A Complete Set of 
Material about the Chinese Arbitration Law' compiled by the Section of Civil Law of Legal Working 
Committee of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the Department of 
Secretary of Chinese International Economy and Trade Arbitration Agency, Beijing: Publishing 
Company of Law, 1995,56-57. 
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have stipulated procedures for cancelling awards. 
636 
Theoretical Underpinning of the Remitting Awards for 
Reconsideration. Where the award goes beyond the scope of the 
arbitration agreement does not resolved some matters submitted to 
arbitration, canceling the award is a very negative outcome. In the latter 
case part of the dispute still needs to be resolved, while in the former 
only part of the award is objectionable. Remitting awards for 
reconsideration takes less time than bringing the dispute to arbitration 
anew or referring it to litigation. Thus the process is more efficient. 
There are two criteria for remitting awards for reconsideration - the 
court considers the award capable of remission, and that the 
challengeable award is apt for reconsideration by the arbitral tribunal. 
The former depends on the court's discretion, which is a subjective 
criterion; the latter is an objective criterion, which also depends on the 
judge's estimation and also forms the basis of the exercise of the court's 
discretion. 
636 See `Explanation about the Chinese Arbitration Law (Draft)', published in `A Complete Set of 
Material about the Chinese Arbitration Law' compiled by the Section of Civil Law of Legal Working 
Committee of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the Department of 
Secretary of Chinese International Economy and Trade Arbitration Agency, Beijing: Publishing 
Company of Law, 1995,56. 
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B. Refusal of Enforcement 
1. Grounds for Refusing Enforcement. 
Domestic Awards. Article 217 of the Civil Procedural Law states that 
the people's court refuse enforcement if it is established that: 
a. There was no arbitration agreement; 
b. The matter being adjudicated does not fall within the arbitration 
agreement or the arbitration organ's authority; 
c. The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitral procedure. 
violates the law 
d. The crucial evidence is found to be insufficient; 
e. The application of the law is found to be erroneous; 
f. The arbitrator is found to have taken bribes, conducted malpractice, 
or misused the law in rendering the award 
The court may also refuse enforcement if it would not be in the public 
interest. 
Foreign-related Awards. Article 71 of the 1994 Arbitration Law of 
PRC provides that the court shall not enforce a foreign-related award if 
the party against whom an application is made provides evidence 
proving that the arbitration award involves one of the circumstances 
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prescribed in Clause 1, Article 260 of the Civil Procedural Law. 
It can be seen that the grounds for challenging foreign-related awards 
are looser than those for challenging domestic awards. The party to a 
domestic award may challenge the award on the grounds that the 
evidence on which the award is based is false; or that the other party has 
concealed evidence which is sufficient to affect the impartiality of the 
award; or that the arbitrator(s) has (have) demanded or accepted bribes, 
committed graft or perverted the law in making the arbitral award, 
whereas a party to a foreign-related award is not entitled to challenge the 
award on those grounds. In other words, a party to a foreign-related 
award is not entitled to challenge the award on substantive grounds. 
Foreign Awards. 
New York Convention 1958. Article 269 of the Civil Procedural Law 
provides that where a verdict rendered by a foreign arbitration 
organization requires a Chinese court to acknowledge its validity and 
enforce it, the applicant must apply to the intermediate court where the 
losing party resides or his property is situated. The court shall then act 
according to the international treaties to which China is a party, or in 
accordance with the principle of mutual reciprocity. It can be seen that 
whether an award is a foreign one depends on whether the award is 
made by a foreign arbitration agency, which is inconsistent with the 
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common approach of international arbitration laws and practice. For 
example, the New York Convention of 1958 applies to the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other 
than the State where recognition and enforcement is sought. It also 
applies to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State 
where recognition and enforcement is sought. 637 These different criteria 
as to what is a foreign award cause no practical problem where an award 
may is made by a foreign arbitration agency, but within the country in 
which recognition and enforcement is sought. In this case, in accordance 
with the New York Convention, the award shall not be deemed a foreign 
award, unless the country in which the recognition and enforcement is 
sought does not consider the award domestic. Chinese law does not 
consider such an award domestic, thus the New York Convention applies. 
However, a problem arises where an award is made by a Chinese 
arbitration agency outwith China. The award is. deemed domestic under 
Chinese law, but foreign under the New York Convention. In this case, a 
conflict would then arise, which is whether the rules in Chinese 
arbitration law regarding domestic awards or the New York Convention 
which deals with foreign awards shall apply. Thus such an award would 
be subject to the rather stricter regime which governs domestic award. I 
recommend that Chinese law should fall in line with the New York 
Convention. 
637 Article 1 (1) of the New York Convention 1958. 
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Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the 
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party 
furnishes to the court where the recognition and enforcement is sought 
can proof one of the grounds provided by the New York Convention. 
Bilateral Judicial aid Agreements. China has made bilateral judicial 
agreements with many countries so far and most of the agreements 
contain bilateral agreements for recognition and enforcement. 638 Most 
of those agreements have clearly provided that the New York 
Convention shall apply to mutual recognition and enforcement of 
awards of the countries who have made the agreement. In fact, most of 
those countries who have made the agreements are themselves member 
states to the New York Convention. For example, Article 26 of the 
Bilateral Civil and Criminal Judicial Agreement between Greece and 
China states that each of the two countries shall recognize and enforce 
arbitral awards on commercial disputes made by the other country 
according to the New York Convention, unless the country has made a 
declaration or reservation. Equally, Article 28 of the Bilateral Civil 
Judicial Agreement between Italy and China provides that an arbitral 
638 Since China has made the first bilateral judicial agreement with France regarding Civil and 
Commercial matters on May 4`h, 1997, China has made more than 30 bilateral judicial agreements 
with states, including Poland, Belgium, Mongolia, Italy, Roumania, Russia, White Russia, Kazakstan, 
Ukraine, Cuba, Spain, Bulgaria, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary, Morocco, 
Kirghizia, Singapore. 
370 
award made in one country shall be recognized and enforced in the other 
country according to the New York Convention 1958. Therefore, in 
these circumstances, performance of the bilateral judicial agreement 
turns to be performance of the New York Convention. 
A few bilateral judicial agreements have not provided that the New York 
Convention shall apply, but have their own regulations regarding 
recognition and enforcement of awards. For example, Article 26 of the 
Bilateral Commercial and Criminal Judicial Agreement between Turkey 
and China provides that, besides the other provisions in Section 3 of the 
chapter, an arbitral award fulfilling the following requirements shall be 
recognized and enforced: 
(1)according to the law of the country of the applicant, the arbitral 
award deals with a contractual or non-contractual commercial dispute. 
(2) There is a written agreement that the parties are willing to refer a 
specific dispute or a dispute arising from a specific legal relation to an 
arbitration agency. The award is made by the arbitration agency 
mentioned above is within its jurisdiction as provided by the arbitration 
agreement. 
(3) According to the law of the place of the party against whom 
recognition and enforcement is sought, the arbitration agreement is 
valid. 
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The Principle of Reciprocity. Article 219 of the Civil Procedural Law, 
indicates that where the state of the applicant has no international treaty 
or bilateral judicial agreement with China, China may recognize or 
enforce a foreign award according to principle of reciprocity. The 
principle of reciprocity is simply a principle, so that no detailed rules are 
attached thereto. 
Procedure for Refusing Enforcement. 
Domestic Awards. Article 217 of the Civil Procedural Law provides 
that where a party fails to carry out an award, the other party may seek 
its enforcement in the competent court, without indicating which court is 
competent. However, Article 256 of `Opinion as to Several Problems on 
Enforcement of Civil Procedural Law' 639 indicates that arbitration 
awards fall within the concept of `other legal documents' recognized by 
Article 207 (2) of the Civil Procedural law. This states that `other legal 
documents' shall be executed by the court in the place where the person 
concerned resides or where the property concerned is located. Article 
207 (1) provides that a civil judgment shall be executed by the court of 
first instance. The combined effect of the above provisions is that, as 
regard enforcement of domestic awards, the competent court is the court 
of first instance in the place where the person against whom the award is 
639 'Opinion on Application of the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC' by SPC, Law Issue No. 22 
(1992), July 14,1992. 
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made resides, or the place where the property concerned is located. 
Article 219 of the Civil Procedural Law states that the time limit for 
requesting enforcement is one year where at least one party is an 
individual, but six months where both parties are enterprises or 
organizations. The time limit specified in the preceding paragraph shall 
be computed from theýlast day of the period of performance prescribed 
by the award. Where the award demands that performance to be carried 
out at different periods, the time limit shall be computed from the last 
day of each performance period as prescribed. These time limits apply to 
request for enforcement of domestic awards, foreign-related awards, 
foreign awards. There is no time limit for the court to make its ruling. 
Foreign-related Awards. Article 259 of the Civil procedural Law states 
that if one party fails to implement a foreign-related award, the other 
party may apply for enforcement in the intermediate court in the place 
where the object of the application resides, or where the property is 
located. There is no rule in Chinese arbitration law as to the time limit 
within which the ruling on enforcement must be made, or as to the time 
limit within which the enforcement shall be finished. 
It is notable that a `Report System' applies to refusing enforcement of, 
foreign-related awards. The SPC issued `Notice of Problems Relating to 
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Treatment of the People's Court as to Foreign-related Awards and 
Foreign Awards' on August 28`h, 1995640. By virtue of this Notice, where 
a party applies for enforcement of a foreign-related award, if the court 
finds one of the grounds provided by Article 260 of the Civil Procedural 
Law to be established, rather than refusing enforcement, the court shall 
report to the higher court of that area, which shall investigate the award. 
If the higher court agrees that enforcement should be refused, it shall 
report its opinion to the SPC. Only after the SPC replies, can the court 
refuse to enforce the award. The Report System applies to not only 
foreign-related awards but also foreign awards. 
Foreign Awards. Bilateral Judicial Agreement. As to refusal of 
enforcement of a foreign awards by virtue of bilateral judicial agreement, 
the appropriate court is as before. The same is true of time limits for 
making applications. As regards the time limit for making a ruling, 
where a bilateral judicial agreement provides that the New York 
Convention applies, the time limit which applies to a New York 
Convention Award shall apply. Where a bilateral judicial agreement does 
not provide that the New York Convention applies, Chinese arbitration 
law contains no rule as to time limits. The `Report System' again applies 
in this context. 
640 'Notice on the Issues that People's Courts Treat Foreign-Related Awards and Foreign Arbitral 
Matters' by the SPC, Law Issue No. 18 (1995), August 28,1995 
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II. Suggested Improvements to Chinese Law 
1. In deciding whether an arbitral award is foreign-related or not, the 
rules of the Civil Procedural Law and the 1994 Arbitration Law of PRC 
are different from the rules of `Opinion as to Several Problems on 
Enforcement of Civil Procedural Law'. The conflict between the 
different rules should be resolved. 
2. Whether an arbitral award is foreign should not depend on which 
arbitration agency makes the award, but on in which country the award 
is made, so that the conflict between the rules of Chinese arbitration law 
and the rules of the New York Convention can be avoided. 
3. As to domestic awards and foreign-related awards, the Chinese 
arbitration law does not provide the time limit within which an 
application for refusal of enforcement shall be made or the time limit 
within which the enforcement shall be finished. 
4. As to foreign awards to which the New York Convention does not 
apply, Chinese arbitration law does not stipulate a time limit within 
which a ruling on enforcement or a ruling of refusal of enforcement 
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shall be made, or the time limit within which the enforcement shall be 
finished. 
5. It is not clear whether an arbitral award can be cancelled in part. 
III. The Approach of the Laws Operating in the UK 
A. Introduction 
As ever it is useful to refer to the United Kingdom for a paradigm which 
offers two models for consideration - the 1996 Arbitration Act and the 
Model Law. Chinese arbitration law, the Model Law, and the 1996 Act 
all give the parties the right to challenge an arbitral award. There are 
similarities among the three laws as to the grounds and procedures for 
challenging awards, and remedies for challengeable awards. Since 
there are differences in culture and tradition, there are differences 
between the three laws as to the detail of challenging an award. One 
main difference relates to remedies for challengeable awards. There is 
also difference in the grounds and procedures for challenging awards. 
Another main difference is that only in the1996 Act, the court may, on 
the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the 
other party to provide security. 
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B. Cancellation of Awards 
1. Grounds for cancellation 
Incapacity and invalidity 
Model Law. By virtue of Article 34, the only recourse against an award 
is via an action for setting aside641, although a party is not precluded 
from defending himself by resisting recognition and enforcement under 
Article 36in proceedings initiated by the other party. 642 The reason why 
the Working Group did not consider refusal of recognition and 
enforcement as a form of "recourse" is that the term "recourse" has in a 
number of languages the connotation of a positive initiative or action, 
such as an "appeal ", 
643 
Article 34 (1) of the Model Law provides that recourse to a court against 
an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside 
in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article. Article 34 (2) 
provides the grounds on which an award may be set aside. These 
grounds are divided into two groups. Some grounds are required to be 
proved by the applicant, whereas the others are required to be found by 
the court. The importance of the distinction is not only that the applicant 
641 Doc. A/CN. 9/232, para. 14. 
642 Doc. A/CN. 9/246, para. 274. 
643 Doc. A/CN. 9/246, para. 197. 
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is not required as a legal matter to allege these grounds, but also that the 
court may set aside an award notwithstanding that the applicant is 
affected by waiver or estoppel under Articles 4 or 16644 
Article 34(2)(a)(i) provides that an arbitral award may be set aside by 
the court only if the party making the application furnishes proof that: 
a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under 
some incapacity; or 
the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of this 
State (i. e the state which has adopted the Model Law). 
The final report on the Model Law records that "it was understood that 
an award might be set aside on any of the grounds listed in paragraph (2) 
irrespective of whether such ground had materially affected the 
644 Article 4- Waiver of right to object. A party who knows that any provision of this Law from 
which the parties may derogate or any requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been 
complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such 
non-compliance without undue delay or, if a time-limit is provided therefor, within such period of 
time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to object. Article 16 - Competence of arbitral tribunal 
to rule on its jurisdiction 1. The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an 
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the 
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall 
not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. 2. A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not 
have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is 
not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the 
appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority 
shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the 
arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the 
delay justified. 3. The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article 
either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a 
preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having 
received notice of that ruling, the court specified in Article 6 to decide the matter, which decision 
shall be subject to no appeal. while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the 
arbitral proceedings and make an award. 
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award. s645 Nevertheless, Article 34(2) indicates that the court "may" 
rather than "must" set the award aside, when any of the grounds are 
proved646, so that the court has discretion to decline to set aside an 
award, where it considers that a procedural defect is unimportant. One 
must bear in mind the effect of waiver in this context. If a party believes 
that the arbitration agreement is invalid, he should raise a plea of no 
jurisdiction before the tribunal under Article 16(2). If he fails to do so, 
the travaux preparatoires comment that647: "he should be precluded 
from raising objections with respect to the existence or validity or scope 
of the arbitration agreement also in other contexts ... in particular the 
post-award stage, i. e. Article 34(2)(a)(i)". Nonetheless, "it was 
recognized that the failure to raise a plea could not have the effect of a 
waiver in all circumstances, especially where the plea... was that the 
dispute was non-arbitrable or that the award was in conflict with public 
policy". 648 In the end it was decide not to attempt to deal specifically 
with this matter, leaving the question to be interpreted or regulated by 
states adopting the Model Law 649 It submitted that beyond arbitrability 
and public policy, the waiver principle should apply. 650 
645 U. N. A/40/17, para. 303. 
646 See U. N. A/CN. 9/SR. 318, para 65. 
647 U. N. A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 50, para. 16. 
648 U. N. A/40/17, para. 288. 
649 U. N. A/40/17, para. 289. 
650 Davidson, Fraser P., Arbitration, Edinburgh: W. Green, 2000,370.. 
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1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not cite a party's lack of capacity or the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement as specific grounds for 
challenging awards. Yet it may be assumed that incapacity is a form of 
invalidity. Section 30(1)(a) states that an arbitral tribunal may rule on 
whether there is a valid arbitration agreement when it rules on its own 
substantive jurisdiction. Thus, if the arbitration agreement is invalid, the 
tribunal will lack substantive jurisdiction. Section 67(1) provides that a 
party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to 
the tribunal) apply to the court challenging any award of the arbitral 
tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction; or seek an order declaring an 
award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in whole or 
in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law also stipulates the invalidity of 
the arbitration agreement as a ground of challenge without specifically 
mentioning incapacity. However, by virtue of Article 17 (2) of the 
Arbitration Law 651, "incapacity" is included in "invalidity". Thus 
Chinese arbitration law need make no amendment in this regard. 
Lack of proper notice or being unable to present case 
Model Law. Article 34(a)(ii) states that it is a ground of challenge that 
651 Article 17 (2) of the Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994 provides that an arbitration agreement is 
invalid if the arbitration agreement concluded by persons without or with limited capacity for civil 
acts. 
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the party making the application was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case. It is clear that in arbitral 
proceedings with more than one arbitrator failure to give proper notice 
of the appointment of any one of them constitutes a ground for setting 
aside an award. 652 The first part of the provision contemplates the 
situation where a party cannot present his case because he has not had 
sufficient advance warning of an arbitrator's appointment or of the 
proceedings generally. 653 Under Article 3(a) any written communication 
is deemed to have received, if it is delivered to the addressee personally 
or if it is delivered at his place of business, habitual residence or mailing 
address; if none of these can be found after making a reasonable inquiry, 
a written communication is deemed to have been received if it is sent to 
the addressee's last-known place of business, habitual residence or 
mailing address by registered letter or any other means which provides a 
record of the attempt to deliver it. It is therefore possible that a party 
may take no part in the proceedings, indeed being ignorant of the 
appointment of the tribunal, the arbitral proceedings and even the 
making of the award, without the validity of the award being threatened, 
provided communications have addressed to him as indicated by Article 
652 Commission Report, para. 286. 
653 See the English case The Myron [1970] 1 Q. B. 527. See Davidson, Fraser P., Arbitration, 
Edinburgh: W. Green, 2000,368. 
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3 654 The second part of the provision deals with the situation where a 
party is effectively prevented from presenting his case. If a party was 
unable to present his case due to personal reasons or "could have 
avoided the situation, he should not be given an opportunity to set the 
award aside' : 55 The provision obviously has a considerable degree of 
affinity with Article 18, which establishes the fundamental principle that 
the parties should be treated equally and each given a full opportunity to 
present his case. Yet a decision that the wording of Article 34(2)(a)(ii) 
should be aligned with Article 18656 was later reversed as it was 
regarded as more important to align Article 34 with Article 36. and thus 
Article V of the New York Convention than with Article 18.657 It is 
perhaps worth recalling that by virtue of Article 18, unequal treatment of 
the parties or the failure to allow one party to present his case will 
always be a ground on which the award may be set aside, whatever else 
happens or may be agreed. Thus the waiver principle cannot preclude an 
award being set aside on the grounds of a breach of Article 18, even 
though it might prevent the setting aside of the award in relation to 
minor procedural defects. 658 
654 Davidson, Fraser P., Arbitration, Edinburgh: W. Green, 2000,369. 
655 U. N. A/CN. 9/SR. 317, paras 39,40. 
656 U. N. A/40/17, para. 287. 
657 U. N. A/40/17, para. 302. 
658 Davidson, Fraser P., Arbitration, Edinburgh: W. Green, 2000,372. 
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1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not literally state that an award may be set 
aside on the ground that the application was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case. However, these are serious 
irregularities and s. 68(l) indicates that a party to the arbitral proceedings 
may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the 
court challenging an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious 
irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award. Section 
68(2) then specifies what is meant by serious irregularity. One should 
always bear in mind that it is a requirement under this section that an 
irregularity has caused or is likely to cause substantial injustice to the 
applicant, although the use of the word "irregularity" might suggest that 
something less than a major failure in procedure or error in the award is 
sufficient. Section 68(2)(a) refers to failure by the tribunal to comply 
with s. 33 (general duty of tribunal) to give the parties a reasonable 
opportunity to put their case, while s. 68(2)(c) refers to failure by the 
tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure 
agreed by the parties. It follows that it is not enough that the arbitrator 
has conducted the proceedings in a fashion which has caused one of the 
parties to lose faith in him. 659 Moreover, if the arbitrators have made 
their award, further evidence is not admissible as the arbitrators are 
functus, but if the award has not been made and it remains possible for 
659 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,16-18. 
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the late evidence to be heard, failure to allow its admission may amount 
to failure to give a party an opportunity to present his case660 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, as regards domestic awards, 
the fact that the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration 
procedure is contrary to the legal procedure is a ground for challenge. 
As regards foreign-related awards, Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure 
Law specifies exactly the same ground as Article 34(2)(a)(ii). Thus, 
there is no need for Chinese arbitration law to be amended. 
Beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration 
Model Law. Article 34 (2) (iii) states that the award deals with a dispute 
not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, 
only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not 
submitted to arbitration may be set aside. If only part of the award 
exceeds the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, only that part need be set 
661 
aside, provided it is separable from the rest of the award. Once again 
the waiver principle would apply here. 
660 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,16-18. 
661 See (1983) 8 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 386. 
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1996 Act. Section 68(2)(b) provides that the tribunal exceeding its 
powers (otherwise than ' by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction) is a 
ground of challenge. Matters which might fall within s. 68(2)(b) include 
any exercise of interlocutory powers (eg, the power to order security for 
costs) which the parties have agreed the arbitrators are not to possess. 662 
Chinese Law. Article 58(2) of the Chinese arbitration law and Article 
260 (4) of the Civil Procedural Law provide that an award may be 
challenged on the ground that the matters of the award are beyond the 
extent of the arbitration. However, there is no provision in Chinese 
arbitration law dealing with the situation in which the tribunal exceeds 
its powers. I suggest that the Chinese Arbitration Law should adopt the 
legislative approach of the 1996 Act and make this a ground for 
challenging awards in the future amendment. 
Composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was 
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or with law 
Model Law Article 34(2)(a)(iv) indicates as a ground of challenge that 
the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not 
in. accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement 
was in conflict with a provision of this Law from which the parties 
662 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,16-18. 
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cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with 
this Law. The text of the provision does not clearly reflect the Working 
Group's decision that an award should be subject to setting aside not 
only if the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure 
is not in accordance with any agreement of the parties, but also if such 
composition or procedure, while in accordance with such agreement, 
violates mandatory provision of the Model Law. The text says that if the 
parties' agreement conflicts with mandatory provisions of the Model 
Law, non-observance of the agreement is not a ground for setting aside, 
but does not say that observance of such a conflicting agreement is a 
ground for setting aside. 663 Yet this is undoubtedly the intent of the 
provision. The travaux pr 6 paratoires explain that 664: "where the 
agreement (of the parties) was in conflict with a mandatory provision of 
this law or where the parties had not made an agreement on the 
procedural point at issue, the provisions of `this law' whether mandatory 
or not, provided the standards against which the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure were to be measured. ". The. 
Model Law is an example of poor and obscure drafting in this respect, 
and hardly provides a model to be emulated. 
1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not employ the same words as the Model 
663 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,212. 
664 U. N. A/40/17, para. 290. 
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Law But the combined effect of S. 68(2)(a) which provides that failure 
by the tribunal to comply with s. 33 -the general duty of the tribunal) to 
adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the case avoiding 
unnecessary delay or expense is a ground of challenge and s. 68(2)(c) 
which provides that failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in 
accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties is a ground is as the 
same as that ofArticle 34(2)(a)(iv). 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law simply provides that the party 
may challenge an award on the ground that the composition of the 
arbitration tribunal or the arbitral procedure is contrary to the law. Since 
Chinese arbitration law and the CIETAC Arbitration Rules allow the 
parties to make their own agreement as to the composition of tribunal 
and arbitral proceedings, I suggest that the law should also provide as a 
ground of challenge that the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral 
procedure is contrary to the parties' agreement, making it plain that if 
the agreement conflicts with mandatory law, non-observance of the 
agreement is not a ground for setting aside while that observance of such 
an agreement is a ground for setting aside. 
Non-arbitrability 
Model Law. Article 34(2)(b)(i) provides that an award may be set aside 
if the court finds that the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of 
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, 
settlement by arbitration under the law of this State. It is important to 
remember that in terms of Article 34 (1) the only recourse against an 
award is via an application to set it aside, so that the court may not 
intervene unless such an application has been made. 665 
1996 Act. The 1996 Act does not literally state that non-arbitrability is a 
ground for challenging, but it is assumed that non-arbitrability would 
fall within the scope of lack of substantive jurisdiction. The 1996 Act 
does not divide the grounds of challenging into two types, and any 
ground must be proved by the applicant. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not directly state 
non-arbitrability as a ground for challenging awards. Yet, Chinese 
arbitration law provides that if a dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration, the arbitral agreement is invalid666, and the invalidity of an 
arbitral agreement is a ground of challenge. Chinese arbitration law 
clearly provides which kinds of disputes cannot be referred to 
arbitration667. So I consider it would not be too hard for the applicant to 
prove non-arbitrability. Therefore, it is no need to amend the provision 
of Chinese arbitration law. 
665 U. N. A/CN. 9/SR. 318, paras 7,8. 
666 Article 17 (a) of the Arbitration Law. 
667 The following disputes shall not be submitted to arbitration: 1. disputes over marriage, adoption, 
guardianship, child maintenance and inheritance. and 2. administrative disputes falling within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant administrative organs according to law. 388 
Conflict with public policy 
Model Law. Article 34(2)(b)(ii) indicates that an award may be set aside 
if the court finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of 
this State. As to the question whether conflict with public policy covered 
all the stages in the arbitral proceedings during which irregularities 
might have occurred, the relevant portion of the Commission Report 
reads as follows: 
"It was understood that the term `public policy', which was used in the 
1958 New York Convention and many other treaties, covered 
fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive as well as 
procedural respects. Thus, instances such as corruption, bribery and 
fraud and similar serious cases would constitute a ground for setting 
aside. It was noted, in that connection, that the wording `the award is in 
conflict with the public policy of the State" was not to be interpreted as 
excluding instances or events relating to the manner in which an award 
was arrived at". 668 
1996 Act. By virtue of s. 68(2)(g), it is a ground for challenge that the 
award or the way in which it was procured was contrary to public policy. 
Unlike the Model Law, in the 1996 Act this ground is not to be found by 
the court, but is required to be proved by the applicant. 
668 Doc. A/CN. 9/SR. 331, para. 297. 
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Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the award or the way in 
which it was procured being conflict with public policy is a ground for 
challenging awards, which shall be found by the court. In my opinion, it 
is better for this ground to be found by the court, rather than a party, as it 
might be difficult for the party to consider whether an award or the way 
in which it was made is conflict with public policy. Thus, Chinese 
arbitration law needs not to be amended. 
Failure to deal with all the issues 
Model Law. The Model Law does not provide failure to deal with all 
the issues that were put to it as a ground for challenging an award, 
although a procedure exists under Article 33(3) whereby a party may 
apply to the tribunal for an additional award to be made to cover the 
matters which were omitted. 
1996 Act. Section 68 (2) (d) states failure by the tribunal to deal with 
all the issues that were put to it as a ground of challenge. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not mention failure to deal 
with all the issues that were put to it. In my view, where issues are 
omitted from the award, the better approach is for the party, to be entitled 
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to apply to the arbitral tribunal for an additional award to cover the 
matters which were omitted, since there is no reason why the award 
need be set aside in such a case. 
Excess of powers by any arbitral institution or other person 
Model Law. The grounds for challenging awards in the Model Law 
does not include excess of powers by any arbitral or other institution or 
person vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings 
or the award exceeding its powers. 
1996 Act. Section 68 (2) (e) provides that excess of powers by any 
arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers 
in relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its powers is a 
ground for challenging awards. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law regards excess of powers by 
arbitration agency as a ground, without mentioning excess of powers by 
other arbitral institution or person. Since in Chinese arbitration law, the 
parties are not free to vest other institution or person with powers in 
relation to the proceedings or the award, there is no need for Chinese 
arbitration law to adopt the approach of the 1996 Act. 
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Uncertainty or ambiguity as to effect of award 
Model Law. Under the Model Law, uncertainty or ambiguity as to effect 
of awards is not a ground of challenge, although a procedure exists 
under Article 33(l)(b) whereby a party may apply to the tribunal for an 
interpretation of a specific part of the award. 
1996 Act. Under the 1996 Act, a party can challenge an award on the 
ground that uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award. 669 An 
award is not to be taken as too uncertain if the obligations of the parties 
are apparent from it. 670 Under s. 57(3) a party may apply to the arbitral 
tribunal to correct an award or to make an additional award so as to 
clarify or remove any ambiguity in the award. By virtue of s. 70(2) 
which provides that an application or appeal may not be brought if the 
applicant or appellant has not first exhausted an available recourse under 
section 57, the party shall first apply to the tribunal to correct an award 
or make an additional award before challenging an award before the 
court. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, uncertainty or ambiguity as 
effect of award is not a ground on which a party may challenge an award. 
In my view, it is beneficial for Chinese arbitration law to adopt the 
669 Section 68 (2) (f) of the 1996 Act. 
670 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,16-18. 
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instance of the 1996 Act and add this ground. 
Award being obtained by fraud 
Model law. Although the Model Law is apparently silent about the 
consequences of an award being obtained by fraud, such an award 
would certainly be open to challenge on the basis that it offended against 
public policy. 
1996 Act. Section 68 (2) (g) indicates that a party may challenge an 
11 award on the ground that the award is obtained by fraud. One obvious 
situation in which this head of serious irregularity would be applicable is 
where one of the parties has withheld evidence which is material to the 
award and which might, if disclosed, have produced a different result. 
The fact that evidence does subsequently become apparent is not enough 
for a finding that the award is obtained by fraud. What is required is 
fraudulent non-disclosure. 671 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, as regards domestic awards, a 
party may challenge an award on the ground that the evidence on which 
the award is based is falsified, or the other party has concealed evidence 
which is sufficient to affect the , impartiality of the award, or the 
arbitrator(s) has (have) demanded or accepted bribes, committed graft or 
671 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,16-18. 
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perverted the law in making the arbitral award. Yet, as regards 
foreign-related awards, Chinese arbitration law does not mention the 
ground that an award is obtained by fraud. I suggest that award being 
obtained by fraud should also be made a ground for challenging 
foreign-related awards. 
Failure to comply with requirement as to form of award 
Model Law. An award which is not in the form stipulated by Article 31 
is not an award at all in the eyes of the Model Law, and thus need not be 
challenged. 
1996 Act. Section 68 (2) (h) provides that a party may challenge an 
award on the ground that there is a failure to comply with the 
requirements as 'to the form of, the award. Such requirements may be 
agreed by the parties, or in the absence of agreement may flow from the 
default rules for the form of awards set out in s. 52 of the 1996 Act, 
which requires the awards to be signed, dated, containing a statement as 
to the seat of the arbitration and reasoned. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, failure to comply with 
requirements of form is not regarded as a ground for challenging awards. 
In my view, failure to comply with requirement as to form of the award 
could be amended in the stage of correction of an award, and no need to 
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regard it as a ground for challenging an award. Thus, it is not needed for 
Chinese arbitration law to adopt the stance of the 1996 Act. 
Irregularity admitted by the tribunal or any arbitral or other 
institution or person 
Model Law. The Model Law does not mention this ground. 
1996 Act. Section 68 (2) (i) states that a party may, challenge an award 
on the ground that there is any irregularity in the conduct of the 
proceedings or in the award which is admitted by the tribunal or by any 
arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers 
in relation to the proceedings or the award. It may be that this ground 
has a very limited role, as procedural errors in the conduct of the 
proceedings or in the format of the award are caught by the more 
specific earlier provisions of s 68 (2) of the Act. 672 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law is silent about this ground. Since, 
as mentioned above, Section 68 (2) (i) has very limited effect, and 
Chinese arbitration law does not allow the parties to vest other 
institution or person with powers in relation to arbitral proceedings or 
the award, Chinese arbitration law does not need to adopt the instance of 
the 1996 Act in this respect. 
672 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,17-18. 
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Appeal on point of law 
Model Law. Under the Model Law, a party is not entitled to challenge 
an award on a question of law. 
1996 Act. Section 69 (1) provides that unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other 
parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law 
arising out of an award made in the proceedings. An agreement to 
dispense with reasons for the tribunal's award shall be considered an 
agreement to exclude the court's jurisdiction under this section. It can be 
seen that the parties can agree to exclude the right of appeal. However, 
in relation to domestic arbitration agreements, exclusion agreements are 
ineffective unless entered into after the commencement of the arbitral 
process. 673 Consideration was given to the question of whether a right 
of appeal on the substantive issues should be preserved at all. The 
principle that the parties are free to agree how to resolve their dispute 
with minimum of court intervention would, prima facie, militate against 
a substantive appeal. From a commercial point of view, the possibility of 
long, drawn-out court proceedings involved in a substantive appeal 
might make the parties choose another arbitral forum. The rationale for a 
right of appeal on a point of law is that the parties cannot be taken to 
673 Section 87 of the 1996 Act. 
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have agreed that the tribunal would obviously misapply the relevant law. 
There is also a general interest in enabling a seriously doubtful decision 
to be reviewed. These are instances of safeguards, necessary in the 
public interest, that delimiting the freedom of the parties to choose their 
tribunal and abide by its decision. 674 Section 69 (2) states that an 
appeal shall not be brought except with the agreement of all the other 
parties to the proceedings, or with the leave of the court, which leave 
shall be given under s. 69(3) only if the court is satisfied- 
a. that the determination of the question will substantially affect the 
rights of one or more of the parties, 
b. that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine, 
c. that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award- 
(i) the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, or 
(ii) the question is one of general public importance and the decision of 
the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and 
d. that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by 
arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to 
determine the question. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, a party is not allowed to 
challenge an international or foreign-related award on the substantive 
674 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
3`d ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,254. 
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issues. 675 In my view, if substantive issues could be appealed, the scope 
of intervention of the court would be too great, even with the restrictions 
which are now built into the 1996 Act. English law is almost unique in 
allowing appeals on points of law. It has been driven to retain this 
possibility at least partly because of the pre-eminence of English 
commercial law, it being thought that dealing with appeals from arbitral 
awards permits the continued development of English commercial law. 
China dos not share this need, so that Chinese arbitration law does not 
need to adopt the approach of the 1996 Act. 
. 2. Procedure for Challenging awards 
Bringing forward of an application 
Model Law. There is no specific requirement as to bringing forward of 
an application under the Model Law. 
1996 Act. As to procedures for appeal on point of law, an appeal shall 
not be brought except with the agreement of all the other parties to the 
proceedings, or with the leave of the court. 676 
675 With respect of a domestic arbitration award, however, a party is allowed to present a challenge on 
the grounds of the errors of law or fact. See Article 58 of Arbitration Law of the PRC 1994 and 
Section 20 of the 'Interpretation of the SPC on Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC', Law 
Interpretation No. 7 (2006), Sept. 8,2006. 
676 Section 69 (2) of the 1996 Act. 
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Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not allow a party to 
challenge an award on point of law, so there is no need to consider what 
requirement shall be fulfilled to make such an appeal. 
Time limits 
Model Law. 
By virtue of Article 34 (3), an application for setting aside may not be 
made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party 
making that application had received that award or, if a request had been 
made under article 33 (which refers to the correction and interpretation 
of awards and the making of addition awards) from the date on which 
that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. The Model 
Law does not provide a time limit within which a court should make 
decision whether to set side an award. Remitting awards for 
reconsideration by the tribunal is not allowed under the Model Law, thus 
there is no time limit in this respect. 
1996 Act. Under s. 70(3), any application or appeal must be brought 
within 28 days of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral 
process of appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant 
was notified of the result of that process. Where only a part of the award 
is tainted by ambiguity, that part must be referred back in light of s. 57, ` 
and the remainder appealed immediately, and indeed the appeal is 
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governed by the 28-day time limit in s. 70(3). 677 By virtue of s. 80(5), 
the court has power to extend any time limit, but an application to the 
court for an extension must state the basis on which the applicant seeks 
an extension, and the respondent has seven days from service on him to 
file written evidence contesting the extension of time. 678 This power 
would be useful to overcome the difficulties arising form the tribunal 
exercising its power to withhold the award until payment, pursuant to s. 
56. If the award is not released until the time limit for challenge or 
appeal has expired, then an application to the court for an extension of 
time under s. 80(5) would be appropriate. However, where the 
difficulties have arisen because of the applicant's failure to pay for and 
collect the award promptly, the applicant will have a heavy burden 
placed upon him to justify his conduct and thus obtain an extension. 679 
Section 71(3) states that where the award is remitted to the tribunal, in 
whole or in part, for reconsideration, the tribunal shall make a fresh 
award in respect of the matters remitted within three months of the date 
of the order for remission or such longer or shorter period as the court 
may direct. One must also bear in mind that s. 79 gives the court power, 
unless the parties otherwise agree, to extend any time limit agreed by 
them in relation to any matter relating to the arbitral proceedings or 
677 Gbangbola v. Smith & Sheriff Ltd [1998] 3 All ER 730. 
678 CPR r 62.11. 
679 Harris, Bruce/Planterose, Rowan & Tecks, Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 
Yd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003,259. 
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specified in any provision having effect in default of such agreement. 680 
The 1996 Act does not provide any time limit for the court to make a 
decision whether to set aside an award. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not give the court power to 
extend the time limit for application. If the Chinese arbitration law does 
not adopt the approach of the 1996 Act to give the tribunal power to 
withhold awards, there is no need for Chinese arbitration law to give 
such power to the court. If Chinese arbitration law attempts to adopt that 
approach, it is suggested that the approach of giving the court power to 
extend the time limit should also be adopted. 
Exhausting available arbitral procedure 
Model Law. The Model Law does not require a party to exhaust 
available arbitral processes before challenging an award. 
1996 Act. Section 70(2) provides that an application or appeal may not 
be brought if the applicant or appellant has not first exhausted any 
available arbitral process of appeal or review, and any available recourse 
under s. 57 (correction of award or additional award). 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, there is no requirement that 
680 Section 79 (1) also provides that this section does not apply to a time limit to which section 12 
applies (power of court to extend time for beginning arbitral proceedings, & c. ). 
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arbitral process of appeal or review should be first exhausted. The 
reason of this lack is probably that no arbitral process of appeal or 
review is provided by the Chinese arbitral rules, including the CIETAC 
Rules. From my point of view, the Chinese arbitral rules should 
recognise arbitral processes of appeal or review, so that the will of the 
parties to refer the dispute to arbitration could be respected and the 
intervention of the court restricted. Moreover, where the seat of 
arbitration is within China, the parties may choose to apply a set of 
arbitral rules which is not Chinese. In such circumstances, if the rules 
chosen provide for a process of appeal or review, Chinese law's failure 
to require that such process be exhausted before an award may be 
challenged is unsatisfactory. Therefore, I suggest that the Arbitration 
Law adopts the stance of the 1996 Act in this matter. 
Ordering the tribunal to state reasons 
Model Law. The Model Law does not empower the court as described 
below. 
1996 Act. Section 70(4) states that if on an application or appeal it 
appears to the court that the award does not contain the tribunal's 
reasons, or does not set out the tribunal's reasons in sufficient detail to 
enable the court properly to consider the application or appeal, the court 
may order the tribunal to state the reasons for its award in sufficient 
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detail for that purpose. 
Chinese Law. Under Chinese arbitration law, the court has no power to 
order the tribunal to state reasons for that purpose. Since this power is 
mainly concerned with appeals on a point of law and the Chinese 
arbitration law does not allow an appeal on this ground, I suggest that 
there is no need for Chinese arbitration law to adopt this approach of the 
1996 Act in this regard. 
. Costs of application or appeal 
Model Law. Under the Model Law, the court has no power as described 
below. 
1996 Act. Section 70(6) states that the court may order the applicant or 
appellant to provide security for the costs of the application or appeal, 
and may direct that the application or appeal be dismissed if the order is 
not complied with. 
Chinese Law. Chinese arbitration law does not give the court the power 
to order an applicant or appellant to provide security' of cost of 
application or. appeal. In my view, ordering the applicant or appellant to 
provide such security could, to some extent, prevent or reduce abusive 
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applications or appeals. Therefore, Chinese arbitration law might 
beneficially adopt such power. 
Court s Decision 
Model Law. By virtue of Article 34, the court may set aside an award on 
the grounds provided by the Law. Also, the court may, where 
appropriate and so requested by a party, suspend the setting aside 
proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the 
arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to 
take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will eliminate 
the grounds for setting aside . 
681 This power can only be exercised if a 
party. so requests. 
1996 Act. As to challenge of lack of substantive jurisdiction, the court 
may under s. 67(3) confirm the award, vary the award, or set aside the 
award in whole or in part. As to challenge of serious irregularity 
affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award, the court may under 
s. 68(3) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for 
reconsideration, or set the award aside in whole or in part, or declare the 
award to be of no effect, in whole or in part. The court shall not exercise 
its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in whole 
or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the 
681 Article 34 (4) of the Model Law. 
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matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration. Assuming that 
some action is to be taken, the main objection to setting aside, as 
opposed to remission, is that the parties are put to the expense of a full 
rehearing of their dispute. In a number of situations set out in s. 68(2), 
remission of the award to the arbitrators is the obvious remedy, e. g., 
where the award is incomplete or uncertain or ambiguous, or does not 
comply with statutory or agreed requirements of form, or where there 
is an admitted error in the award. Setting aside the award may, however, 
be the only sensible option in exceptional' circumstances where the 
serious irregularity relates to the conduct of the proceedings and further 
aggravating circumstances render remission inappropriate. 682 Setting 
aside the award does not affect the validity of the original arbitration 
agreement between the parties, nor does it automatically operate to 
affect the status of the existing arbitrators. 683 Where an award has been 
remitted, the hearing will generally take place before all of the original 
arbitrators. 684 Even if there is reason to doubt the ability of the existing 
arbitrators to reach a fair decision, the court has no jurisdiction under the 
1996 Act to remit the award to a fresh panel. The effect of a remission is . 
not to impose upon the arbitrators the obligation to make a fresh award 
even in respect of the matters not remitted to him. As to appeal on point 
682 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,18-19. 
683 Merkin, Robert & Lyde, Barlow & Gilbert. Arbitration Law. London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing, 1991,18-20. 
684 This applies even where the original award was reached by a majority decision: Richard Clear& 
Co Ltd v. Bloch (1922) 13 L1 LR 462. 
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of law, the court may under s. 69(7) confirm the award, vary the award, 
remit the award to the tribunal in whole or in part for reconsideration in 
the light of the court's determination, or set aside the award in whole or 
in part. Again, the court shall not exercise its power to set aside an 
award, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be 
inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for 
reconsideration. The decision of the court on an appeal on point of law 
shall be treated as a judgment of the court for the purposes-of a further 
appeal. 685 The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a 
decision of the court regarding all kinds of challenge of awards. 686 In 
light of s. 71(2), where the award is varied, the variation has effect as 
part of the tribunal's award. In light of s. 71(4), where the award is set 
aside or declared to be of no effect, in whole or in part, the court may 
also order that any provision that an award is a condition precedent to 
the bringing of legal proceedings in respect of a matter to which the 
arbitration agreement applies, is of no effect as regards the subject 
matter of the award or, as the case may be, the relevant part of the 
award. 
Chinese Law. In Chinese arbitration law, the court has power to confirm, 
set aside, or remit an award for reconsideration by the arbitral tribunal. 
685 Section 69 (8) of the 1996 Act. 
686 Section 67 (4), section 68 (4), section 69 (6) of the 1996 Act. 
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The court is not allowed by the Chinese law to vary a challengeable 
award. From my point of view, giving the court power to vary an award 
would allow too much scope for court intervention. Moreover, since the 
court can remit an award to be reconsidered by the arbitral tribunal, I 
consider there is no need to allow the court to vary an award. The 
Chinese Arbitration Law does not mention whether the party can appeal 
a decision of the court regarding challenge of awards, but certain legal 
explanations of the Supreme Court deal with the issue. `The Supreme 
Court's reply about whether a party could appeal against the decision of 
the court as to set aside an award or dismissal of an application for 
setting an award aside'687states that the party is not allowed to appeal 
against the court's decision on this issue. `The Supreme Court's reply 
about whether the court shall accept an application for appeal against the 
court's decision as to setting an award aside' provides that where the 
court orders an award to be set aside, if the party appeals to the court, 
the court shall dismiss the application. 688 Giving parties the right to 
appeal against the court's decision may protect their legal interests. 
However, in China arbitration is under-developed, so such right is very 
likely to be abused, while the finality and efficiency of arbitration will 
be adversely affected. Therefore, considering the stage of the 
development of Chinese arbitration, I suggest Chinese arbitration law 
681 See Law Reply [1997] No. 5, April 23d, 1997; 
688 See the `Official and Written Reply to the Matter on whether the People's Court Accepts the 
Petition for Re-hearing Presented by the Party who is not subject to the Ruling of the People's Court 
on Setting Aside an Arbitration Award' by the SPC, Law Interpretation No. 6 (1999), Jan. 29,1999. 
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does not give parties the right to appeal against the court's decision as to 
setting aside an award. 
C. Resisting Enforcement 
Grounds for Resisting Enforcement 
The grounds for resisting enforcement under the Model Law are 
identical to the grounds for setting it aside, both being based on the 
grounds for resisting enforcement under the New York Convention. 
Since the United Kingdom and China are both parties to the New York 
Convention, the law in the two systems, being based on the New York 
Convention, are identical. Thus, the grounds for resisting enforcement of 
awards in the three laws are identical, and no amendment should be 
made to this part of Chinese arbitration law. 
IV. Conclusion 
It has been suggested that Chinese arbitration law should adopt some of 
the grounds for challenging an award contained in the 1996 Act, such as 
the tribunal's failure to deal with all the issues put to it, uncertainty or 
ambiguity as to the effect of an award, and an award being obtained by 
fraud. Secondly, if Chinese arbitration law adopts the, approach of the 
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1996 Act in giving tribunals power to withhold awards, it is suggested 
that the approach of giving the court power to extend time limits should 
also be adopted, so as to avoid the problem of awards being released 
after the time limits for challenges or appeals have expired. Thirdly, 
Chinese arbitration law should adopt the stance of the 1996 Act and give 
the court power to order the tribunal to state the reasons for its award in 
sufficient detail, to allow the court to consider properly applications or 
appeals. Finally, the 1996 Act gives the court power to order the 
applicant or appellant to provide security for the costs of applications or 
appeals. Chinese arbitration law should confer such power to help 




It can be seen from the thesis that many provisions of Chinese 
Arbitration Law and the CIETAC Rules 2005 are far from perfect. In 
some areas, the level of judicial control is too high, while in some other 
areas the level of courts support is insufficient. Moreover, agencies of 
the state play a very intrusive role in the arbitral process. As a result, the 
independence of the arbitral tribunal and the efficiency of the arbitral 
process may be adversely affected, while the autonomy of the parties 
might not be properly respected. Additionally, many provisions are 
obscure or contradictory. Such defects would tend to make parties lose 
confidence in the Chinese system and choose an alternative arbitral 
forum to the detriment of China's developing trade relations. Therefore, 
to give the parties, particularly foreign users, confidence in the Chinese 
system, reform is vital. Through comparing the Model Law and the 1996 
Act with Chinese arbitration law, I suggested that Chinese law be 
reformed as follows - 
First, regarding the nature and form of the arbitration agreement, the 
requirement of Chinese arbitration law that parties choose an arbitration 
agency to regulate the arbitration has two main disadvantages. It 
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prevents ad hoc arbitration, while imposing on both the arbitral tribunal 
and the court a heavy burden to examine the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. I suggest that Chinese arbitration law should abandon this 
requirement. At the same time Chinese arbitration law requires that 
arbitration agreements be in writing, but is not clear as to what 
constitutes "writing". This problem could be removed if China simply 
abandons requirement of writing. 
Secondly, regarding the staying of legal proceedings, if China adopts 
the principle of Competence-competence, Chinese law should require 
the court to stay its proceedings, rather than dismiss the action, where a 
challenge to the tribunal's competence is made. The courts in this 
context should have discretion whether to examine the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. 
Thirdly, regarding the creation of the arbitral tribunal, Chinese law 
should provide for the situation where the arbitral tribunal is to consist 
of an even number of arbitrators and appointment procedures have 
broken down. Moreover, Chinese law might make an arbitrator's lack of 
agreed qualifications a ground for both removing arbitrators and 
challenging awards, and in this context the arbitration commission 
should be given the power to revoke the appointments already made. 
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Fourthly, regarding the revocation of arbitral authority and its 
consequences, in Chinese arbitration law, the court does not play a role 
in the challenge procedure and in most cases the Chairman of the 
arbitral agency shall make rule on the challenge, his decision being final. 
Where the challenge is unsuccessful, the challenging party therefore has 
no recourse. Chinese law should permit the court to review the 
Chairman's decision and provide necessary supervision of the arbitral 
process. Also the law should specify grounds on which the court may 
remove the arbitrator. The parties should have the power to agree 
whether a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed, and, where a new 
tribunal is constituted, whether the previous proceeding shall stand. 
Obvious gaps in the Chinese law should be filled, as to such matters as 
the liabilities and entitlement to fees of an arbitrator who resigns, the 
effect of the death of an arbitrator or the person who appointed him, and 
the effect of an arbitrator's ceasing to hold his position on any 
appointment made by him. 
Fifthly, regarding arbitral immunity, arbitrators should be liable for 
damages in negligence like other providers of professional services. 
However, it should be possible for arbitrators to be granted immunity 
from suit by agreement with the parties. In the situations where there is 
no such agreement, a party should be obliged to provide security before 
bringing an action against an arbitrator. 
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Sixthly, As regards questions of jurisdiction, the principles of 
competence-competence and separability should be adopted, and should 
be regarded as mandatory and interdependent. Chinese law should offer 
clarification as to how jurisdictional objections should be raised and the 
stage at which this should be done. 
Seventhly, as regards the conduct of the proceeding, Chinese arbitration 
law should permit the parties to preclude the arbitral tribunal from 
collecting evidence on its own initiative. It might be useful to give the 
court the power to collect evidence, subject to the agreement of the 
parties. However, the tribunal should be given power to order interim 
measures of protection, and the court should be able to enforce with the 
peremptory orders of the tribunal. 
Eightly, As to the arbitral award, Chinese law might require that the 
tribunal should conciliate only if both parties desire it, or one party so 
desires and the other party agrees. Moreover, the tribunal should be able 
to interpret ambiguities in an award unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties. The court might be allowed to extend the periods within which 
an arbitral award, or an application for correction or an actual correction, 
may be made. As far as enforcement is concerned, the court should be 
allowed not only to enforce an award in the same manner as a judgment, 
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but also issue a judgment in terms of the award. The arbitral tribunal 
might be given power to withhold an arbitral award in case of 
non-payment of fees, while the court should be able to order the tribunal 
to deliver the award on the payment into court by the applicant. 
Finally, as regards challenging awards, the Chinese arbitration law 
should add new grounds for challenging an award, i. e. the tribunal's 
failure to deal with all the issues put to it, uncertainty or ambiguity as to 
the effect of an award, and an award being obtained by fraud. If the 
law gives tribunals power to withhold awards, it might also give the 
court power to extend time limits within which challenges should be 
made. The court should have power to order the tribunal to state the 
reasons for its award in sufficient detail, and to order the applicant or 
appellant to provide security for the costs of applications or appeals. 
It is suggested that if Chinese arbitration law is reformed as described 
above, it will achieve an appropriate balance between the autonomy of 
the arbitral process and the legitimate interests of the Chinese legal 
system. Thus China would become a modern, attractive arbitral forum, 
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